WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and John Thune (R-SD) led a group of colleagues in a letter to Anne Milgram, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), expressing support for the agency’s new engagement on a potential special registration for telehealth but sharing serious concerns over the agency’s proposed rules on the future of prescribing controlled substances via telehealth. Despite efforts by Sen. Warner to ensure continued access to telehealth services following the end of the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE), the DEA’s rules as proposed would drastically affect patient care.

Joining Sens. Warner and Thune in this letter are U.S. Sens. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Dan Sullivan (R-AK).

At the start of the pandemic, the DEA acted swiftly to take advantage of exceptions detailed in the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act that allowed the agency to waive in-person requirements for prescribing controlled substances in the case of a Public Health Emergency (PHE). With the expiration of the COVID-19 PHE earlier this year, however, the DEA announced a proposed rule detailing their plans for prescribing these medications via telehealth going forward that would limit the ability of doctors to prescribe controlled substances without an in-person visit and place unnecessary requirements on care providers. The proposed rule would only allow a 30-day supply of a schedule III-V non-narcotic medication prior to an in-person medical evaluation, and would not permit any initial supply for schedule II or schedule III-V narcotic medication.

The senators wrote, “Although we appreciate the limited flexibilities proposed by the rule, they are insufficient to meet the health care needs of our constituents and the needs of the providers who care for them. We support the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) extending the full set of telehealth flexibilities through November 2023 and are encouraged by the upcoming public listening sessions on the proposed regulations. We urge the DEA to consider feedback from health care stakeholders and apply the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure patients maintain access to care through telehealth, while still minimizing diversion and fraud.”

Highlighting the difficulty patients have scheduling in-person appointments, the senators continued, “We have concerns about our constituents’ ability to obtain in-person appointments within 30 days of starting a new medication, and the potential consequences to their health of starting a new medication and abruptly ending it should they not be able to obtain such an appointment. It takes on average 26 days to schedule a new patient appointment with a health care provider. Therefore, a 30-day supply could result in patients going without their medication while they wait for an in-person appointment or will turn to higher-acuity and higher-cost settings of in-person care to meet this deadline, such as emergency departments.” 

The senators also called attention to a rule Congress created as part of the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act that requires the DEA create a registration for telemedicine practitioners who would not be subject to mandatory in-person medical evaluations. The goal of this special registration is to allow medical evaluations over telehealth more broadly, which the senators state this DEA rule does not accomplish.

Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, tremendous progress was made to ensure that patients could receive care without interruption. Reinstating these hard limits on telehealth would be taking a step backwards, and have serious impacts on the care options for thousands of patients. Sen. Warner has consistently led efforts to expand telehealth accessibility, introducing legislation to expand telehealth services and repeatedly calling on congressional leadership to extend telehealth services after the end of the pandemic.

A copy of the letter is available here and text is below:

Dear Administrator Milgram:

On behalf of our constituent patients, health care providers, and pharmacists, we’re writing to share strong concerns with the notice of proposed rulemaking on the future of controlled substances prescribing over telehealth. Although we appreciate the limited flexibilities proposed by the rule, they are insufficient to meet the health care needs of our constituents and the needs of the providers who care for them. We support the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) extending the full set of telehealth flexibilities through November 2023 and are encouraged by the upcoming public listening sessions on the proposed regulations. We urge the DEA to consider feedback from health care stakeholders and apply the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure patients maintain access to care through telehealth, while still minimizing diversion and fraud.

Proposed Rule

As you know, the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (“Ryan Haight Act”) offered seven exceptions to the in-person medical evaluation requirement when providers are engaged in the “practice of telemedicine;” a public health emergency is one such exception, and we’re grateful the DEA moved swiftly to utilize that exception during the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, we are concerned that the proposed rule undermines the gains made during the PHE that saw expanded access to critical health care services through telehealth

Initial supply: Prior to an in-person medical evaluation, the proposed rule permits a DEA-registered prescriber to provide an initial 30-day supply of a controlled substance for non-narcotic schedule III-V medications. We have concerns about our constituents’ ability to obtain in-person appointments within 30 days of starting a new medication, and the potential consequences to their health of starting a new medication and abruptly ending it should they not be able to obtain such an appointment. It takes on average 26 days to schedule a new patient appointment with a health care provider. Therefore, a 30-day supply could result in patients going without their medication while they wait for an in-person appointment or will turn to higher-acuity and higher-cost settings of in-person care to meet this deadline, such as emergency departments.

Despite the 180-day grace period after the end of the PHE, new and existing patients will be seeking in-person appointments simultaneously in a health care system that is already burdened by a shortage of health care providers. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 163 million Americans live in Mental Health Care Health Professional Shortage Areas.  Approximately 8,200 additional psychiatrists would be needed nationwide just to remove this shortage designation.  Nationwide averages also obscure the variation among states and territories; for example, Arizona has only 8.5% of its psychiatric health care needs met and would need 227 psychiatrists to meet 100% of these needs.  And beyond mental health care, 100 million Americans live in Primary Care Health Professional Shortage Areas, with more than 17,000 primary care providers needed at a minimum to remove the designation. 

Medical societies representing health care providers and their patients nationwide have encouraged a window of longer than 30 days for an initial prescription in order to provide enough time to obtain an appointment: the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Psychiatric Association recommend 180 days, with the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) urging no less a 90-day maximum when the provider believes it is appropriate. In addition, the AMA and the AAMC recommend that existing patients have one year to fulfill the in-person appointment requirement.

Provider safety: The proposed rule requires the prescribing provider to report their physical address at the time of the telemedicine appointment. Health care providers have shared they sometimes do telemedicine appointments from their home and have safety and privacy concerns with their home address being on the prescription. We urge you to allow providers to use the business address of their DEA registration.

Referrals:

• Referring providers: The proposed rule requires that an in-person medical evaluation be performed by a DEA-registered provider before a referral to another DEA-registered provider who would be permitted to prescribe a controlled substance over telehealth. We are concerned that individuals without adequate in-person access to a DEA-registered provider will see their health care treatment options limited should they be referred to a specialist for a telehealth appointment, or instead a second in-person medical evaluation would be required with a DEA-registered provider prior to seeing a specialist, which would increase costs to the patient and the health care system as a whole. We urge you to work with health care providers to ensure patients do not encounter any truly unnecessary barriers to care.  
• Prescribing practitioner: The proposed rule requires a referring provider to specifically include the name and National Provider Identifier (NPI) of the prescribing practitioner to which the referring prescriber is referring the patient. In practice, patients are often referred to a group practice where they see whichever specialist has a first available appointment. Or, referrals may not have a provider indicated at all, as the patient often has to explore insurance network coverage and new patient availability. This requirement may prevent patients from receiving the legitimate health care services they need.

Recordkeeping: Finally, we have heard widespread concerns about additional recordkeeping and other administrative burdens required from providers and pharmacies. This additional administrative burden will strain an already exhausted workforce could also deter providers from being able to provide this care. Stakeholders have shared that existing recordkeeping requirements should be sufficient for the purpose of DEA being able to combat diversion and fraud, and we encourage you to work with providers on the least burdensome path forward.

Special Registration

In addition to the PHE exception to the Ryan Haight Act discussed above, Congress also created a “special registration” exception, not as an option for DEA to utilize but a requirement to do so most recently in the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (“SUPPORT Act”). We do not believe this NPRM fulfills DEA’s obligation to create a special registration.

Congress envisioned this special registration to allow certain health care providers to be cleared and registered to use their clinical judgment when a medical examination can be done over telehealth for the purposes of a controlled substances prescription. DEA envisioned this to be the case, as well: in the preamble to Ryan Haight Act implementation regulations, DEA wrote:

“Special registration for telemedicine—a practitioner who is engaged in the practice of telemedicine within the meaning of the Act is not subject to the mandatory in-person medical evaluation requirement of 21 U.S.C. 829(e) (although such practitioner remains subject to the requirement that all prescriptions for controlled substances be issued for a legitimate medical purpose.”

Although we appreciate DEA not requiring a special registration for the initial prescriptions currently proposed, we are concerned that the proposed rule does not include the special registration directed to be created by Congress and even envisioned by the DEA. However, we are pleased to see DEA recently indicate further consideration of a special registration process that would allow clinicians to prescribe a controlled substance via telemedicine without an in-person visit. We appreciate the continuation of the comment process via public listening sessions, and encourage the DEA to review and incorporate stakeholders’ feedback in future rulemaking related to telemedicine prescribing.

In addition to allowing qualified health care providers to determine when a medical evaluation over telehealth is appropriate, a special registration would also provide a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of certain prescribers having the ability to prescribe over telehealth medications not covered by the post-COVID-19 proposed rule, namely Schedule II medications and Schedule III-V narcotic medications.

Health care providers across the board continue to ask for a special registration process that would provide a pathway for certain providers to provide more care involving controlled substances over telehealth than the proposed rule allows, and we implore DEA to follow its statutory requirements under the Ryan Haight Act and the SUPPORT Act and do just that.

Thank you for your consideration of these concerns, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on these important issues.

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WASHINGTON – Ahead of a Tuesday oversight hearing in the Senate Banking Committee with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Gary Gensler, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Sherrod Brown (D-OH) reintroduced legislation to require publicly traded companies to disclose information regarding workforce management metrics, including investments made in skills training, workforce safety, and employee retention.

“Workers are the most valuable resource a company can have, but without a clear set of standards for reporting, the investment that public companies make in their personnel are next-to-impossible to track,” said Sen. Warner. “This legislation will help provide a clearer picture of how public companies are managing, supporting, and investing in their workers – factors that significantly influence a company’s ability to innovate and compete.”

“Big Tech and other corporations use subcontracting and outsourcing to hide their total number of workers. The result is that too many workers are invisible under current disclosure requirements,” said Sen. Brown. “The Workforce Investment Disclosure Act will finally shed some sunlight on how companies outsource and subcontract their workers and allow the public to scrutinize what these companies are doing to invest in their workers.”

Since the start of his tenure in 2021, Chair Gensler has stated disclosure of these workforce metrics would be a priority of his agenda, but a rule making this a requirement has yet to be proposed. The Workforce Investment Disclosure Act would require public companies disclose basic human capital metrics, which have an increasingly high value across industries in our 21st century economy. These metrics include workforce turnover rates, skills and development training, workforce health and safety, workforce engagement, and compensation statistics.

Specifically, the legislation would build on existing disclosure requirements by requiring companies to disclose:

• Demographic information;
• Data on temporary and contract workers;
• Employee turnover rate;
• Employee skills and capabilities;
• Workforce health, safety, and well-being, including findings of harassment or discrimination; and
• Employee compensation, benefits, and incentives.

Sen. Warner, a former entrepreneur and venture capitalist, has long stressed the importance of updating human capital disclosure requirements to reflect the priorities of modern companies. First introducing the Workforce Investment Disclosure Act in 2020, Sens. Warner and Brown have also urged the SEC to implement improvements to their human capital disclosure rules including for part-time employees.

Full text of the bill is available here. 

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today urged several artificial intelligence (AI) companies to take additional action to promote safety and prevent malicious misuse of their products. In a series of letters, Sen. Warner applauded certain companies for publicly joining voluntary commitments proposed by the Biden administration, but encouraged them to broaden their efforts, and called on companies that have not taken this public step to commit to making their products more secure.

As AI is rolled out more broadly, researchers have repeatedly demonstrated a number of concerning, exploitable weaknesses in prominent products, including abilities to generate credible-seeming misinformation, develop malware, and craft sophisticated phishing techniques. In July, the Biden administration announced that several AI companies had agreed to a series of voluntary commitments that would promote greater security and transparency. However, the commitments were not fully comprehensive in scope or in participation, with many companies not publicly participating and several exploitable aspects of the technology left untouched by the commitments.

In a series of letters sent today, Sen. Warner pushed directly on companies that did not participate, including Apple, Midjourney, Mistral AI, Databricks, Scale AI, and Stability AI, requesting a response detailing the steps they plan to take to increase the security of their products and prioritize transparency. Sen. Warner additionally sent letters to companies that were involved in the Biden administration’s commitments, including Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection AI, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI, asking that they extend commitments to less capable models and also develop consumer-facing commitments – such as development and monitoring practices – to prevent the most serious forms of misuse. 

“While representing an important improvement upon the status quo, the voluntary commitments announced in July can be bolstered in key ways through additional commitments,” Sen. Warner wrote.

Sen. Warner also called specific attention to the urgent need for all AI companies to make additional commitments to safeguard against a few highly sensitive potential misuses, including non-consensual intimate image generation (including child sexual abuse material), social-scoring, real-time facial recognition, and proliferation activity in the context of malicious cyber activity or the production of biological or chemical agents.

The letters follow up on Sen. Warner’s previous efforts to engage directly with AI companies to push for responsible development and deployment. In April, Sen. Warner directly called on AI CEOs to develop practices that would ensure that their products and systems are secure. In July, he also pushed on the Biden administration to keep working with AI companies to expand the scope of the voluntary commitments.

Additionally, Sen. Warner wrote to Google last week to raise concerns about their testing of new AI technology in real medical settings. Separately, he urged the CEOs of several AI companies to address a concerning report that generative chatbots were producing instructions on how to exacerbate an eating disorder. Additionally, he has introduced several pieces of legislation aimed at making tech safer and more humane, including the RESTRICT Act, which would comprehensively address the ongoing threat posed by technology from foreign adversaries; the SAFE TECH Act, which would reform Section 230 and allow social media companies to be held accountable for enabling cyber-stalking, online harassment, and discrimination on social media platforms; and the Honest Ads Act, which would require online political advertisements to adhere to the same disclaimer requirements as TV, radio, and print ads.

Copies of each of the letters can be found here.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today urged Google CEO Sundar Pichai to provide more clarity into his company’s deployment of Med-PaLM 2, an artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot currently being tested in health care settings. In a letter, Sen. Warner expressed concerns about reports of inaccuracies in the technology, and called on Google to increase transparency, protect patient privacy, and ensure ethical guardrails.

In April, Google began testing Med-PaLM2 with customers, including the Mayo Clinic. Med-PaLM 2 can answer medical questions, summarize documents, and organize health data. While the technology has shown some promising results, there are also concerning reports of repeated inaccuracies and of Google’s own senior researchers expressing reservations about the readiness of the technology. Additionally, much remains unknown about where Med-PaLM 2 is being tested, what data sources it learns from, to what extent patients are aware of and can object to the use of AI in their treatment, and what steps Google has taken to protect against bias.

“While artificial intelligence (AI) undoubtedly holds tremendous potential to improve patient care and health outcomes, I worry that premature deployment of unproven technology could lead to the erosion of trust in our medical professionals and institutions, the exacerbation of existing racial disparities in health outcomes, and an increased risk of diagnostic and care-delivery errors,” Sen. Warner wrote. 

The letter raises concerns over AI companies prioritizing the race to establish market share over patient well-being. Sen. Warner also emphasizes his previous efforts to raise the alarm about Google skirting health privacy as it trained diagnostic models on sensitive health data without patients’ knowledge or consent.

“It is clear more work is needed to improve this technology as well as to ensure the health care community develops appropriate standards governing the deployment and use of AI,” Sen. Warner continued.

The letter poses a broad range of questions for Google to answer, requesting more transparency into exactly how Med-PaLM 2 is being rolled out, what data sources Med-PaLM 2 learns from, how much information and agency patients have over how AI is involved in their care, and more.

Sen. Warner, a former tech entrepreneur, has been a vocal advocate for Big Tech accountability and a stronger national posture against cyberattacks and misinformation online. In April, Sen. Warner directly expressed concerns to several AI CEOs – including Sundar Pichai – about the potential risks posed by AI, and called on companies to ensure that their products and systems are secure. Last month, he called on the Biden administration to work with AI companies to develop additional guardrails around the responsible deployment of AI. He has also introduced several pieces of legislation aimed at making tech more secure, including the RESTRICT Act, which would comprehensively address the ongoing threat posed by technology from foreign adversaries; the SAFE TECH Act, which would reform Section 230 and allow social media companies to be held accountable for enabling cyber-stalking, online harassment, and discrimination on social media platforms; and the Honest Ads Act, which would require online political advertisements to adhere to the same disclaimer requirements as TV, radio, and print ads.

A copy of the letter can be found here are below. 

Dear Mr. Pichai,

I write to express my concern regarding reports that Google began providing Med-PaLM 2 to hospitals to test early this year. While artificial intelligence (AI) undoubtedly holds tremendous potential to improve patient care and health outcomes, I worry that premature deployment of unproven technology could lead to the erosion of trust in our medical professionals and institutions, the exacerbation of existing racial disparities in health outcomes, and an increased risk of diagnostic and care-delivery errors.

Over the past year, large technology companies, including Google, have been rushing to develop and deploy AI models and capture market share as the technology has received increased attention following OpenAI’s launch of ChatGPT. Numerous media outlets have reported that companies like Google and Microsoft have been willing to take bigger risks and release more nascent technology in an effort to gain a first mover advantage. In 2019, I raised concerns that Google was skirting health privacy laws through secretive partnerships with leading hospital systems, under which it trained diagnostic models on sensitive health data without patients’ knowledge or consent. This race to establish market share is readily apparent and especially concerning in the health care industry, given the life-and-death consequences of mistakes in the clinical setting, declines of trust in health care institutions in recent years, and the sensitivity of health information. One need look no further than AI pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum’s experiments involving chatbots in psychotherapy to see how users can put premature faith in even basic AI solutions.

According to Google, Med-PaLM 2 can answer medical questions, summarize documents, and organize health data. While AI models have previously been used in medical settings, the use of generative AI tools presents complex new questions and risks. According to the Wall Street Journal, a senior research director at Google who worked on Med-PaLM 2 said, “I don’t feel that this kind of technology is yet at a place where I would want it in my family’s healthcare journey.” Indeed, Google’s own research, released in May, showed that Med-PaLM 2’s answers contained more inaccurate or irrelevant information than answers provided by physicians. It is clear more work is needed to improve this technology as well as to ensure the health care community develops appropriate standards governing the deployment and use of AI

Given these serious concerns and the fact that VHC Health, based in Arlington, Virginia, is a member of the Mayo Clinic Care Network, I request that you provide answers to the following questions. 

1. Researchers have found large language models to display a phenomenon described as “sycophany,” wherein the model generates responses that confirm or cater to a user’s (tacit or explicit) preferred answers, which could produce risks of misdiagnosis in the medical context. Have you tested Med-PaLM 2 for this failure mode?
2. Large language models frequently demonstrate the tendency to memorize contents of their training data, which can risk patient privacy in the context of models trained on sensitive health information. How has Google evaluated Med-PaLM 2 for this risk and what steps has Google taken to mitigate inadvertent privacy leaks of sensitive health information?
3. What documentation did Google provide hospitals, such as Mayo Clinic, about Med-PaLM 2? Did it share model or system cards, datasheets, data-statements, and/or test and evaluation results?
4. Google’s own research acknowledges that its clinical models reflect scientific knowledge only as of the time the model is trained, necessitating “continual learning.” What is the frequency with which Google fully or partially re-trains Med-PaLM 2? Does Google ensure that licensees use only the most up-to-date model version?
5. Google has not publicly provided documentation on Med-PaLM 2, including refraining from disclosing the contents of the model’s training data. Does Med-PaLM 2’s training corpus include protected health information?
6. Does Google ensure that patients are informed when Med-PaLM 2, or other AI models offered or licensed by, are used in their care by health care licensees? If so, how is the disclosure presented? Is it part of a longer disclosure or more clearly presented?
7. Do patients have the option to opt-out of having AI used to facilitate their care? If so, how is this option communicated to patients?
8. Does Google retain prompt information from health care licensees, including protected health information contained therein? Please list each purpose Google has for retaining that information.
9. What license terms exist in any product license to use Med-PaLM 2 to protect patients, ensure ethical guardrails, and prevent misuse or inappropriate use of Med-PaLM 2? How does Google ensure compliance with those terms in the post-deployment context? 
10. How many hospitals is Med-PaLM 2 currently being used at? Please provide a list of all hospitals and health care systems Google has licensed or otherwise shared Med-Palm 2 with.
11. Does Google use protected health information from hospitals using Med-PaLM 2 to retrain or finetune Med-PaLM 2 or any other models? If so, does Google require that hospitals inform patients that their protected health information may be used in this manner?
12. In Google’s own research publication announcing Med-PaLM 2, researchers cautioned about the need to adopt “guardrails to mitigate against over-reliance on the output of a medical assistant.” What guardrails has Google adopted to mitigate over-reliance on the output of Med-PaLM 2 as well as when it particularly should and should not be used? What guardrails has Google incorporated through product license terms to prevent over-reliance on the output?

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WASHINGTON – Last week, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Tim Kaine (both D-VA), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sent letters to the Air Force, Army, Navy, and to the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding their implementation of privatized housing reforms and tenant protections for servicemembers and their families. After hearing from military families in Virginia about the hazardous and unsafe living conditions in many privatized military housing units that included leaking roofs, mold, and rodents, Sens. Warner and Kaine championed housing reforms, including the “Tenant Bill of Rights” in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and the Senators have continued to push for housing support in subsequent defense bills.

Despite passing legislation to improve these conditions, a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that while DoD has made progress in implementing provisions, “gaps in guidance and training remain.” The Senators are urging DoD and each military branch to take a range of steps, including the necessary actions outlined in the report, to ensure that they are meeting their obligations towards servicemembers and properly implementing all necessary reforms. Specifically, the GAO focused on implementation of three reforms in order to give servicemembers and their families more leverage when dealing with unsafe and inadequate living conditions:

• More detailed guidance on the formal dispute resolution process;
• Improved guidance on the role of tenant advocates;
• Better oversight of the condition of private housing units.

The Senators also called on DoD and the services to better incorporate resident feedback into the implementation process of the various protections, in order to inform continued progress and highlight areas for additional reform.

“Having spent years addressing privatized housing concerns from multiple fronts – hearing from families firsthand who are dealing with challenges, and helping them to address those; working with installation leadership to push for greater oversight and accountability for these housing projects; and demanding action from the privatized housing companies – we have been incredibly disturbed by some of the conditions that members of the military and their families have been subjected to,” the Senators wrote.

“The purpose of these reforms and continued Congressional oversight is to provide long-overdue improvement to the experience that military members and their families have with the privatized housing system,” they continued. “It is vital that the protections and reforms that we have put in place are implemented in a way that works for residents, and there must be a continual effort to examine the use of these reforms and processes.”

The letters include a series of questions aimed at better understanding the progress being made in implementation as well as better understanding what is causing certain delays. Among the questions are inquiries about the branches’ process when enacting these reforms as well as questions on what is being done to standardize implementation across the country so that all members of the military have access to, and can utilize, the same protections.

A copy of the letters can be found here. 

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WASHINGTON?– Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) sent a letter to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) urging them to ensure that investments through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF), a key Inflation Reduction Act program, serve to strengthen diverse-owned financial institutions dedicated to climate financing in low-income communities and communities of color. Today’s letter comes as the EPA prepares to release the Notices of Funding Opportunity for the GGRF, a competitive grant program to boost clean energy and climate projects in low-income and disadvantaged communities.  

“We write to urge the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in its review of applications for funding from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF), to give priority to applicants whose proposals fully utilize the diversity of financial institutions engaged in climate finance, including green banks, community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and minority depository institutions (MDIs), as well as center their investment approach on low income and disadvantaged (LID) communities,” wrote the lawmakers in a letter to the EPA. “Specifically, CDFIs and MDIs leverage capital and have a proven track record of providing products and service to the most underserved communities. We urge EPA to heed the lessons learned from the Paycheck Protection Program regarding the importance of being intentional with program design when driving investments in low income and disadvantaged communities.”  

In the letter, the lawmakers stressed the need to award this federal funding so that it goes towards projects and communities that lack access to affordable capital. They also highlighted the importance of ensuring that grant recipients have the structure, diversity, and track record needed to meet the goals of the GGRF. 

“[T]he entities receiving direct federal investment must also demonstrate experience navigating green financing projects and have shown the ability to manage these projects across a variety of communities in order to achieve [Greenhouse Gas] GHG emissions reductions and develop successful projects. It is critical that the EPA balance out these needs for both financial viability and project-level expertise in order to maximize the fund’s performance across all metrics,” they continued. “Additionally, since the Justice40 prioritization should be a floor, not a ceiling, the EPA should require applicants to provide a strategy for how they will drive awareness, demand, and adoption of clean technologies in LID communities. We urge you to learn about community-level solutions that the Fund can support, especially solutions from low-income and disadvantaged communities.” 

Further, the lawmakers urged the EPA to make important adjustments and issue guidance in order to maximize the impact of the funding in vulnerable communities.  

“The success of the program in LID communities depends heavily on the ability to develop an ecosystem that supports other actors, including clean energy and workforce developers. Although the EPA guidance makes available $625,000 for technical assistance for indirect recipients, in order to drive demand and create an ecosystem we recommend that the EPA require some of these funds be aggregated and administered at the national level by the eligible recipient,” they wrote. “The Implementation Framework released by EPA caps the amount per indirect recipient at $5,000,000, which may not be the most impactful way to reach LID communities. For example, some communities have a limited number of mission driven lenders (e.g. CDFI deserts), making the cap on indirect investments have an impact on the amount of climate financing in those communities. We urge you to adjust this limitation on indirect investments to account for more factors, including demand, size of the institution and impact.” 

Among other measures, the lawmakers also suggested that the EPA review the deep impact standards created by the Department of the Treasury for the Emergency Capital Investment Program (ECIP) – a key initiative created as part of a Warner-championed $12 billion investment?to open up new credit opportunities for low-income communities and communities of color. 

Joining Sen. Warner and Rep. Waters in sending the letter are Sens. Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Tina Smith (D-MN), and Alex Padilla (D-CA), as well as Reps. Nydia M. Velázquez (D-NY), Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), and Judy Chu (D-CA).  

Text of the letter is available here and below. ? 

Dear Administrator Regan:

We applaud the EPA in taking an important step forward by providing guidance through the Implementation Framework for the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and express our continued support for the swift implementation of this critical program. We agree with the EPA’s principles that this program can reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other air pollutants, deliver benefits of projects to American communities, particularly those in LID communities, and mobilize financing and private capital to stimulate additional deployment of GHG reducing projects.

We write to urge the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in its review of applications for funding from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF), to give priority to applicants whose proposals fully utilize the diversity of financial institutions engaged in climate finance, including green banks, community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and minority depository institutions (MDIs), as well as center their investment approach on low income and disadvantaged (LID) communities. It is important that EPA adhere to the meaning and intent of Congress in the text of the Inflation Reduction Act (Pub. L. 117-169) (IRA) which highlights a dual mission of reducing greenhouse gases, while impacting LID communities.

In order to meet the objectives and principles outlined in the Implementation Framework, we believe eligible recipients must include meaningful involvement of a variety of financial institutions and business models, including clean financing institutions, community based-financing institutions, and other institutions designed to support clean technology deployment. Specifically, CDFIs and MDIs leverage capital and have a proven track record of providing products and service to the most underserved communities. We urge EPA to heed the lessons learned from the Paycheck Protection Program regarding the importance of being intentional with program design when driving investments in low income and disadvantaged communities. As a result, we believe that an ideal applicant for GGRF funds should have a shared governance structure that is diverse and accountable to local communities, have a plan for continued operability that includes experience investing in or with a variety of mission driven financial institutions, a market transformation approach that effectively crowds-in private capital without displacing otherwise commercially viable investment activities, a strategy for driving demand in LID communities, and an approach that incentivizes a significant amount of investment in the most underserved of the LID communities.

A shared governance structure where decision-making authority is granted to a variety of financial institutions and implementation partners is critical to meeting the goals of the GGRF, particularly in the competition for the National Clean Investment Fund. Mission driven lenders have different business models and products, making it essential that the governing body of the eligible recipient reflect that diversity of expertise and approach. To maximize the program’s success, the governing body must include green banks, CDFIs, MDIs, and other mission driven lenders with experience in climate finance and investment in LID communities. The governing body must be appropriately empowered and go beyond advisory to ensure capital allocation decisions reflect the diversity of business models among indirect recipients and private capital providers. Additionally, the governing body should reflect the demographic diversity of our nation and demonstrate accountability to local communities. 

The IRA includes a “continued operability” requirement that ensures that direct investments be structured to ensure all communities continue to be served beyond the initial award of funds to an eligible recipient.  However, in the Implementation Framework released on April 19, 2023 the EPA decided to separate direct investment and indirect investments into two separate competitions. This policy decision likely eliminates the possibility of cross-subsidies that would ensure continued operability for indirect investments in LID communities, which typically need a deeper subsidy. If the EPA opts to continue with separate competitions, we believe the agency should give priority to applicants that are applying for or collaborating across both competitions, have a strong track record of leveraging private capital, and a demonstrated ability to diversify a portfolio that includes debt, equity and grants in a way that meets the needs of a variety of financial institutions. Without a strong track record, direct recipients will not be able to instill confidence in the capital markets and optimize leverage across the portfolio at the indirect recipient level as well as at the qualified project level. We urge you to continue working closely with the staff from the U.S. Department of the Treasury that have experience internally, and through their consultants, making these types of investments in mission driven lenders. This includes a $12 billion suite of capital and grant programs to support CDFIs, MDIs, and the communities they serve, as well as the renewed State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) that is supporting up to $100 billion in small business loans, investments, and technical assistance through various state, tribal, and territory government programs.  We urge you to collaborate with them to maximize the impact of GGRF for communities that need the support the most.

Similarly, the entities receiving direct federal investment must also demonstrate experience navigating green financing projects and have shown the ability to manage these projects across a variety of communities in order to achieve GHG emissions reductions and develop successful projects. It is critical that the EPA balance out these needs for both financial viability and project-level expertise in order to maximize the fund’s performance across all metrics. The EPA should seek to work with entities that are composed of both impact-oriented institutions as well as green financing entities, to ensure that the goals of impact, performance, GHG emissions reductions and long-term sustainability are achieved.

Furthermore, the impact of the GGRF should not be to crowd out private capital but instead to focus on those eligible projects and communities that lack access to affordable capital. Although the IRA states that eligible recipients should prioritize projects that lack access to financing, the EPA should be focused on market transformation. Displacing affordable private capital focused on the broad use and adoption of clean technologies would run counter to the country’s climate goals.

Additionally, since the Justice40 prioritization should be a floor, not a ceiling, the EPA should require applicants to provide a strategy for how they will drive awareness, demand, and adoption of clean technologies in LID communities. We urge you to learn about community-level solutions that the Fund can support, especially solutions from low-income and disadvantaged communities. In addition, CDFIs and MDIs have a long track record of serving communities long ignored by the traditional banking sector, including the development of financing and financial tools that meet the needs of low-income and disadvantaged communities. Simply put, reducing emissions and lowering energy costs among those communities will be best accomplished through the use of financing tools, grant support, and effective outreach to generate demand, change behavior, and build local capacity.  It’s important that applicants prioritize technologies that will transform LID communities – saving households money on energy costs, creating quality jobs, and improving air quality - and work within the existing debt burden of families in LID communities. However, these communities cannot be served with financing tools alone and will need significant grant support across the value chain to generate demand, change behavior, and build local capacity. The success of the program in LID communities depends heavily on the ability to develop an ecosystem that supports other actors, including clean energy and workforce developers. Although the EPA guidance makes available $625,000 for technical assistance for indirect recipients, in order to drive demand and create an ecosystem we recommend that the EPA require some of these funds be aggregated and administered at the national level by the eligible recipient.

Driving demand will also need to be accompanied by a meaningful level of investment in mission driven lenders in order to change behavior. The Implementation Framework released by EPA caps the amount per indirect recipient at $5,000,000, which may not be the most impactful way to reach LID communities. For example, some communities have a limited number of mission driven lenders (e.g. CDFI deserts), making the cap on indirect investments have an impact on the amount of climate financing in those communities. We urge you to adjust this limitation on indirect investments to account for more factors, including demand, size of the institution and impact.

Finally, we urge you, after defining low income and disadvantaged community, to encourage applicants to the GGRF to structure a significant number of their investments in a way that incentivizes investments in the most underserved low income and disadvantaged communities, including those affected by high rates of adverse health and environmental outcomes. Investments in some underserved communities, like areas of persistent poverty and majority-minority communities, often are more time consuming and costly than in some other communities that are also considered underserved. Also, the definition of LID should include people focused categories, like the CDFI definitions for Low Income Targeted Populations (LITP) and Other Targeted Populations (OTP), to make sure that the low income and minority people who live in the LID communities are also directly benefiting from the GGRF.  We urge you to look at the deep impact standards created by Treasury for the Emergency Capital Investment Program (ECIP) and encourage eligible recipients to make investments in mission driven lenders that include similar financial incentives for investments in the most underserved communities. 

We share a dedication to decarbonization and justice and hope that we can work together with you and our nation’s mission driven lenders to meet the goals of the GGRF.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – As violence between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues for a third week, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA), joined by Sens. Ben Cardin (D-MD), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Michael Bennet (D-CO), have formally requested that the Biden administration offer all available support for humanitarian efforts in the region. The worsening conditions in Sudan have resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and have forced hundreds of thousands to flee in search of safety.

In a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Samantha Power, the senators highlighted the continued and indiscriminate violence, which has significantly worsened the humanitarian situation, and disrupted aid operations on the ground. According to the United Nations, even prior to the recent outbreak in violence nearly 16 million people in Sudan were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance.

“As the violence has escalated, its impact has been far reaching across all sectors of society. Damage to critical civilian infrastructure, including transportation and communication infrastructure, has limited the ability of people and basic goods to move throughout the country; damage to hospitals, depleted resources, and broken medical supply chains have largely degraded the nation’s health care capacity; and continued conflict has left significant portions of the population sheltering in their homes, with dwindling or exhausted supplies of food, water, and medicine,” the senators wrote. “As the UN’s top humanitarian affairs official said this week, ‘the humanitarian situation is reaching [a] breaking point.’ Unfortunately, this conflict has also deteriorated the flow and delivery of humanitarian assistance into Sudan, and aid groups’ ability to operate on the ground.”

Noting the indiscriminate violence and reported gross violations of international humanitarian law, the senators echoed calls for the parties to the conflict to ensure safe access and movement for humanitarian workers and medical personnel. They requested that the U.S. designate a senior diplomat or envoy to ensure that securing these humanitarian assurances remains a priority in direct negotiations, and that we engage with neighboring countries to help address the cross-border challenges seen from mass movement out of Sudan. Additionally, they voiced support for USAID and State Department efforts to support aid organizations in returning to Sudan quickly and safely, leverage local humanitarian organizations as part of the ongoing response to the violence, and engage with international partners as part of the U.S. response strategy.

The senators continued, “[A]s aid organizations work to reestablish operations, it is vital that the U.S. State Department and USAID provide all available support to facilitate ongoing aid operations on the ground, and support a resumption of efforts – whether in Sudan or in neighboring countries – that have been suspended due to the violence. In response to the significant need, and in part to fill in as international organizations have been forced to suspend their operations, a range of local and national Sudanese organizations have stepped forward to provide capacity. We encourage you to use flexibility in supporting these local efforts, in order to best leverage them alongside international efforts.”

Sens. Warner and Kaine, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), have been vocal about their support for aid efforts in Sudan and for the Sudanese diaspora in the United States, which in 2021 totaled more than 54,000 immigrants from Sudan, with the highest concentration located in Fairfax County, VA. Earlier this week, the senators called on the Biden administration to issue a new Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Sudan, which would provide relief from deportation and access to a work permit for foreign nationals from the country currently in the United States.

A copy of the letter can be found here and below. 

Dear Secretary Blinken and Administrator Power,

We write with deep concern regarding the horrific violence in Sudan, and its impact on the rapidly declining humanitarian situation on the ground. Now in its third week, the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left hundreds dead, thousands more injured, and has forced hundreds of thousands of individuals to flee to neighboring regions and countries.

As the violence has severely disrupted humanitarian assistance on the ground – including by forcing some organizations to withdraw or suspend their efforts – we urge that you offer all available support to resume aid operations, take steps to reposition aid resources to reflect the current security environment, leverage local organizations as part of an ongoing response strategy, and continue efforts to marshal an international response.

Direct negotiations facilitated by the United States are critical to the reestablishment of a robust international aid response, and we urge that assurances for immediate and safe aid operations be made a primary focus of those negotiations.

We are deeply grateful for the U.S. Government’s efforts in evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel, and American citizens from Sudan. However, the recent conflict has hit areas like Khartoum and Darfur particularly hard, and it tragically exacerbates the existing crisis and humanitarian need across the country. According to the United Nations (UN), even prior to the recent outbreak in violence nearly 16 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance – a figure that represents close to a third of the total population in Sudan. Even prior to the start of the conflict, the crisis was already acute – more than 4 million children and pregnant and lactating women are counted as being “severely malnourished.”

As the violence has escalated, its impact has been far reaching across all sectors of society. Damage to critical civilian infrastructure, including transportation and communication infrastructure, has limited the ability of people and basic goods to move throughout the country; damage to hospitals, depleted resources, and broken medical supply chains have largely degraded the nation’s health care capacity; and continued conflict has left significant portions of the population sheltering in their homes, with dwindling or exhausted supplies of food, water, and medicine. As the UN’s top humanitarian affairs official said this week, “the humanitarian situation is reaching [a] breaking point.”

Unfortunately, this conflict has also deteriorated the flow and delivery of humanitarian assistance into Sudan, and aid groups’ ability to operate on the ground. The men and women who work for the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as those employed by international relief organizations, have committed themselves to careers seeking to alleviate suffering around the world, oftentimes carrying out this mission in harm’s way. Tragically, in the first two weeks of fighting at least five international aid workers had been killed, and there have been broader threats targeting aid personnel and supplies.

To be clear, the blame for the disruptions to aid and casualties lie with the warring parties. Reported gross violations of international humanitarian law have greatly impacted the safety of aid personnel, and directly contribute to the suffering of the Sudanese people. We echo international calls for the parties to the conflict to ensure safe access and movement for humanitarian workers and medical personnel, and to allow for steady streams of aid into and throughout the country.

In response to the dire humanitarian need, the reestablishment of these aid flows is critical. We understand that organizations are looking at how to best reposition and recalibrate support in light of the serious security risks. We appreciate the direct efforts that the U.S. Government has initiated to support humanitarian assistance, including USAID’s activation of a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) on April 23, and we urge you to take steps to safely reposition and pre-position resources so that they can best be utilized on the ground as soon as possible.

Additionally, as aid organizations work to reestablish operations, it is vital that the U.S. State Department and USAID provide all available support to facilitate ongoing aid operations on the ground, and support a resumption of efforts – whether in Sudan or in neighboring countries – that have been suspended due to the violence. In response to the significant need, and in part to fill in as international organizations have been forced to suspend their operations, a range of local and national Sudanese organizations have stepped forward to provide capacity. We encourage you to use flexibility in supporting these local efforts, in order to best leverage them alongside international efforts.

In an alarming estimate earlier this week, the UN projected that the ongoing conflict may drive more than 860,000 individuals to flee from Sudan into neighboring countries. We have already seen significant levels of migration out of Sudan over the past three weeks, which at many points has overwhelmed border capacity, thereby creating additional humanitarian concerns at these crossings. We welcome U.S. efforts to engage these neighboring countries and the UN to increase border capacity, ensure UN and international non-governmental organizations (INGO) access to these border crossings, provide additional aid along these routes, and scale up planning efforts to account for significant anticipated volume.

It is critical that negotiations involving a ceasefire between the warring parties prioritize the immediate creation of safe and durable humanitarian access to those in need. Additionally, we urge the deployment of an appointed special envoy or other senior diplomat to the region to engage directly with neighboring countries to ensure the free movement of individuals seeking safety out of Sudan, and that UN and INGOs are able to provide needed assistance in these border efforts.

It is vital that the U.S. continue its diplomatic engagement to push for a durable cessation of violence, in partnership with the African Union, and other regional and international partners. This cessation ultimately is the only path towards ensuring that urgent humanitarian needs on the ground are met. It must, however, also be accompanied by a concerted international effort, which fully resources the work done by aid organizations.

We have listened to concerns about what this ongoing violence means for individuals’ loved ones in Sudan, and for the country’s future. We support and encourage all efforts by the U.S. Government to be a forward-leaning and strong partner in the international aid response to this crisis in Sudan. Finally, we request regular updates and briefings from the State Department and USAID on the delivery of humanitarian aid for civilians in Sudan, and from the State Department on the evacuation of American citizens.                                                                                

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – With violence erupting across the country, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee in search of safety, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) today formally requested that the Biden administration issue a new Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Sudan.

In a letter to Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the senators expressed their concern with the worsening humanitarian conditions in Sudan as intense fighting continues across the country despite multiple attempted ceasefires.

“In recent weeks, violence in Sudan has claimed hundreds of lives, injured thousands, forcibly displaced tens of thousands, and terrorized many more,” the senators wrote. “Despite multiple attempted ceasefires between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), intense and indiscriminate fighting continues across the country, including within the densely populated capital of Khartoum, and in the continuously conflict-stricken region of Darfur. Ongoing hostilities have led to the near collapse of the healthcare system, significantly disrupted the flow of humanitarian aid into the country, and in many cases made access to basic resources like food, water, and medication impossible.”

Established by the U.S. Congress through the Immigration Act of 1990, TPS is a temporary, renewable program that provides relief from deportation and access to a work permit for foreign nationals from certain countries who are unable to return safely to their home country due to natural disasters, armed conflicts, or other extraordinary conditions. There are more than 54,000 immigrants from Sudan in the United States as of 2021, according to data, with the highest concentration located in Fairfax County, VA.

The senators continued, “Given the extremely violent clashes, deteriorating conditions, and the posture of the Department of State, it is clear that Sudan meets the standards for TPS. To that end, it is critical that a new designation be issued for Sudan that reflects the ongoing armed conflict and the continued extraordinary and temporary conditions on the ground.”

Last week Sen. Warner expressed his support for the steps the Biden administration has taken to deliver humanitarian assistance to the region and push for an end to the violence through diplomatic efforts. Sen. Kaine, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), has been pushing for the administration to ensure the safety and security of U.S. citizens in Sudan and urging both sides to commit to a permanent ceasefire. Last week, he held an event in Richmond with members of Virginia’s Sudanese American community to hear their perspectives on the conflict and discuss ways he can be helpful. Sens. Warner and Kaine have been longtime supporters of the TPS program for regions facing instability, most recently joining 116 of their colleagues in a letter, led by Sen. Kaine and Rep. Castro, to the Biden administration requesting the redesignation of TPS for El Salvador and Honduras and celebrating the Biden administration’s decision to issue a Temporary Protected Status designation for Cameroon during a period of unrelenting violence.

A copy of the letter can be found here and below. 

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Secretary Blinken:

We urge you to issue a new Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Sudan, as the current armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has led to a mass exodus of individuals fleeing violence, scarcity of essential goods, and rapidly deteriorating health services. A new designation would protect current Sudanese TPS holders from returning to Sudan in the midst of this violence and would offer protected status to Sudanese nationals who arrived after March 1, 2022.

In recent weeks, violence in Sudan has claimed hundreds of lives, injured thousands, forcibly displaced tens of thousands, and terrorized many more. Despite multiple attempted ceasefires between the SAF and the RSF, intense and indiscriminate fighting continues across the country, including within the densely populated capital of Khartoum, and in the continuously conflict-stricken region of Darfur. Ongoing hostilities have led to the near collapse of the healthcare system, significantly disrupted the flow of humanitarian aid into the country, and in many cases made access to basic resources like food, water, and medication impossible.

Due to the continued threat of armed conflict, on April 22, 2023, the U.S Department of State issued a Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory and ordered the departure of Embassy employees. This is part of a broader effort by the U.S., in coordination with regional and international partners, to evacuate U.S. nationals from Khartoum and allow for a safe path into neighboring countries. Given the extremely violent clashes, deteriorating conditions, and the posture of the Department of State, it is clear that Sudan meets the standards for TPS. To that end, it is critical that a new designation be issued for Sudan that reflects the ongoing armed conflict and the continued extraordinary and temporary conditions on the ground.

It is important to note that, while the situation is rapidly changing, the threat will not subside immediately once the conflict stops. Lasting damage has been done to Sudan’s telecommunications networks, electrical infrastructure, and transportation systems, including to Khartoum International Airport, making international travel extremely difficult. 

Redesignating Sudan’s TPS status would also provide much needed clarity for current Sudanese TPS holders and would offer protection for Sudanese individuals who entered the U.S. more recently. As you know, Sudanese nationals living in the United States can currently apply for TPS under the April 2022 designation, which expires on October 19, 2023. TPS holders under the 2013 designation are facing an uncertain future due to ongoing litigation. The expiration date of TPS documentation under the 2013 designation is contingent on the outcome of the Ramos v. Nielsen case – a lawsuit determining the legality of the Trump Administration’s termination of Sudan’s 2013 designation – which could potentially remove status for TPS holders who have not applied under the 2022 designation.

Additionally, while TPS holders registered under the 2022 designation are exempt from the ongoing litigation, their protection expires in October. Further, there is currently no recourse for Sudanese nationals who have arrived in the U.S. after March 2022. This uncertainty and the continued dangerous circumstances in Sudan have created considerable hardship for TPS recipients and their families, including American-born children.

A new TPS designation for Sudan would protect eligible beneficiaries from the dangers they face if they were removed and would provide protection for newer arrivals. In light of these considerations, we strongly urge you to redesignate TPS for Sudan to ensure that Sudanese nationals already living in the U.S. are not forced to return to a nation facing violence and instability.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

###

Specifically, Sen. Warner wrote to Sec. Blinken regarding the now-closed Online Passport Renewal (OPR) System, which received more than 500,000 requests from August 2022 to February 2023. The online system has been unable to keep up with demand, leaving travelers scrambling to replace their passports at the last minute. In addition to costly delays, many constituents who filed to renew their passports online are receiving little to no information on the progress being made with applications regardless of how well in advance of planned travel their requests were filed, leaving many in limbo waiting for their documents.

“In an increasingly online age, I welcome the ability for my constituents to renew their passports through a secure paperless process,” wrote Sen. Warner. “However, the OPR system seems to be fraught with significant errors that have caused Virginians headaches, stress, and unfortunately in some instances, delayed or missed travel. Simply put, the service my constituents have received is unacceptable.”

In his letter, Sen. Warner posed a series of questions to better understand how the State Department plans to address the backlog:

• How does the agency’s handling of passport applications submitted online differ from those that are filed through traditional processes, either by applying at a Passport Acceptance Facility in person or by U.S. Mail?
• How does the agency determine the assignment of OPR applications to their Passport Agencies across the country? How does this compare to the assignment of traditional applications received?
• What is the current average processing time of an application submitted through the OPR process compared to those submitted through the traditional process? Please indicate the processing time for applications submitted under both expedited and routine processing.
• Does agency data reflect that some Passport Agencies are more successful in processing OPR applications timely than others? If so, what does the agency believe is the source of this imbalance, and how is the agency addressing this problem?
• Members of my staff have been told by Passport Agency officials that “technical issues” can at times impede the processing of an OPR application and that officials must transfer the application into the traditional system for final processing. Can you further explain these technical issues and what steps the agency is taking to fix these issues?

Sen. Warner’s constituent casework team works daily to help Virginians with a variety of federal agency needs, including help with passport renewal. Constituents experiencing any problems with new passport applications or passport renewals through both online and traditional applications can reach out to Sen. Warner for assistance through his website, available here.

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

Dear Secretary Blinken:

I write today to express my concern and frustration with the State Department’s Online Passport Renewal (OPR) system. 

The OPR system opened to the public in a pilot status in August 2022, and the agency reports it received more than 500,000 applications before they system closed in February 2023. During that time, many Virginians participated in utilizing this system to submit their passport renewals. Since the start of 2023, my office has received a significant increase in requests from Virginians who are experiencing considerable delays in the processing of their renewal applications filed through the OPR system prior to its closure. In many cases, my constituents filed well in advance of their travel date and paid for expedited processing. That said, the applicants still faced delays and, in some cases, ultimately needed to physically travel to a Passport Agency, often the day before their scheduled travel, in order to have their passport issued.

In an increasingly online age, I welcome the ability for my constituents to renew their passports through a secure paperless process. However, the OPR system seems to be fraught with significant errors that have caused Virginians headaches, stress, and unfortunately in some instances, delayed or missed travel. Simply put, the service my constituents have received is unacceptable. Therefore, I ask that you please address the following questions:

My office has been told that the agency is experiencing “an unprecedented volume of early demand for passports this year.” I commend officials at Passport Agencies across the country for their tireless work in adjudicating millions of passport applications each year. However, it appears that the OPR system’s flaws are directly inhibiting this effort, and I look forward to understanding how the agency will address existing challenges and improve the system for future use.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) led more than a dozen senators from both parties in urging for the extension of a policy that allows rural hospitals to continue delivering quality care to their communities. In a letter to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Administrator Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, the senators formally requested a four-year extension of the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy, which allows hospitals in rural areas to compete for, and retain, high-quality staff by increasing reimbursements to hospitals in rural areas with lower overall wages. Without action, Medicare payments to these hospitals will reduce after September 30, 2023.

In their letter, the lawmakers pointed out that extenuating circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, have not allowed for adequate evaluation of the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy. They argue that extending the policy will allow CMS to better assess its impact on the benefiting hospitals ability to recruit and retain health care staff.

“Unfortunately, due to disruptions in the marketplace caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we have not had the opportunity to see the true impact of the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy envisioned by CMS,” the Senators wrote. “Extending the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy for four additional years will allow hospitals and the agency to better understand the policy’s true impact in a more normal environment.”

In addition to Sens. Warner and Blackburn, the letter was signed by Sens. Tim Kaine (D-VA), Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), Joe Manchin (D-WV), John Boozman (R-AR), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), Bill Hagerty (R-TN), James Lankford (R-OK), Tim Scott (R-SC), Tom Cotton (R-AR), and Katie Boyd Britt (R-AL).

Sens. Warner and Blackburn are also the lead sponsors of the Save Rural Hospitals Act, which would establish an appropriate national minimum to the Medicare Area Wage Index to ensure that rural hospitals receive fair payment for the care they provide, while preserving the existing reimbursements for urban hospitals. The legislation, which was introduced in the last several Congresses, will be reintroduced in the 118^th Congress.

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

Dear Administrator Brooks-LaSure:

Thank you for your continued commitment to ensuring all health care providers have the resources they critically need to provide quality health care to Medicare beneficiaries. We write to you regarding the Medicare hospital area wage index (AWI) in the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). Specifically, we urge you to include a four-year extension of the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy, also known as the Lowest Quartile Adjustment (LQA) policy, in the upcoming Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 IPPS rule.

In August 2019, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) first included a four-year AWI adjustment to bottom quartile hospitals as part of the FY2020 IPPS (CMS-1716-F). At the time, CMS stated that the policy “reflected a common concern that the current wage index system perpetuates and exacerbates the disparities between high and low wage index hospitals.”[1] To address this concern, CMS increased the wage index for hospitals with a wage index value below the 25th percentile. The additional assistance has been a valuable lifeline for more than 800 hospitals in 23 states throughout FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, and now FY2023.

Unfortunately, due to disruptions in the marketplace caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we have not had the opportunity to see the true impact of the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy envisioned by CMS. Extending the Low Wage Index Hospital Policy for four additional years will allow hospitals and the agency to better understand the policy’s true impact in a more normal environment. In its original August 2019 rule, CMS appeared to acknowledge that more time may be needed to implement the policy when it stated, “this policy will be effective for at least 4 years.” We applaud CMS for that foresight and encourage it to extend the policy for four additional years.

The continuation of this critical policy will allow hospitals to recruit and retain health care staff and protect access to care for millions of Americans.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner joined Sens. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Chris Murphy (D-CT) and a group of 31 colleagues in a letter urging the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to take immediate action and address short-term limited duration insurance (STLDI) plans, or junk plans, which fail to provide adequate, comprehensive health insurance coverage.

In 2018, in an effort to sabotage the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Trump Administration made junk plans more widely available to consumers. Since then, these plans have continued to expand, however, they are not required to adhere to important standards, including prohibitions on discrimination against people with pre-existing conditions, coverage for the 10 essential health benefit (EHB) categories, and annual out-of-pocket maximums.

“Now, more than ever, the Department of Health and Human Services must act. Beginning in April, millions of Americans will likely lose the Medicaid coverage that they have relied upon during the COVID-19 pandemic. We must protect those who will be looking for coverage in the near future, and take steps to ensure that these plans are not allowed to further proliferate,” wrote the Senators. “It is past time for your Department to step up and address the expansion and proliferation of junk plans.”

In addition to Sens. Warner, Baldwin, and Murphy, the letter was signed by Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Bob Casey (D-PA), Christopher Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Maggie Hassan (D-NH), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Timothy Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ben Ray Luján (D-NM), Edward Markey (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Patty Murray (D-WA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Tina Smith (D-MN), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Peter Welch (D-VT).

Full text of the letter can be found here and below.

Dear Secretary Becerra,

As we celebrate the State of the Union and the important gains that we have made when it comes to expanding the availability of comprehensive, affordable health care coverage, we write once again to urge you to take immediate action and address short-term limited duration insurance plans, or, junk plans. Now, more than ever, the Department of Health and Human Services must act. Beginning in April, millions of Americans will likely lose the Medicaid coverage that they have relied upon during the COVID-19 pandemic. We must protect those who will be looking for coverage in the near future, and take steps to ensure that these plans are not allowed to further proliferate.

The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Families First) (P.L. 116-127) provided additional federal Medicaid funding to states during the COVID-19 public health emergency in exchange for maintaining coverage, specifically by meeting certain maintenance-of-effort requirements. These requirements barred states from lowering income eligibility levels, imposing new premiums or other barriers to enrollment, and involuntarily disenrolling individuals from their programs. According to federal data, Medicaid enrollment has increased by over 30 percent since February of 2020, an additional 19.5 million people. Congress has also worked to provide additional financial support for those who purchase ACA marketplace plans, and in August, passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which extended the additional financial support first enacted as part of the American Rescue Plan. As a result of this additional support, consumers saved an average of $800 on their premiums in 2021, and will continue to see savings through 2025.

As part of the Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23) omnibus, Congress took steps to uncouple the maintenance-of-effort requirements included in Families First from the public health emergency in order to avert both a Medicaid coverage and funding cliff. Starting on April 1, 2023, states will be able to begin conducting Medicaid eligibility redeterminations and enhanced federal funding will gradually phase out from April through December 2023. In order to receive enhanced funding during this period, states must follow all federal requirements related to redeterminations, update beneficiaries’ contact information, and use multiple methods to contact individuals when they have moved and have an out-of-date mailing address. States will also be required to submit monthly reports on unwinding, including information indicating where beneficiaries are experiencing challenges.

Congress worked to make sure that the FY23 omnibus gave state Medicaid programs a roadmap for the months ahead and enacted the Inflation Reduction Act to provide additional financial support for those enrolling in health coverage through the marketplace. It is now time for the Administration to do its job and act to protect those who will be seeking to enroll in coverage in the coming months.

According to estimates from your Department, approximately 15 million individuals will lose Medicaid or CHIP coverage in the coming year and will therefore require affordable health care coverage. Millions will be eligible for significant financial assistance to purchase comprehensive coverage on the marketplace. But without additional protections, many Americans could find themselves enrolled in junk plans that do not provide comprehensive coverage or protection for individuals with pre-existing conditions. These plans, which were actively promoted by the previous Administration and remain unchecked, are not required to comply with consumer protections that limit out-of-pocket costs or coverage of essential health benefits, including mental health services, treatment for substance-use disorder, prescription drug benefits, and maternity care. Furthermore, these plans engage in the type of discriminatory practices, such as retroactive coverage rescissions, medical underwriting, and lifetime and annual caps, which were commonplace before the Affordable Care Act.

Since President Biden took office, he has prioritized expanding access to comprehensive, affordable health coverage. Congress has supported these efforts. It is past time for your Department to step up and address the expansion and proliferation of junk plans.

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON – Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Vice Chairman Marco Rubio (R-FL) wrote to the Biden administration to request that it expand the use of existing tools and authorities at the Departments of Treasury and Commerce to prevent China’s military industrial complex from benefiting from U.S. technology, talent and investments.

In a pair of letters, the Senators expressed concern with the flow of U.S. innovation, talent, and capital into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which seeks to exert control over global supply chains, achieve technological superiority, and rise as the dominant economic and military power in the world. They also stress the need to utilize the authorities at the government’s disposal to protect U.S. interests and ensure that American businesses, investors, and consumers are not inadvertently advancing China’s authoritarian interests or supporting its ongoing genocide in Xinjiang and human rights abuses in Tibet and Hong Kong.

In their letter to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the Senators wrote, “It is widely known that the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) program targets technological advancements in the U.S., as well as university and research partnerships with the U.S., for the PRC’s military development.  U.S. technology, talent, and capital continue to contribute—through both lawful and unlawful means, including theft—to the PRC’s development of critical military-use industries, technologies, and related supply chains. The breadth of the MCF program’s ambitions and reach creates dangerous vulnerabilities for U.S. national and economic security as well as undermines respect for democratic values globally.”

The Senators also posed a number of questions for Sec. Yellen regarding Treasury’s internal Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) lists, which do not include a number of entities and individuals who have been identified by the U.S. Government as posing national security risks or human rights concerns.  

In their letter to Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the Senators wrote, “Despite recent restrictions on the export of sensitive technologies critical to U.S. national security, we remain deeply concerned that American technology, investment, and talent continue to support the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military industrial complex, intelligence and security apparatus, its ongoing genocide, and other PRC efforts to displace United States economic leadership. As such, we urge the Department of Commerce to immediately use its authorities to more broadly restrict these activities.”

The Senators also requested answers from Sec. Raimondo regarding America’s most critical high-technology sectors, the Department’s ability and authority to evaluate companies’ reliance on China and assess the flow of U.S. innovation to PRC entities.  

A copy of the letter to the Department of Treasury is available here. A copy of the letter to the Department of Commerce is available here.  

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WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Chairman Mark R. Warner and Sen. Tim Kaine, a member of the Senate Armed Services (SASC) and Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), joined Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) in a bipartisan push to fully fund the Department of Defense (DOD) office that addresses unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) and airborne national security risks. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) was created following a UAP amendment in the  Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to focus the DOD on resolving UAP sightings, improve data sharing between the DOD and intelligence community on UAP sightings, address national security concerns, and report health effects people may experience in relation to UAP events. AARO has access to DOD and intelligence community UAP data and is required to provide Congress with briefings and reports on UAPs. The Fiscal Year 2023 funding falls short of what AARO needs to fulfill its mission and maintain U.S. air supremacy.

“AARO provides the opportunity to integrate and resolve threats and hazards to the U.S., while also offering increased transparency to the American people and reducing the stigma around this issue of high public interest,” wrote the senators. “AARO’s success will depend on robust funding for its activities and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. As such, we respectfully request your assistance in securing the necessary funding and organizational support for AARO’s success and longevity.”

In addition to Warner, Kaine, Gillibrand, and Rubio, the letter is signed by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Michael Bennet (D-CO), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN).

Full text of the letter is available here and below.

Dear Deputy Secretary Hicks and Deputy Director Dixon,

We write today regarding implementation of Section 1683 of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the development of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO). AARO provides the opportunity to integrate and resolve threats and hazards to the U.S., while also offering increased transparency to the American people and reducing the stigma. AARO’s success will depend on robust funding for its activities and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. As such, we respectfully request your assistance in securing the necessary funding and organizational support for AARO’s success and longevity.

While we recognize there was an Administration request for funds in Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23) to fund basic operating expenses for AARO, it is facing a funding shortfall that will impede its ability to fulfill its mission. The amount outlined in the classified attachment is crucial to AARO’s scientific plan, and the lack of funding for these capabilities presents a serious impediment to AARO’s mission. We believe it is imperative for the Department of Defense to reprogram funds to cover this serious funding gap and it is for these reasons that we ask that the Department of Defense reprogram funds to prevent disruption to AARO’s work. Without FY23 funding, AARO’s ability to deliver integrated collection and analysis will fall behind schedule and be sub-optimized.

Additionally, while we understand that the Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) Presidential Budget Request is all but finalized, we anticipate that the request will not include necessary Research, Development, Test, and Evaluations funding for FY24. While we appreciate that the Department of Defense has been vocal in expressing its support for the resolution of unidentified anomalous phenomena, this commitment must also be reflected in funding requests provided to Congress. Accordingly, we urge you to work with Congress to ensure that AARO is funded appropriately in FY24 and that robust funding is requested for FY25.

In addition to securing necessary funding, we request a briefing from your offices on your agencies’ plan to implement the dual reporting of AARO to the leadership of the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.  The FY23 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) requires that the Director of AARO report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, with administrative support provided by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. The briefing should cover the balance between Intelligence Community and Department of Defense involvement, including how Title 10 and Title 50 authorities will be delegated to, and exercised by, the Director of AARO. We see it as essential that AARO’s activities are not viewed or managed as solely an intelligence activity.

The FY22 and FY23 IAAs and NDAAs provided broad authorities for the resolution of unidentified anomalous phenomena across domains, demonstrating significant support for its mission from Congress. It is critical that the aspirations of AARO’s mission are met with the resources necessary to succeed.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) and Vice Chairman Marco Rubio (R-FL) wrote to Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg, questioning the company about recently released documents revealing that the company knew, as early as 2018, that hundreds of thousands of developers in what Facebook classified as “high-risk jurisdictions” including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia had access to user data that could have been used to facilitate espionage. The documents were released as part of ongoing litigation against the company related to its lax handling of personal data after revelations regarding Cambridge Analytica.

Under pressure from Congress, Facebook revealed in 2018 that it provided access to key application programming interfaces (APIs) to device-makers based in the PRC, including Huawei, OPPO, TCL, and others. In the wake of those disclosures, Facebook met repeatedly with the staffs of both senators and the Senate Intelligence Committee to discuss access to this data and what controls Facebook was putting in place to protect user data in the future.

Wrote the bipartisan leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee in today’s letter, “Given those discussions, we were startled to learn recently, as a result of this ongoing litigation and discovery, that Facebook had concluded that a much wider range of foreign-based developers, in addition to the PRC-based device-makers, also had access to this data. According to at least one internal document, this included nearly 90,000 separate developers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is especially remarkable given that Facebook has never been permitted to operate in the PRC.  The document also refers to discovery of more than 42,000 developers in Russia, and thousands of developers in other ‘high-risk jurisdictions,’ including Iran and North Korea, that had access to this user information.”

The newly available documents reveal that Facebook internally acknowledged in 2018 that this access could  be used for espionage purposes.

“As the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, we have grave concerns about the extent to which this access could have enabled foreign intelligence service activity, ranging from foreign malign influence to targeting and counter-intelligence activity,” wrote Warner and Rubio, posing a series of questions to the company about the implications of the access, including:

1)      The unsealed document notes that Facebook conducted separate reviews on developers based in the PRC and Russia “given the risk associated with those countries.” What additional reviews were conducted on these developers? When was this additional review completed and what were the primary conclusions? What percentage of the developers located in the PRC and Russia was Facebook able to definitively identify?  What communications, if any, has Facebook had with these developers since its initial identification? What criteria does Facebook use to evaluate the “risk associated with” operation in the PRC and Russia?

2)      For the developers identified as being located within the PRC and Russia, please provide a full list of the types of information to which these developers had access, as well as the timeframes associated with such access.

3)      Does Facebook have comprehensive logs on the frequency with which developers from high-risk jurisdictions accessed its APIs and the forms of data accessed?

4)      Please provide an estimate of the number of discrete Facebook users in the United States whose data was shared with a developer located in the each country identified as a “high-risk jurisdiction” (broken out by country).

5)      The internal document indicates that Facebook would establish a framework to identify the “developers and apps determined to be most potentially risky[.]” How did Facebook establish this rubric? How many developers and apps based in the PRC and Russia met this threshold? How many developers and apps in other high-risk jurisdictions met this threshold? What were the specific characteristics of these developers that gave rise to this determination? Did Facebook identify any developers as too risky to safely operate with? If so, which?

6)      The internal document references your public commitment to “conduct a full audit of any app with suspicious activity.” How does Facebook characterize “suspicious activity” and how many apps triggered this full audit process? 

7)      Does Facebook have any indication that any developers’ access enabled coordinated inauthentic activity, targeting activity, or any other malign behavior by foreign governments?

8)      Does Facebook have any indication that developers’ access enabled malicious advertising or other fraudulent activity by foreign actors, as revealed in public reporting? 

The full of today’s letter is available here and below.

Dear Mr. Zuckerberg,

We write you with regard to recently unsealed documents in connection with pending litigation your company, Meta, is engaged in. It appears from these documents that Facebook has known, since at least September 2018, that hundreds of thousands of developers in countries Facebook characterized as “high-risk,” including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), had access to significant amounts of sensitive user data. As leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee, we write today with a number of questions regarding these documents and the extent to which developers in these countries were granted access to American user data. 

In 2018, the New York Times revealed that Facebook had provided privileged access to key application programming interfaces (APIs) to Huawei, OPPO, TCL, and other device-makers based in the PRC.  Under the terms of agreements with Facebook dating back to at least 2010, these device manufacturers were permitted to access a wealth of information on Facebook’s users, including profile data, user IDs, photos, as well as contact information and even private messages.  In the wake of these revelations, as well as broader revelations concerning Facebook’s lax data security policies related to third-party applications, our staffs held numerous meetings with representatives from your company, including with senior executives, to discuss who had access to this data and what controls Facebook was putting in place to protect user data in the future.

Given those discussions, we were startled to learn recently, as a result of this ongoing litigation and discovery, that Facebook had concluded that a much wider range of foreign-based developers, in addition to the PRC-based device-makers, also had access to this data. According to at least one internal document, this included nearly 90,000 separate developers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is especially remarkable given that Facebook has never been permitted to operate in the PRC.  The document also refers to discovery of more than 42,000 developers in Russia, and thousands of developers in other “high-risk jurisdictions,” including Iran and North Korea, that had access to this user information.

As Facebook’s own internal materials note, those jurisdictions “may be governed by potentially risky data storage and disclosure rules or be more likely to house malicious actors,” including “states known to collect data for intelligence targeting and cyber espionage.”  As the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, we have grave concerns about the extent to which this access could have enabled foreign intelligence service activity, ranging from foreign malign influence to targeting and counter-intelligence activity. 

In light of these revelations, we request answers to the following questions on the findings of Facebook’s internal investigation:

1) The unsealed document notes that Facebook conducted separate reviews on developers based in the PRC and Russia “given the risk associated with those countries.”

• What additional reviews were conducted on these developers?
• When was this additional review completed and what were the primary conclusions?
• What percentage of the developers located in the PRC and Russia was Facebook able to definitively identify?
• What communications, if any, has Facebook had with these developers since its initial identification?
• What criteria does Facebook use to evaluate the “risk associated with” operation in the PRC and Russia?

2) For the developers identified as being located within the PRC and Russia, please provide a full list of the types of information to which these developers had access, as well as the timeframes associated with such access.

3) Does Facebook have comprehensive logs on the frequency with which developers from high-risk jurisdictions accessed its APIs and the forms of data accessed?

4) Please provide an estimate of the number of discrete Facebook users in the United States whose data was shared with a developer located in the each country identified as a “high-risk jurisdiction” (broken out by country).

5) The internal document indicates that Facebook would establish a framework to identify the “developers and apps determined to be most potentially risky[.]”

• How did Facebook establish this rubric?
• How many developers and apps based in the PRC and Russia met this threshold? How many developers and apps in other high-risk jurisdictions met this threshold?
• What were the specific characteristics of these developers that gave rise to this determination?
• Did Facebook identify any developers as too risky to safely operate with? If so, which?

6) The internal document references your public commitment to “conduct a full audit of any app with suspicious activity.”

• How does Facebook characterize “suspicious activity” and how many apps triggered this full audit process? 

7) Does Facebook have any indication that any developers’ access enabled coordinated inauthentic activity, targeting activity, or any other malign behavior by foreign governments?

8) Does Facebook have any indication that developers’ access enabled malicious advertising or other fraudulent activity by foreign actors, as revealed in public reporting? 

Thank you for your prompt attention.

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