Press Releases

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, released the following statement regarding the Commerce Department’s agreement with ZTE:

“It is the unanimous conclusion of our nation’s intelligence community that ZTE poses a significant threat to our national security. These concerns aren’t new; back in 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a report on the serious counterintelligence concerns associated with ZTE equipment. 

“It’s not only that ZTE was busted for evading sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and then lied about it; It’s that ZTE is a state-controlled telecommunications company that poses significant espionage risks, which this agreement appears to do little to address.” 

 

###

 

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today released the following statement:

“We are troubled to hear of the charges filed against a former member of the Committee staff. While the charges do not appear to include anything related to the mishandling of classified information, the Committee takes this matter extremely seriously. We were made aware of the investigation late last year, and have fully cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice since then. Working through Senate Legal Counsel, and as noted in a Senate Resolution, the Committee has made certain official records available to the Justice Department.

“This news is disappointing, as the former staffer in question served on the Committee for more than three decades, and in the Armed Forces with distinction. However, we trust the justice system to act appropriately and ensure due process as this case unfolds. This will in no way interfere with our ongoing investigation, and the Committee remains committed to carrying out our important work on behalf of the American people.”

 

###

WASHINGTON –U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, today sent letters to Twitter and Google parent company Alphabet, requesting information about any data sharing agreements between the companies and Chinese vendors. The letter follows a disclosure earlier this week by Facebook that the company has partnerships with Chinese telecom companies including Huawei that allow them to access Facebook users’ non-public data. 

“Since at least October 2012, when the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released its widely-publicized report, the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and equipment makers like Huawei and ZTE has been an area of national security concern. Since then, numerous articles in the tech trade press have focused on concerns by American and allied intelligence agencies that products from Chinese device makers, such as Lenovo, have security vulnerabilities that could allow Chinese intelligence to access data stored on, or transmitted by, devices.  And the New York Times reported in 2016 that firmware found in low-end smartphone devices, such as those of Huawei and ZTE, continually transmitted local data to Chinese severs, potentially for foreign intelligence purposes,” Sen. Warner wrote to the two companies today. 

It is publicly known that Alphabet has entered into strategic partnerships with Chinese mobile device manufacturers, including Huawei and Xiaomi, as well as with Chinese technology platform Tencent. In light of Facebook’s recent revelations, Sen. Warner requested that the company provide information about those partnerships, as well as any other agreements that Alphabet may have entered into with third-party vendors based in China. A similar request was posed to Twitter. 

Sen. Warner’s letter to Alphabet CEO Larry Page is available here. His letter to Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey is available here.  

###

Washington, DC – Today, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) sent a letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and FBI Director Christopher Wray requesting that the Department of Justice confirm that they have not given the President’s outside counsel, White House staff or the President access to the same classified information briefed to Congress. 

“We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities,” the Members wrote in the letter. “These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power.”

In the letter, Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff also request confirmation that the DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information to the same individuals in the future outside of appropriate judicial proceedings, and that going forward, the DOJ will not brief additional Members of Congress beyond the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

After the May 24 briefing to the “Gang of 8,” Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff released the following statement: “Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

 

***

 

The full letter is below:

 

Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Director Wray:

 

We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities.     

 

Most recently, Rudy Giuliani, one of the President’s personal attorneys, repeated publicly that the White House and the President’s lawyers expect access to classified information of the utmost sensitivity related to the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation. Executive agencies earlier had briefed this information to select Members of Congress in response to a publicly-announced directive from President Trump.  Giuliani also said that the President will refuse to be interviewed by the Special Counsel, unless the President’s attorneys are permitted to review related classified documents.

 

These demands, if fulfilled, would grossly violate our system of checks and balances, established procedure and fundamental norms. Although he has not been indicted, President Trump’s own conduct reportedly remains under examination by the Special Counsel. And absent an indictment, the subjects of federal investigation cannot access law enforcement or related national security information for any reason.

 

As the President’s attorney has made clear, his legal team wishes to obtain the classified information at issue, not for any legitimate purpose—but instead to frustrate and discredit publicly the work of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  

 

These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s personal or political benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power. 

 

We thus respectfully request that the Department of Justice confirm, in writing, by no later than 5 p.m. on Monday, June 11:  

 

(1)   that the following parties have not been given access to the classified information, which executive branch agencies briefed to the “Gang of 8” on May 24, 2018:

 

·         Rudy Giuliani, Jay Sekulow, or any other attorney who represents or has represented President Trump in his personal capacity;

 

·         White House staff, including attorneys from the White House Counsel’s office;

 

·         President Donald J. Trump;

 

(2)   that DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information in the future to the President and his attorneys outside of an appropriate judicial proceeding; and

 

(3)   that going forward, DOJ and FBI will not brief additional Members of Congress who are not part of the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

 

Thank you for your immediate attention to our concerns, which are of the utmost urgency.  We look forward to your reply. 

 

Sincerely,

 

NANCY PELOSI

House Democratic Leader

CHUCK SCHUMER

Senate Democratic Leader

ADAM SCHIFF

Ranking Member, House Intelligence Committee 

MARK WARNER

Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee 

 

###

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, released the following statement regarding the Trump administration’s deal on ZTE:

“This would be a big mistake. President Trump should listen to the advice of his intelligence leaders, who have unanimously said that ZTE poses a national security threat to the United States.” 

 

###

Washington, D.C. –U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), and Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA) released the following joint statement regarding their Gang of Eight briefing with the Justice Department:

“Today’s Gang of Eight briefing was conducted to ensure protection of sources and methods.

“Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

 

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the following statement:

“The Gang of Eight exists in custom and in law to ensure that Congress can oversee intelligence matters without putting sensitive sources and methods at risk. If there is a clear and compelling need to brief Congress on sensitive intelligence matters, it should be handled through the Gang of Eight. The White House’s plan to provide a separate briefing for their political allies demonstrates that their interest is not in informing Congress, but in undermining an ongoing criminal investigation. 

“If they insist upon carrying out this farce, the White House and its Republican allies in the House will do permanent, longstanding damage to the practice of bipartisan congressional oversight of intelligence. They will also be sending a terrible message to anyone who works in or with our nation’s intelligence community that the White House will always prioritize partisan politics over protecting the people who help keep this country safe.” 

###

 

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) joined a group of bipartisan Senators in sending a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin, the Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, and the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, urging the Administration to protect national security interests when negotiating the U.S.-China trade relationship. This comes after President Trump has publicly pledged to lift a seven-year ban on American firms doing business with Chinese telecom company ZTE.

“There can be no question that China seeks to surpass the U.S. both economically and militarily and become the world’s foremost superpower, and neither the Federal Government nor private U.S. companies should aid and abet that effort,” the Senators wrote.  “As such, we implore you to reject any proposal to soften restrictions on the transfer to China of U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies, including semiconductors." 

“We urge you not to compromise lawful U.S. enforcement actions against serial and pre-meditated violators of U.S. law, such as ZTE.  This is particularly critical when the violators are state-owned and -influenced, part and parcel of China’s policies and practices designed to strengthen its own national security innovation base, and essential tools of efforts to spread China’s influence in other countries that pose national security threats to the United States. Export control and sanctions laws should not be negotiable, because fidelity to the rule of law is a key part of what distinguishes the U.S. from a country like China that is ruled by a Communist dictatorship,” the Senators concluded.

As the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Warner has publicly voiced his concern that rolling back trade restrictions on Chinese telecom company ZTE would pose significant national security risks to the United States. Last week, Sen. Warner joined a group of 34 Senators urging President Trump not reverse trade restrictions on ZTE. 

In addition to Sen. Warner, the letter was signed by Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), John Cornyn (R-TX), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Marco Rubio (R-FL), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Steve Daines (R-MT), Susan Collins (R-ME), Mike Rounds (R-SD), John Thune (R-SD), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Roy Blunt (R-MO), Bob Casey (D-PA), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Ben Sasse (R-NE), Joe Manchin (D-WV), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Jack Reed (D-RI), Bill Nelson (D-FL), David Perdue (R-GA), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tom Cotton (R-AR), Kamala Harris (D-CA), and Angus King (I-ME)

 

Full text of the letter can be found below.

 

The Honorable Steven Mnuchin        

Secretary of the Treasury             

U.S. Department of the Treasury   

1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW     

Washington, DC  20220              

 

The Honorable Wilbur Ross

Secretary of Commerce              

U.S. Department of Commerce

1401 Constitution Ave., NW     

Washington, DC  20230             

 

The Honorable Robert E. Lighthizer

U.S. Trade Representative

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

600 17th St., NW        

Washington, DC 20508

 

Dear Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Ross, and Ambassador Lighthizer:

 

As you work to secure a fair and equitable trading and investment relationship with China for the American people, we write to express serious concerns over reports that China, in the ongoing negotiations, is pushing for access to U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies.  We strongly support these critical negotiations to rebalance the U.S.-China economic relationship, but U.S. national security must remain the paramount consideration.  Therefore, we strongly urge you to reject any proposal by China to loosen existing restrictions on the export or other transfer of these sensitive U.S. technologies.  Any such move would bolster China’s aggressive military modernization and significantly undermine long-term U.S. national security interests.  

 

We agree with General Joe Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that within seven years, China will pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security of any nation.  Likewise, we concur with the Department of Defense’s most recent report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” which states that “China’s military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. military-technological advantages.  To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies . . . .  Several cases emerged in 2016 of China using its intelligence services, and employing other illicit approaches that violate U.S. laws and export controls, to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.” 

 

Clearly, the Chinese Communist Party regards these sensitive technologies as essential for China’s military modernization and is accelerating its efforts to acquire such technologies through both legal and illegal means, including cyber theft, civil-military integration policies, coercion through joint ventures with foreign companies, targeted investment, and exploitation of the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies.  We must guard against such efforts and remain vigilant in protecting our national security innovation base. 

 

As you know, export controls are designed to protect national security.  The relaxing of these or other technology transfer restrictions would directly contradict and undermine key parts of President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS).  The NSS states that, “China and Russia . . . are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime.  In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.”

 

There can be no question that China seeks to surpass the U.S. both economically and militarily and become the world’s foremost superpower, and neither the Federal Government nor private U.S. companies should aid and abet that effort.  As such, we implore you to reject any proposal to soften restrictions on the transfer to China of U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies, including semiconductors.  We do support a balanced and constructive relationship with China, but one that is clear-eyed about China’s predatory, comprehensive efforts to acquire sensitive technologies that would increase the risk China poses to the United States and our allies in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.  

 

In addition, we urge you not to compromise lawful U.S. enforcement actions against serial and pre-meditated violators of U.S. law, such as ZTE.  This is particularly critical when the violators are state-owned and -influenced, part and parcel of China’s policies and practices designed to strengthen its own national security innovation base, and essential tools of efforts to spread China’s influence in other countries that pose national security threats to the United States.  Export control and sanctions laws should not be negotiable, because fidelity to the rule of law is a key part of what distinguishes the U.S. from a country like China that is ruled by a Communist dictatorship. 

 

Thank you for your attention to these concerns. 

 

Sincerely,

 

 

CC:  The Honorable James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense

        The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State

         The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

 

###

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Warner (D-Va.), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, today requested three separate Inspector Generals open up probes into the Trump Administration’s failure to fully impose legally mandated sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). 

In a letter addressed to the Inspector Generals of the U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Intelligence Community, the senators listed a series of instances where the Trump administration’s mixed signals or inaction have resulted in flouting seven mandatory CAATSA provisions, despite clear evidence of sanctionable activity.

“In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent,” wrote the senators. “Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.” 

It has been ten months since Congress overwhelmingly passed CAATSA’s wide-ranging mandatory sanctions measures to hold Russia accountable for their destabilizing activities against our country and nations around the world. 

 

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

 

May 19, 2018

 

Mr. Steve A. Linick

Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors

U.S. Department of State

Office of Inspector General

1700 North Moore Street

Arlington, VA  22209

 

Mr. Eric M. Thorson

Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.  20220

 

Mr. Wayne A. Stone

Acting Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Investigations Division

Washington, D.C.  20511

 

 Dear Inspectors General Linick, Thorson, and Stone:

 

We are writing to request that you conduct a review of your respective department’s/community’s role in implementing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions law (CAATSA), signed by President Trump on August 2, 2017.  

 

Several mandatory provisions of the law have not been implemented by the administration, despite strong evidence that actions taken by or on behalf of the Russian government are in violation of the CAATSA sanctions law and applicable executive orders codified by CAATSA.  For example, the U.S. government released a joint statement on April 16, 2018 with British authorities that accused Russian government-backed hackers of conducting cyber attacks in other countries, including the U.S., which should trigger sanctions under Section 224 of CAATSA. Yet the administration has not imposed any such sanctions in response, nor has it issued waivers under this provision.  

 

Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then the administration did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.  This raises obvious questions about the provision of Russian technology or support to Syria in violation of Section 234 of the law.

 

Overall, CAATSA includes seven mandatory provisions (Sections 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233 and 234) which we believe merit further examination.    We also remain concerned that the administration has not formally determined whether individuals are conducting significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors under Section 231.   Without such determinations, it is impossible to ascertain whether individuals are substantially reducing significant transactions with these entities as outlined in the law.

 

In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions actions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent.  In general, with respect to mandatory measures, the President is required to make determinations in the event that he has established that sanctionable behavior has taken place, and then either impose sanctions or exercise a waiver.  We understand that only one determination, with respect to Section 224, has been made under new congressionally-mandated CAATSA sanctions since the law went into effect last August. 

 

As part of your respective reviews, we request that you address the following issues and make any necessary recommendations for improvement:

 

1.      Why have mandatory provisions of the law not been implemented, despite clear evidence of sanctions violations?

2.      What are the internal processes by which your respective agencies have contributed to the creation of Russia sanctions designation packages when CAATSA or applicable executive orders are violated?

3.      How has interagency coordination taken place with respect to CAATSA implementation, or other provisions of law or executive orders related to Russia, and is the inter-agency review process working as it should? 

4.      Are there obstacles in the inter-agency review process of which Congress should be made aware, as administration officials consider imposing additional sanctions on Russian actors consistent with current law?

 

Thank you for your consideration of our request.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

###

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on attempts to undermine the Special Counsel’s investigation:

“The first thing any new member of the Intelligence Committee learns is the critical importance of protecting sources and methods. Publicly outing a source risks not only their life, but the lives of every American, because when sources are burned it makes it that much harder for every part of the intelligence community to gather intelligence on those who wish to do us harm.

“It would be at best irresponsible, and at worst potentially illegal, for members of Congress to use their positions to learn the identity of an FBI source for the purpose of undermining the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in our election. Anyone who is entrusted with our nation’s highest secrets should act with the gravity and seriousness of purpose that knowledge deserves.”

 

###

WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, spoke on the floor of the U.S. Senate ahead of an expected vote to confirm Gina Haspel as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

“Gina Haspel is among the most qualified people to be nominated for the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. She’s served with the Agency for thirty three years, including tours as a case officer, four times as a station chief, the deputy chief of the National Resources Division, the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service, and currently as the Deputy Director of the Agency,” Sen. Warner said. “In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the Intelligence Community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm… I would also note that, as a Senator from Virginia, the home to thousands of CIA personnel, and the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have heard from many Agency officers, and for that matter, members of the rank and file of other Intelligence Community agencies. And almost to a person, this rank and file have supported her nomination.”

Sen. Warner also addressed concerns about Ms. Haspel’s participation in the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program.

“Let me be clear—this has not been an easy decision. Over the past several weeks I have held multiple meetings and calls with Ms. Haspel and many others about her record and her character. In our open committee hearing, I have raised questions about her involvement with the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program, and if she were to be confirmed, her willingness to push back if President Trump asked her to undertake any immoral, or legally questionable, activity… I strongly believe that we, as Americans, have a duty to look squarely at our mistakes, and to not sweep them under the rug, but to learn from them, and in the future do better,” said Sen. Warner. “Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President, who will speak truth to power if this President orders her to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. I believe this not just because she’s told me so, or because she wrote it in a letter, or even because she said it under oath in front of the committee. I believe it because I’ve heard it from people who worked with her and who have known her for years.” 

Concluded Sen. Warner, “I respect my colleagues who have made a different decision. This was not an easy choice. I too spent weeks working through it. But at the end of the day, and as we vote later this afternoon, I believe Gina Haspel should be confirmed. I look forward to supporting her, I look forward to her being a good Director of the CIA, and I look forward to her performance convincing those who could not support her today that her long-term value to our country will make our country safer and that she will act in accordance to the principles and values of our country.”

 

Below is the full text of his remarks:

 

Gina Haspel is among the most qualified people to be nominated for the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. She’s served with the Agency for thirty three years, including tours as a case officer, four times as a station chief, the deputy chief of the National Resources Division, the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service, and currently as the Deputy Director of the Agency.

 

In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the Intelligence Community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm.

 

In addition, while she’s not emphasized this, we should not overlook the historic nature of Ms. Haspel’s nomination as the first woman to be nominated as Director of the CIA. Seeing her portrait in the halls of the Agency next to the long line of former Directors will be a long overdue but important breakthrough for the Intelligence Community.

 

I would also note that, as a Senator from Virginia, the home to thousands of CIA personnel, and the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have heard from many Agency officers, and for that matter, members of the rank and file of other Intelligence Community agencies. And almost to a person, this rank and file have supported her nomination.

 

Let me be clear—this has not been an easy decision for me. Over the past several weeks I have held multiple meetings and calls with Ms. Haspel and many others about her record and her character. In our open committee hearing, I have raised questions about her involvement with the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program, and if she were to be confirmed her willingness to push back if President Trump asked her to undertake any immoral, or legally questionable, activity. 

 

I questioned her willingness to declassify to the extent possible more information about her background at the Agency.

 

I still wish more could be done to discuss her background in an open setting. The Agency just recently has declassified more information about her service with the Counter Terrorism Center. I thank them for that, but I still believe that it would have been preferable if we could have found a way to be even more transparent. If she’s confirmed as Director, I will encourage Ms. Haspel to keep this in mind.

 

To those here who have concluded that Ms. Haspel’s background with the RDI program should preclude her from leading the CIA. I respect their arguments, and I know the passion with which they put forward their position. I myself struggled with this point. 

 

Many people at the CIA participated in the program. They were told it was legal by the Justice Department and ordered by the President. But, some of the actions undertaken were repugnant and amounted to torture. 

 

Since those days, America’s had a long debate about the standards that we as a nation, can, and should, apply to the treatment of detainees, regardless of who they might be. That is why I was one of 17 cosponsors in the Senate of the McCain-Feinstein amendment to prohibit torture and to prohibit any interrogation technique not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual. That is why I voted to both approve and to declassify the Senate Intelligence Committee’s extensive study of the RDI program. 

 

I strongly believe that we, as Americans, have a duty to look squarely at our mistakes, and to not sweep them under the rug, but to learn from them, and in the future, to do better.

 

Nor do I believe that we can excuse torture or the way in which detainees – no matter who they were, or what crimes they were guilty of – were treated. We are better than that, and we need a CIA Director who will ensure – in an ironclad way – that we will never return to those dark days; that we will follow the law, as enacted by Congress.

 

This is why I have pushed Ms. Haspel, both in our hearing and in our private meetings on this very point—what is her view now of the RDI program? And how would she react if she were asked as Director to undertake something similar in the future?

 

In both our one-on-one meetings and in classified session before the Committee, I found Acting Director Haspel to be forthcoming regarding her views on the interrogation program. However, I thought it was important that she say this in public, not just privately, which is why I asked her to memorialize those comments in writing.

 

Gina Haspel wrote, “With the benefit of hindsight and my experience as a senior Agency leader, the enhanced interrogation program is not one the CIA should have undertaken.” I believe this is a clear statement of growth as a leader and learning from the mistakes of the past. And while I wish that she would be more forceful, I also understand her reluctance to condemn the many men and women at the Agency who thought they were doing the right thing at the time.

 

I first met Gina at one of her overseas postings. But I didn’t really get to work with her until this last year, when the former Director appointed her to be the Deputy Director of the Agency. Over this last year, I have found her to be professional and forthright with our Intelligence Committee.

 

I’ve had the ability to have candid, unfiltered discussions with her. Whether the challenge we confront is North Korea… ISIS terrorists… or the long-term challenge of countries like China and Russia, I will feel safer knowing that the CIA has Ms. Haspel at the helm.  

 

Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President, who will speak truth to power if this President orders her to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. 

 

I believe it because I’ve heard it from people who worked with her and who have known her for years. People we all know and trust—John Brennan, James Clapper, Leon Panetta, Jim Mattis, and many others who served presidents of both parties. Every one of them said they trusted her to push back on immoral, illegal, or just plain stupid orders from the President.

 

I furthermore believe that she is someone who will push back – and push back strongly – against any attempts by this President to undercut, denigrate, or ignore the professional men and women of CIA, and their responsibility, again, to speak truth to power whatever the political ramifications may be.

 

It is for these reasons that I am supporting Gina Haspel’s nomination to be Director of the CIA.

 

I respect my colleagues who have made a different decision. This was not an easy choice. I too spent weeks working through it. But at the end of the day, and as we vote later this afternoon, I believe Gina Haspel should be confirmed. I look forward to supporting her, I look forward to her being a good Director of the CIA, and I look forward to her performance convincing those who could not support her today that her long-term value to our country will our make our country safer and that she will act in accordance to the principles and values of our country.

 

###

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today announced Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gina Haspel, was favorably reported out of the Committee by a vote of 10-5 to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

“Gina Haspel is the most qualified person the President could choose to lead the CIA and the most prepared nominee in the 70 year history of the Agency,” said Chairman Richard Burr.  “She has acted morally, ethically, and legally, over a distinguished 30-year career and is the right person to lead the Agency into an uncertain and challenging future.  I’m pleased to see the Committee favorably report her nomination to the full Senate, and I look forward to her swift confirmation.”

“As Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel will be the first operations officer in more than five decades to lead the Agency. I believe that she will be a strong advocate for the Agency’s workforce, and an independent voice who can and will stand up on behalf of our nation’s intelligence community,” said Vice Chairman Mark Warner.  “Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President if ordered to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture.”

 

###

 

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-founder of the Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, released the following statement after the White House eliminated the role of Cybersecurity Coordinator on the National Security Council, a position created to harmonize the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity and digital warfare:  

“It’s frankly mindboggling that the Trump Administration has eliminated the top White House official responsible for a whole-of-government cyber strategy, at a time when the cyber threat to our nation is greater than ever. Our adversaries are investing heavily in 21st century cyber warfare capabilities, and if we only view national security through a conventional 20th century lens, we’re going to find ourselves unable to respond to increasingly asymmetric cyber threats down the road.”
 

###

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today held a closed hearing to complete its review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.”  The testimony of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of CIA John Brennan, and former Director of NSA Mike Rogers will inform the Committee’s final report on this “chapter” of its Russia inquiry.

Chairman Burr said, “The first task in our inquiry was to evaluate the Intelligence Community’s work on this important piece of analysis.  Committee staff have spent 14 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft, and analytic work, and we see no reason to dispute the conclusions.  There is no doubt that Russia undertook an unprecedented effort to interfere with our 2016 elections.  I look forward to completing the Committee’s inquiry and issuing our findings and recommendations to the American people.” 

“Despite the short time frame they had to prepare it, the intelligence community did a very good job with the ICA,” said Vice Chairman Warner.“After a thorough review, our staff concluded that the ICA conclusions were accurate and on point. The Russian effort was extensive, sophisticated, and ordered by President Putin himself for the purpose of helping Donald Trump and hurting Hillary Clinton. In order to protect our democracy from future threats, we must understand what happened in 2016. And while our Committee’s investigation remains ongoing, one thing is already abundantly clear – we have to do a better job in the future if we want to protect our elections from foreign interference.”

Today’s closed hearing is a bookend to the hearing the Committee held in January 10, 2017, on Russian Active Measures.  Staff will finalize this chapter of the report on the Intelligence Community’s work and submit it for a classification review. 

 

###

WASHINGTON – During a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today to consider the nomination of Bill Evanina to serve as the nation’s top counterintelligence official, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), the Committee’s Vice Chairman, voiced concern that rolling back trade restrictions on Chinese telecom company ZTE would pose significant national security risks to the United States.

In recent days, President Trump has publicity expressed his desire to reverse trade restrictions placed on the company for violating sanctions on Iran and North Korea. 

“On the question of counterintelligence with China, a number of members of this committee have raised concerns about certain Chinese telecom companies and their penetration into the American market. I was actually pleased that the President acted on one of those companies, ZTE. Now it appears that that is simply a bargaining chip in negotiations with China. I don’t think that is the appropriate way,” said Sen. Warner during the nomination hearing. 

“If this is a security threat, then it is a security threat and needs to be dealt with as such — not as a bargaining chip in greater trade negotiations,” added Sen. Warner.

On Sunday, May 13 Trump tweeted, “President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done!” The next day, Trump followed with another tweet: “ZTE, the large Chinese phone company, buys a big percentage of individual parts from U.S. companies. This is also reflective of the larger trade deal we are negotiating with China and my personal relationship with President Xi.”

Earlier today, Sen. Warner joined a group of 34 Senators urging President Trump not to reverse trade restrictions on ZTE.

 

###

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, announced today that he will support the nomination of Gina Haspel to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 

“Gina Haspel has served our country with dedication for 33 years. In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the intelligence community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm.  

“Over the last year I’ve had the opportunity to work with Ms. Haspel in her role as Deputy Director, and I have always found her to be professional and forthright with the Intelligence Committee. Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President if ordered to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. 

“I acknowledge that this has been a difficult decision. There are valid questions that have been raised regarding the Acting Director’s record, and I have been frank with Ms. Haspel that I wish she had been more open with the American public during this process. However, in both our one-on-one meetings and in classified session before the Committee, I found Acting Director Haspel to be more forthcoming regarding her views on the interrogation program, which is why I asked her to memorialize those comments in writing. I also take to heart the strong support Ms. Haspel has among rank-and-file members of the intelligence community and from intelligence community leaders who served under President Obama. 

“I’m going to support Gina Haspel’s nomination to be Director of the CIA. I also respect my colleagues who have made a different decision.

“If she is confirmed, the Senate Intelligence Committee will continue to conduct thorough and vigorous oversight over the nation’s intelligence agencies.”
 

###

 

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) joined a group of 33 Senators calling on the Trump Administration to put American jobs and national security ahead of China. The Senators wrote a letter to the Administration in response to President Trump’s announcement that he has directed the Department of Commerce to look at easing penalties imposed on China-based company ZTE for violations that include selling sensitive U.S. technologies to Iran and North Korea in violation of U.S. sanctions laws.

“Offering to trade American sanctions enforcement to promote jobs in China is plainly a bad deal for American workers and for the security of all Americans,” the Senators wrote. “American workers and companies confront rampant theft of U.S. intellectual property, agricultural policies that disadvantage American farmers, restrictions on market access for U.S. service providers and manufacturers, and mercantilist industrial policies that have cost U.S. workers their jobs.  America’s policies toward China should put American workers, farmers and businesses first, not China’s.”

“We urge you to focus on identifying effective strategies to reshape China’s policy approach in each of these areas, such as through enforceable commitments to eliminate forced technology transfer policies, market distorting subsidies, data localization policies, and foreign investment restrictions, and ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment of U.S. firms in regulatory and other proceedings. Above all, we urge you to remain steadfast in enforcing America’s laws,” the Senators concluded.  

In addition to Sens. Warner and Kaine, the letter was signed by Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Tom Carper (D-DE), Bob Casey (D-PA) , Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Joe Donnelly (D-IN), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Ed Markey (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Tina Smith (D-MN), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Tom Udall (D-NM), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI). 

The full text of the letter can be found below:

Dear Mr. President:

Your recent remarks directing Secretary Ross to help ZTE – a Chinese company that has repeatedly sold sensitive U.S. technologies to Iran and North Korea in clear violation of American sanctions laws – call into grave doubt whether this administration will put American jobs and national security first.

If acted upon, your instruction would reverse a law enforcement decision by Secretary Ross to impose a seven-year denial of export privileges on ZTE, setting aside that decision made in the interests of U.S. national security to cushion the employment impact on the Chinese company.  ZTE not only violated US sanctions law but then repeatedly lied about steps it would take to remedy the problems. As Secretary Ross noted when he imposed the order, “ZTE made false statements to the U.S. Government when they were originally caught and put on the Entity List, made false statements during the reprieve it was given, and made false statements again during its probation. ZTE misled the Department of Commerce.  Instead of reprimanding ZTE staff and senior management, ZTE rewarded them. This egregious behavior cannot be ignored.” 

In addition to paying a fine of $1.2 billion, and pleading guilty to knowingly violating U.S. sanctions laws, ZTE agreed to a multi-year denial of export privileges, to be activated if any aspect of the agreement was not met and/or if the company committed additional violations of US export control regulations. Prompted by new violations, Commerce imposed the denial.

America’s national security must not be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations.  Offering to trade American sanctions enforcement to promote jobs in China is plainly a bad deal for American workers and for the security of all Americans. Bargaining away law enforcement power over bad actors such as ZTE undermines the historically sharp distinction between sanctions and export control enforcement and routine trade decisions made by the US.

Your order comes as your administration is in the midst of discussions with China to address China’s market-distorting policies and other tactics to undermine key American industries. Beyond appearing to risk American national security, the statement suggests that the administration is not serious about addressing the many economic challenges China presents.  The devastating effects of China’s trade policies are clear.  As your top trade negotiator recognized in his trade report on China less than six months ago, to address the “very serious and harmful problems generated by China’s trade regime”, China must “truly embrace a market-oriented approach, rooted in the fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency.”  There is no evidence that China has agreed to such a shift in approach.

American workers and companies confront rampant theft of U.S. intellectual property, agricultural policies that disadvantage American farmers, restrictions on market access for U.S. service providers and manufacturers, and mercantilist industrial policies that have cost U.S. workers their jobs.  America’s policies toward China should put American workers, farmers and businesses first, not China’s.

We urge you to focus on identifying effective strategies to reshape China’s policy approach in each of these areas, such as through enforceable commitments to eliminate forced technology transfer policies, market distorting subsidies, data localization policies, and foreign investment restrictions, and ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment of U.S. firms in regulatory and other proceedings. Above all, we urge you to remain steadfast in enforcing America’s laws.  

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and James Lankford (R-OK), members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the Committee’s unclassified summary of the first installment of the Committee’s Russia Report, including updated recommendations on election security and findings regarding Russian targeting of election infrastructure. In parallel, the Committee has prepared a comprehensive, classified report on threats to election infrastructure. The classified report will be submitted for declassification review, and the Committee anticipates releasing it to the public when that process is completed.

“Elections at all levels are central to our democracy, to our institutions, and to our government's legitimacy, and I remain concerned that we as a country are still not fully prepared for the 2018 midterm elections. That’s one reason why we, as a Committee, have decided that it is important to get out as much information as possible about the threat, so that governments at every level take it seriously and take the necessary steps to defend ourselves,” said Senator Mark Warner. “I am proud of the bipartisan work our Committee members have done on this issue, and I look forward to continuing in a bipartisan way to investigate what happened in 2016, and prevent future interference in our elections.” 

“I’m pleased to be able to release this summary of our findings and recommendations on election security to the American public,” said Senator Richard Burr. “Today’s primaries are the next step toward the 2018 midterms and another reminder of the urgency of securing our election systems. Our investigation has been a bipartisan effort from day one, and I look forward to completing the Committee’s work and releasing as much of it as possible.  We are working tirelessly to give Americans a complete accounting of what happened in 2016 and to prevent any future interference with our democratic process.” 

“While our investigation remains ongoing, one conclusion is clear: the Russians were relentless in attempting to meddle in the 2016 election, and they will continue their efforts,” said Senator Susan Collins.  “The findings and recommendations we are releasing today are a major step forward in our effort to thwart any attempt to meddle in our elections.  With the 2018 election fast approaching, the need to act now is urgent.  We must provide states the assistance they need to strengthen the security of their voting systems.”

“Our democracy hinges on Americans' ability to fairly choose our own leaders. With primary elections underway, and as we approach the midterm elections and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to protect the integrity of our voting process,” said Senator Martin Heinrich. “I am proud of how our whole Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, has taken on the task of getting to the bottom of Russia's interference in our election. Until we set up stronger protections of our election systems and take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to attack.”

 

“During the 2016 election, Russian entities targeted presidential campaign accounts, launched cyber-attacks against at least 21 state election systems, and hacked a US voting systems software company,” said Senator James Lankford. “We must proactively work to ensure the security of our election infrastructure for the possibility of interference from not just Russia, but possibly another adversary like Iran or North Korea or a hacktivist group. After 18 months of investigations and interviews, this bipartisan report underscores the importance of efforts to protect our democracy from foreign attacks on our elections.”

 

The Committee’s unclassified summary of this chapter of the Russia Report – Election Security Findings and Recommendations are embedded below:

 

Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election:

Summary of Initial Findings and Recommendations

 

May 8, 2018

 

Overview

 

In 2016, cyber actors affiliated with the Russian Government conducted an unprecedented, coordinated cyber campaign against state election infrastructure. Russian actors scanned databases for vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions, and in a small number of cases successfully penetrated a voter registration database. This activity was part of a larger campaign to prepare to undermine confidence in the voting process.  The Committee has not seen any evidence that vote tallies were manipulated or that voter registration information was deleted or modified.

 

·         The Committee has limited information about whether, and to what extent, state and local officials carried out forensic or other examination of election infrastructure systems in order to confirm whether election-related systems were compromised. It is possible that additional activity occurred and has not yet been uncovered.

 

Summary of Initial Findings

 

·         Cyber actors affiliated with the Russian government scanned state systems extensively throughout the 2016 election cycle. These cyber actors made attempts to access numerous state election systems, and in a small number of cases accessed voter registration databases.

 

o   At least 18 states had election systems targeted by Russian-affiliated cyber actors in some fashion.[1] Elements of the IC have varying levels of confidence about three additional states, for a possible total of at least 21. In addition, other states saw suspicious or malicious behavior the IC has been unable to attribute to Russia.

o   Almost all of the states that were targeted observed vulnerability scanning directed at their Secretary of State websites or voter registration infrastructure. Other scans were broader or less specific in their target. 

o   In at least six states, the Russian-affiliated cyber actors went beyond scanning and conducted malicious access attempts on voting-related websites.[2]

o   In a small number of states, Russian-affiliated cyber actors were able to gain access to restricted elements of election infrastructure. In a small number of states, these cyber actors were in a position to, at a minimum, alter or delete voter registration data; however, they did not appear to be in a position to manipulate individual votes or aggregate vote totals.

 

·         The Committee found that in addition to the cyber activity directed at state election infrastructure, Russia undertook a wide variety of intelligence-related activities targeting the U.S. voting process. These activities began at least as early as 2014, continued through Election Day 2016, and included traditional information gathering efforts as well as operations likely aimed at preparing to discredit the integrity of the U.S. voting process and election results.

 

·         The Committee’s assessments, as well as the assessments of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are based on self-reporting by the states. DHS has been clear in its representations to the Committee that the Department did not have perfect insight into these cyber activities. It is possible that more states were attacked, but the activity was not detected. In light of the technical challenges associated with cyber forensic analysis, it is also possible that states may have overlooked some indicators of compromise.

 

·         The Committee saw no evidence that votes were changed and found that, on balance, the diversity of our voting infrastructure is a strength. Because of the variety of systems and equipment, changing votes on a large scale would require an extensive, complex, and state or country-level campaign. However, the Committee notes that a small number of districts in key states can have a significant impact in a national election.

 

[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

2 In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

 

Actors and Motive

 

·         The Committee concurs with the IC that Russian government-affiliated actors were behind the cyber activity directed against state election infrastructure.

 

·         While the full scope of Russian activity against the states remains unclear because of collection gaps, the Committee found ample evidence to conclude that the Russian government was developing capabilities to undermine confidence in our election infrastructure, including voter processes.

 

·         The Committee does not know whether the Russian government-affiliated actors intended to exploit vulnerabilities during the 2016 elections and decided against taking action, or whether they were merely gathering information and testing capabilities for a future attack. Regardless, the Committee believes the activity indicates an intent to go beyond traditional intelligence collection.

 

DHS Efforts to Bolster Election Security

 

·         The Committee found that DHS’s initial response was inadequate to counter the threat. In the summer of 2016, as the threat to the election infrastructure emerged, DHS attempted outreach to the states, seeking to highlight the threat for information technology (IT) directors without divulging classified information.  By the fall of 2016, as the threat became clearer, DHS attempted a more extensive outreach to the states with limited success.

 

o   At the outset, DHS was not well-positioned to provide effective support to states confronting a hostile nation-state cyber actor.

o   In addition, members of the Obama administration were concerned that, by raising the alarm, they would create the very impression they were trying to avoid––calling into question the integrity of election systems.

 

·         DHS and FBI alerts to the states in the summer and fall of 2016 were limited in substance and distribution.  Although DHS provided warning to IT staff in the fall of 2016, notifications to state elections officials were delayed by nearly a year.  Therefore, states understood that there was a cyber threat, but did not appreciate the scope, seriousness, or implications of the particular threat they were facing.

 

o   Many state election officials reported hearing for the first time about the Russian attempts to scan and penetrate state systems from the press or from the public Committee hearing on June 21, 2017.  DHS’s notifications in the summer of 2016 and the public statement by DHS and the ODNI in October 2016 were not sufficient warning.

o   It was not until September of 2017, and only under significant pressure from this Committee and others, that DHS reached out directly to chief election officials in the targeted states to alert the appropriate election officials about the scanning activity and other attacks and the actor behind them.  (However, the Committee notes that in the small number of cases where election-related systems had been compromised, the federal government was in contact with senior election officials at the time the intrusion was discovered.)

 

·         The Committee found that DHS is engaging state election officials more effectively now than in the summer of 2016.  Although early interactions between state election officials and DHS were strained, states now largely give DHS credit for making tremendous progress over the last six months.

 

o   States have signed up for many of the resources that DHS has to offer, and DHS has hosted meetings of the Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council, as required under the critical infrastructure designation. Those interactions have begun to increase trust and communication between federal and state entities.

o   DHS hosted a classified briefing for state chief election officials and is working through providing security clearances for those officials.

o   An Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center has been established, focused on sharing network defense information with state and local election officials.

 

Ongoing Vulnerabilities

 

Despite the progress on communication and improvements to the security of our election process, the Committee remains concerned about a number of potential vulnerabilities in election infrastructure.

 

·         Voting systems across the United States are outdated, and many do not have a paper record of votes as a backup counting system that can be reliably audited, should there be allegations of machine manipulation. In addition, the number of vendors selling machines is shrinking, raising concerns about supply chain vulnerability.

 

o   Paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines––machines with electronic interfaces that electronically store votes (as opposed to paper ballots or optical scanners)––are used in jurisdictions in 30 states and are at highest risk for security flaws.  Five states use DREs exclusively.

 

·         Many aspects of election infrastructure systems are connected to and can be accessed over the internet.  Furthermore, systems that are not connected to the internet, such as voting machines, may still be updated via software downloaded from the internet.

 

o   These potentially vulnerable systems include some of the core components of U.S. election infrastructure, including systems affiliated with voter registration databases, electronic poll books, vote casting, vote tallying, and unofficial election night reporting to the general public and the media.  Risk-limiting audits are a best practice to mitigate risk.

 

·         Vendors of election software and equipment play a critical role in the U.S. election system, and the Committee continues to be concerned that vendors represent an enticing target for malicious cyber actors.  State local, territorial, tribal, and federal government authorities have very little insight into the cyber security practices of many of these vendors, and while the Election Assistance Commission issues guidelines for security, abiding by those guidelines is currently voluntary.

 

Summary of SSCI Recommendations

 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.  The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials have taken to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient.  The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.  The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

                       

1.      Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

·         States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

·         The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.  

·         The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

 

3.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

·         The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyberattacks both quickly and accurately.  Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.  

·         DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels.  We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication. 

·         Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.

·         DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.

·         The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

 

4.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

·         Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election systems. 

·         The Committee recommends State and Local officials prioritize the following:

o   Institute two-factor authentication for state databases.

o   Install monitoring sensors on state systems.  One option is to further expand DHS’s ALBERT network.

o   Identify the weak points in the network, including any under-resourced localities, and prioritize assistance towards those entities.

o   Update software in voter registration systems.  Create backups, including paper copies, of state voter registration databases. Include voter registration database recovery in state continuity of operations plans.

o   Consider a voter education program to ensure voters check registration well prior to an election.

o   Undertake intensive security audits of state and local voter registration systems, ideally utilizing an outside entity.

o   Perform risk assessments for any current or potential third-party vendors to ensure they are meeting the necessary cyber security standards in protecting their election systems.  

 

·         The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:

o   Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process. 

o   Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).

o   Maintain and more aggressively promote the catalog of services DHS has available for states to help secure their systems, and update the catalog as DHS refines their understanding of what states need.  

o   Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.

o   Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.

 

5.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

·         States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems.  At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability.  If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.

·         States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.  Risk-limiting audits, in particular, can be a cost-effective way to ensure that votes cast are votes counted.   

·         DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the potential vulnerabilities of both voting machines and the supply chains.

 

6.      Assistance for the States

·         States should use federal grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits. 

 

###




[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

[2] In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement after Reddit announced that it had taken action against nearly a thousand accounts that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA): 

“I welcome Reddit’s announcement, nearly a year and a half after election day, that it has taken action to investigate and suspend hundreds of Russian-backed accounts responsible for interfering in the U.S. political system.   

“While I recognize that Reddit is fairly distinct among social media platforms in that its users are largely responsible for moderating content, I also believe that all the platform companies have a responsibility to do everything in their power to prevent foreign adversaries like Russia from interfering in our elections. As the 2018 elections approach, I will continue pressing the nation’s intelligence leaders and social media companies to be far more aggressive and proactive in responding to this threat. 

“It’s clear that the Kremlin will use any means at its disposal to spread propaganda and misinformation, and we each bear some responsibility for exercising good judgment and a healthy amount of skepticism when it comes to the things we read and spread on social media.” 

###

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after Facebook announced that it removed 70 Facebook and 65 Instagram accounts — as well as 138 Facebook pages — that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA):

“For many months now, I have been pushing Facebook to more aggressively investigate and identify Russian-linked fake accounts on their platform. Given the scale and scope of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign, it was always clear that Russian activity on Facebook extended far beyond the 470 fake accounts and pages that the company shut down in September. Today’s disclosure of more IRA-linked accounts is evidence that the Kremlin continues to exploit platforms like Facebook to sow division, spread disinformation, and influence political debates around the globe.

“I am glad that Facebook is taking some steps to pinpoint and address this activity, but I also expect Facebook and Mr. Zuckerberg, along with other platform companies, to continue to identify Russian troll activity and to work with Congress on updating our laws to better protect our democracy in the future.”  

In October, Sen. Warner – along with Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and John McCain (R-AZ) – introduced the Honest Ads Act to help prevent foreign interference in elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

 

###

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Mark R. Warner, Vice Chairman of the Senate intelligence Committee joined with Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), and four Ranking Members of key Senate committees on national security in sending a letter to President Donald Trump formally requesting the Administration provide a comprehensive analysis to Congress on whether a foreign government used chemical or biological weapons in the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the United Kingdom. The Senators’ letter calls for the imposition of sanctions if, as the UK government has concluded, the United States determines Russia was behind the chemical weapons attack in Salisbury.”  

Joining Menendez and Durbin were Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Ranking Member on the Senate Judiciary Committee; Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee; Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Mark Warner (D-Va.); Vice Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The full text of the letter to President Trump can be found here and below:

 

 

Dear President Trump:

We write to express our serious concerns regarding the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, in Salisbury, United Kingdom. 

In the aftermath of their poisoning, UK officials identified the chemical agent used in the attack as Novichok, a highly lethal military grade nerve agent the Russian government is known to have developed.    

British Prime Minister Theresa May, in a speech to Parliament, said the UK government had concluded it was highly likely the Russian government was responsible for the attack in Salisbury.  The UK government based this assessment on Russia’s known chemical weapons capabilities and the Kremlin’s record of conducting state sponsored assassinations – including against former intelligence officers.   The United States, in a joint statement with the United Kingdom and other allies, said it shared the UK assessment that the Russian government was responsible for the attack and noted that Russia´s failure to address the legitimate request by the UK government further indicates its responsibility.

We formally request a determination of whether a foreign government has used lethal chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law and a report to Congress analyzing the attack.  Given the use of such a dangerous nerve agent, as well as the origins of the substance, we believe a comprehensive analysis of this chemical attack is vital to uncovering the perpetrators and, if necessary, you should impose sanctions on the individuals and entities involved. 

Moving forward, it is critical that we continue to stand by our indispensable ally and partner in the United Kingdom and take the necessary steps to confront Russian complicity in these heinous acts.  We appreciate your prompt attention to this request.

 

###

WASHINGTON, DC – Senators James Lankford (R-OK), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Kamala Harris (D-CA), Susan Collins (R-ME), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) today introduced a revised Secure Elections Act, a bill to strengthen election cybersecurity in America. The Senators originally introduced the legislation in December, and have since worked with stakeholders to revise and strengthen the bill. With today’s reintroduction, Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC) and Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) also co-sponsored the bill.

The revised legislation maintains the original purpose of the bill to streamline cybersecurity information-sharing between federal intelligence entities and state election agencies; provide security clearances to state election officials; and provide support for state election cybersecurity infrastructure. Today’s revised bill modifies reporting requirements for state election offices; transitions the election security advisory panel from the Department of Homeland Security to the Election Assistance Commission; and makes grants eligible to local jurisdictions, among several other minor modifications. 

“This week’s Intelligence Committee hearing confirmed the need for America to make the security of our election infrastructure a priority,” said Lankford. “During the 2016 election, Russian entities hacked presidential campaign accounts, launched cyber-attacks against at least 21 state election systems, and attacked a US voting systems software company. This revised Secure Elections Act adequately helps the states prepare our election infrastructure for the possibility of interference from not just Russia, but possibly another adversary like Iran or North Korea or a hacktivist group. Although funding for election security is included in the Omnibus appropriations bill, Congress still must pass the Secure Elections Act in order to put needed election improvements into law.” 

“We know—and our top intelligence officials have confirmed—that our election systems remain a target,” said Klobuchar, who is also Ranking Member of the Rules Committee with jurisdiction over federal elections. “The bipartisan group of co-sponsors on the Secure Elections Act have been working with state election officials and the Department of Homeland Security to improve this bill and ensure those on the front-lines of administering elections are equipped with the information and resources necessary to keep them safe. This week we made progress by securing $380 million in funding, but it’s not enough. There are 227 days until the next federal election and primaries have already begun, Congress should pass the bipartisan Secure Elections Act immediately.” 

“Our democracy is under attack by foreign actors who seek to undermine and destabilize our country,” said Chairman Burr. “This bill will help strengthen our cybersecurity heading into upcoming election cycles, and has provisions to ensure that threat information is promptly shared with the states.” 

“Elections – at all levels – are central to our democracy, to our institutions and to our government’s legitimacy,” said Vice Chairman Warner. “During the 2016 campaign, we saw unprecedented targeting of election infrastructure by Russian actors. As we’ve heard in recent weeks from our nation’s top intelligence officials, the Russians will continue to attack our elections. We need to make sure states and localities have the resources and federal support they need to make election security a top priority.” 

“Election security is not a bipartisan issue, it’s a nonpartisan issue,” said Harris. “With 2018 elections across the country underway, the urgency to act is clear. We need to improve communication between states and federal authorities, fortify and upgrade election infrastructure, and implement best practices. We know there will be a new set of threats this year and we must be prepared to meet them.”

“While our investigation is still ongoing, we know for certain that the Russians were relentless in their efforts to meddle in the 2016 elections, and that those efforts are ongoing,” said Collins. “This bipartisan legislation will strengthen the integrity of our election process by ensuring that local voting officials have the information and financial resources they need to secure their voting systems. Given that we are already in an election year, the need to act now is urgent.”

“Our democracy hinges on Americans' ability to fairly choose our own leaders. As we approach the midterm elections and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to protect the integrity of our voting process,” said Heinrich. “Our bipartisan legislation will improve and modernize protections for our voting systems, registration data, and ballots to prevent theft, manipulation, and malicious computer hacking. Until we take these necessary steps, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable.” 

“The Russians have been trying to break the backs of democracies all over the world,” said Graham. “And although they did not change the outcome, they clearly interfered in our 2016 election. This bipartisan legislation will help defend our elections from foreign interference and sends a strong signal to other bad actors – like Iran and North Korea -- that similar acts will not be tolerated.  We are committed to defending and promoting confidence in American democracy by providing states with the resources they need to safeguard their election systems.”

 

###

WASHINGTON – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in advance of today’s press conference with Committee members, made available the Committee’s initial recommendations on election security after investigating Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.

The Committee will hold an open hearing on Wednesday, March 21, 2018, on the threats to election infrastructure.  The hearing will cover attempted attacks on state election infrastructure in 2016, DHS and FBI efforts to improve election security, and the view from the states on their cybersecurity posture.  

The Committee’s initial recommendations are embedded below and available here.

 

RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 2016 ELECTION

 

SUMMARY OF DRAFT SSCI RECOMMENDATIONS

 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials take to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient. The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.

 

The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

 

1. Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

  • States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2. Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

  • The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.
  • The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

3. Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

  • The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyber-attacks both quickly and accurately. Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.
  • DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels. We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication. 
  • Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.
  • DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.
  • The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

4. Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

  • Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election-related systems. Basic but crucial security steps like two-factor authentication for those logging into voter databases can improve the overall election security posture. States and localities should also take advantage of DHS offerings, to include DHS’s network monitoring capabilities.
  • The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:
  • Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process. 
    • Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).
    • Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.
    • Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.
 

5. Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

  • States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability. If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.
  • States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.
  • DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the vulnerabilities of both the machines and the supply chains.

 

6. Assistance for the States

  • The Committee recommends Congress urgently pass legislation increasing assistance and establishing a voluntary grant program for the states.
  • States should use grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. 
  • Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits.

 

###

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking Committee, issued a statement after the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on five Russian entities and 19 individuals for interference in the 2016 election:         

“This is a welcome, if long-overdue, step by the Trump Administration to punish Russia for interfering in the 2016 election. Our nation’s top intelligence officials have testified that Russia continues to interfere in our democracy, with no intention to stop. Yet these sanctions do not go far enough. Nearly all of the entities and individuals who were sanctioned today were either previously under sanction during the Obama Administration, or had already been charged with federal crimes by the Special Counsel. With the midterm elections fast approaching, the Administration needs to step it up, now, if we have any hope of deterring Russian meddling in 2018.”

 

###

 

WASHINGTON – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today made the following statement on Russia’s culpability in the nerve agent attack in England:

“We stand with our British allies and the rest of the civilized world in denouncing the brazen and brutal chemical attack carried out against the United Kingdom.  It has become clear that Russia is behind this effort to kill innocent civilians with a banned nerve agent.  This reckless and hostile act violates every international and diplomatic norm.  The Kremlin may deny it and spread misinformation through its propaganda machine, but we know the truth.  We must come together as a global community and stand against Russia and the malicious actions of the Putin regime.”

 

###