WASHINGTON – This week, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA), alongside U.S. Sens. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Dick Durbin (D-IL), called on Senate appropriators to block any federal funding from being used to relocate Space Shuttle Discovery from its home at the Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum in Virginia to Space Center Houston in Texas. In a letter, the senators warned that such a move would waste taxpayer dollars, risk permanent damage to the shuttle, and mean fewer visitors would be able to visit it.

The senators noted that transporting Discovery could cost more than $375 million in taxpayer money, far exceeding available appropriations, writing: “The Smithsonian estimates that transporting Discovery from Virginia to Houston could cost more than $50 million, with another $325 million needed for planning, exhibit reconstruction, and new facilities. These costs far exceed the $85 million appropriated in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Dedicating hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to move an artifact that is already housed, displayed, and preserved in a world-class facility is both inefficient and unjustifiable.”

They also warned that moving the shuttle would expose it to significant risk, citing past incidents when other shuttles were damaged during transport. The senators wrote, “Moving Discovery by barge or road would be far more complex, exposing it to saltwater, weather, and collision risks across a journey several times longer. As a one-of-a-kind artifact that has already endured the stresses of spaceflight, Discovery is uniquely vulnerable to these hazards. The heat tiles that enabled repeated shuttle missions become more fragile with age, and they are irreplaceable. Moving the shuttle would inevitably and irreparably compromise the artifact and render it unusable as a museum-quality collection item, permanently diminishing its historical and cultural value for future generations.”

The letter also highlighted the importance of maintaining broad public access to Discovery at the Udvar-Hazy Center, where millions of visitors each year including students and veterans can view it for free: “From a public access standpoint, the Udvar-Hazy Center, located in the Washington, D.C. region, offers free public admission and draws millions of visitors annually, including students, veterans, and international tourists. The Smithsonian provides Discovery with professional stewardship and global visibility. The Smithsonian is unique among museums for providing access without placing economic barriers on visitors to a national treasure meant to inspire the American public.”

Read the full letter here.

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) joined by Sens. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) wrote to President Trump questioning his administration’s decision to remove National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vice Chair Alvin Brown. The move is especially alarming given that NTSB plays a critical role in investigating transportation accidents like the deadly January 29^th collision that killed 67 people.

In their letter the senators highlighted the independent nature of NTSB and stressed the need to have qualified individuals serve on the board.

The senators wrote, “Congress designed the Board to represent a range of viewpoints by mandating that no more than three of the five members be of the same political party. Additionally, Congress removed the Board from the Department of Transportation and reestablished it as an independent establishment of the U.S. government to ensure the NTSB retains its independence and that NTSB staff are able to fulfill their mission of performing investigations into certain transportation accidents, including every civil aviation accident in the United States, by determining the probable cause of the accident and issuing safety recommendations.”

They continued, “The NTSB provides support to the victims, survivors, and families following a transportation accident – including facilitating the recovery and identification of fatally injured passengers. The NTSB has earned the trust of the transportation industry and millions of Americans through many grueling investigations; because of the NTSB, improved transportation safety has come out of calamity and tragedy.”

The senators also questioned the rationale behind President Trump’s decision to remove Vice Chair Brown without naming a replacement, leaving a vacancy in this crucial role that manages nearly 1250 investigations in the United States and supports more than 150 foreign investigations each year.

“Mr. Brown’s removal is consistent with your Administration’s dismissals of federal government leaders on the basis of bald partisanship and animus, however it is inconsistent with the law. The recklessness of vacating a leadership role on the NTSB in this critical moment in aviation safety runs counter to your obligations to the American people,” they wrote.

This is only the latest in the Trump administration’s reckless purge of qualified federal workers for political reasons. Earlier this week, Sen. Warner lead a group of colleagues objecting to Director of National Security Tulsi Gabbard’s decision to unilaterally terminate the Acting Counsel of the Office of the Intelligence Community Inspector General, and he has repeatedly warned of the lasting damage of the Trump administration’s continued politicization of nonpartisan government positions and removal of employees.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear President Trump:

On January 29, 2025, 67 souls were lost in the midair collision between an American Airlines flight inbound to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) and a U.S. Army helicopter. The survivors of the loved ones lost and our unanimous commitment is to prevent a tragedy like this from happening ever again. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board) is vital to ensuring that outcome which is why we were alarmed by the abrupt firing of Alvin Brown who recently served as the Vice Chair of the Board. We urge you to reevaluate your Administration’s actions related to Mr. Brown and reinstate his membership to the NTSB. 

The law directs the President to appoint, and the Senate to consent to, the five members of the Board, each serving a term of five years.   Congress designed the Board to represent a range of viewpoints by mandating that no more than three of the five members be of the same political party.  Additionally, Congress removed the Board from the Department of Transportation and reestablished it as an independent establishment of the U.S. government to ensure the NTSB retains its independence and that NTSB staff are able to fulfill their mission of performing investigations into certain transportation accidents, including every civil aviation accident in the United States, by determining the probable cause of the accident and issuing safety recommendations. 

The NTSB provides support to the victims, survivors, and families following a transportation accident – including facilitating the recovery and identification of fatally injured passengers. The NTSB has earned the trust of the transportation industry and millions of Americans through many grueling investigations; because of the NTSB, improved transportation safety has come out of calamity and tragedy. Upwards of “82 percent of NTSB recommendations have led to the implementation of safety improvements deemed acceptable by the Board.” 

On May 5, 2025, you fired the Vice Chair of the NTSB, Mr. Alvin Brown. Mr. Brown was appointed by President Biden and confirmed by the Senate in December 2024 to a term expiring on December 31, 2026. When you fired Mr. Brown, you failed to identify a potential replacement, creating a vacancy on the Board as it manages nearly 1,250 investigations in the United States, and supports close to 160 foreign investigations.  You provided no justification or explanation for Mr. Brown’s abrupt removal even as the law requires that a Board member may only be removed for cause in the form of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance of office.   When your Administration removed Mr. Brown from his position on the National Transportation Safety Board, you made it clear that it was for reasons unrelated to those enumerated in law and even thanked him for his service.  Had Congress intended NTSB members in good standing to be removable by the President at will, it would have written the law accordingly. Mr. Brown’s removal is consistent with your Administration’s dismissals of federal government leaders on the basis of bald partisanship and animus, however it is inconsistent with the law. The recklessness of vacating a leadership role on the NTSB in this critical moment in aviation safety runs counter to your obligations to the American people.

The traveling public relies on the NTSB to be a strong watchdog for transportation safety. Too many advances in aviation safety have come on the heels of a tragedy; but since 1967, the NTSB has worked to ensure the lessons learned are integrated into the aviation industry. Your recent actions indicate that your priorities for aviation safety are focused more on partisan politics rather than the safety of the millions of Americans who use our skies. We hope you will prove us wrong and ask that, in the absence of a showing that your actions to remove Mr. Brown complied with the law, you immediately reinstate Mr. Brown to the NTSB to complete his term of service as Vice Chair and to affirm your commitment to upholding the independence of the NTSB and allow the Board to perform their Congressionally-mandated duties to keep America’s transportation systems safe.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Chris Coons (D-DE), Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Jim Himes (D-CT-04), and Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Betty McCollum (D-MN-04) sent a letter to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard expressing “grave concern” about her recent interference in the independence of the Office of the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG).

In the letter, the lawmakers strongly objected to Director Gabbard’s decision to unilaterally terminate the Acting Counsel to the ICIG and to appoint a “Senior Advisor” to work within the ICIG’s office while reporting directly to the Director herself. The letter notes that these actions were taken without the approval of the Acting ICIG, in direct contravention of federal statues designed to protect the independence of the Inspector General’s office. Director Gabbard’s actions were brought to Congress’s attention in a letter the Acting Inspector General sent to lawmakers on May 28.

“Your actions violate both the letter and the spirit of the law,” the lawmakers wrote. “Despite your obligation to keep the congressional oversight committees fully and currently informed, our committees were notified of your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel, not by your office, but by the Acting ICIG.”

The lawmakers underscored that Director Gabbard’s appointment of a Senior Advisor inside the ICIG’s office compromised the ability to carry out its statutory mission of identifying and preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in the intelligence community.

“[The Acting ICIG’s] letter also disclosed that you have appointed a ‘Senior Advisor’ within the Office of the ICIG who reports to you but works in the ICIG’s office spaces, which presents significant concerns not only for the independence of the ICIG but also the ability of the ICIG to protect confidential whistleblower information,” the lawmakers stated. “Our understanding is that your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel was made 48 hours after she made inquiries regarding the legal basis for the appointment of the Senior Advisor.”

“Your recent actions undermine this independence and are contrary to commitments you made during your confirmation process,” the lawmakers wrote.

The lawmakers called on Director Gabbard to immediately cease “illegal interference into the ICIG’s operations” and to provide a detailed accounting of the personnel actions and communications that led to these decisions.

The letter concludes with a clear warning: “The ICIG must remain independent of political influence, and we will continue to oppose any attempt to interfere with its work, or silence its conclusions.”

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Director Gabbard:

We are writing to express our grave concern with your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) and to appoint a “Senior Advisor” within the Office of the ICIG without the approval of the Acting ICIG. 

The Office of the ICIG was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 with a stated purpose of creating “an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.”  To protect the independence of the Office, the law provides that the ICIG has “final approval of . . . personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the Inspector General” and “shall . . . appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General.”

Your actions violate both the letter and the spirit of the law.  Despite your obligation to keep the congressional oversight committees fully and currently informed, our committees were notified of your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel, not by your office, but by the Acting ICIG.  Her letter also disclosed that you have appointed a “Senior Advisor” within the Office of the ICIG who reports to you but works in the ICIG’s office spaces, which presents significant concerns not only for the independence of the ICIG but also the ability of the ICIG to protect confidential whistleblower information.  Our understanding is that your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel was made 48 hours after she made inquiries regarding the legal basis for the appointment of the Senior Advisor. 

The Acting ICIG disputes your assertion that she “agreed” to terminate the Acting Counsel and described your actions as “contrary to law” and “never sufficiently explained.”  As you testified at your confirmation hearing, the ICIG’s independence is “essential to ensure oversight and accountability.”  Your recent actions undermine this independence and are contrary to commitments you made during your confirmation process.  Therefore, we ask that you immediately provide our committees with the following information:

The justification for your decision to terminate the Acting Counsel to the ICIG.

The justification and legal basis for your decision to appoint a “Senior Advisor” within the Office of the ICIG who reports to you but works in the ICIG’s office spaces.

The identity of the “Senior Advisor” described in the Acting ICIG’s letter.

The names and positions of all ODNI personnel who participated in meetings regarding the decision to terminate the Acting Counsel to the ICIG or appoint a “Senior Advisor” to work within the Office of the ICIG.

All correspondence you have had with the Office of the ICIG since February 12, 2025.

A description of, along with the justification and legal basis for any other personnel actions you have taken with regard to the Office of the ICIG.

The ICIG must remain independent of political influence, and we will continue to oppose any attempt to interfere with its work, or silence its conclusions.

We request that you immediately cease your illegal interference into the ICIG’s operations, and look forward to your prompt reply to the information we are requesting.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine are pressing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to follow U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations requiring law enforcement to properly identify themselves and limit use of face coverings during official operations. This letter comes following repeated instances of unidentified ICE agents making arrests across the country, including in Virginia, causing panic and danger during arrests. 

“Across the country and in Virginia, masked ICE officers and agents without clearly visible identification as law enforcement have been arresting individuals on the streets and in sensitive locations, such as courthouses. Such actions put everyone at risk – the targeted individuals, the ICE officers and agents, and bystanders who may misunderstand what is happening and may attempt to intervene,” wrote the senators.

The senators highlighted that the current alarming trend of ICE agents carrying out arrests while obscuring their faces and failing to identify themselves has increased risk to both officers and the general public alike.

They continued, “The failure of ICE officers and agents to promptly and clearly identify who they are and the authority under which they are acting has led witnesses of immigration enforcement operations to justifiably question the law enforcement status, authority, and constitutionality of ICE officers and agents and their operations. Such actions compromise the safety of law enforcement officers and agents conducting the operation, the individual(s) being apprehended, bystanders, and other law enforcement who may be called to the scene to respond to a suspected crime.”

As part of their letter, the senators are requesting DHS and ICE provide policies, guidance, memoranda, legal advice, training materials, and all other relevant documents produced by ICE and DHS that discuss when and how to use face coverings, organizational clothing, or reveal officer and agent identities during immigration enforcement operations.

Earlier this year, Sen. Warner questioned DHS and ICE regarding their enforcement practices, specifically highlighting a March 5th incident where a U.S. citizen and Virginia resident was stopped and interrogated by ICE. Sens. Warner and Kaine also demanded answers from DHS regarding Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a father who was living legally under protected status in Maryland with his family until he was wrongfully deported without due process by the Trump Administration.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear Secretary Noem, Mr. Homan, Acting Director Lyons, and Director Hott:

We are steadfast in our desire to protect the safety of law enforcement and uphold public safety for every person, regardless of their immigration status, when interacting with law enforcement. The two are inexorably interconnected. The public and law enforcement must both be safe during immigration enforcement actions.

Accordingly, we write to you today regarding ICE’s recent immigration enforcement operations that have taken an alarming and dangerous turn. Across the country and in Virginia, masked ICE officers and agents without clearly visible identification as law enforcement have been arresting individuals on the streets and in sensitive locations, such as courthouses.   Such actions put everyone at risk – the targeted individuals, the ICE officers and agents, and bystanders who may misunderstand what is happening and may attempt to intervene.  

We urge you to direct ICE officers and agents to promptly and clearly identify themselves as law enforcement officers conducting law enforcement actions when arresting subjects, and limit the use of face coverings during arrests and other enforcement actions to avoid intimidation and reduce safety risks to the public.

The American public encounters federal, state, local, territorial, campus, and other law enforcement regularly. In the overwhelming majority of these law enforcement encounters, law enforcement officers reveal their faces and identities while in the commission of their duties. There are likely associated risks to doing so, yet the trooper pulling over a driver at night or the officer standing watch at the courthouse as suspected criminals enter manage those risks to their own and the public’s safety in a transparent and accountable fashion.

The Department of Homeland Security’s regulations provide that, at the time of an arrest, immigration officers must identify themselves if it is practical and safe to do so, and inform the individual of the reason for the arrest.  Additionally, under DHS policy, following a warrantless arrest, ICE officers must submit a write-up documenting the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest, including a statement of how “at the time of arrest, the immigration officer [did], as soon as it [was] practical and safe to do so, identif[ied] himself or herself as an immigration officer who is authorized to execute an arrest; and state[d] that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest.” 

Under the Trump administration, there has been an increase in reported instances of ICE officers and agents apprehending individuals while concealing their faces with masks, balaclavas, or other face coverings, often without clearly displaying their law enforcement credentials through identification, organizational uniform, or insignia.  Historically, the use of face coverings by ICE had been reserved for undercover or sensitive operations, but press reports and public videos indicate that ICE officers and agents have broadened this practice to the arrests of nonviolent individuals without a prior criminal history.  Anecdotally, the increased use of face coverings has been described as a means to conceal ICE officer and agent identities to avoid identification and accountability, particularly as the public has taken to filming immigration enforcement encounters. 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police warns that, “members of the general public may be intimidated or fearful of officers wearing a face covering, which may heighten their defensive reactions.”  The failure of ICE officers and agents to promptly and clearly identify who they are and the authority under which they are acting has led witnesses of immigration enforcement operations to justifiably question the law enforcement status, authority, and constitutionality of ICE officers and agents and their operations.  Such actions compromise the safety of law enforcement officers and agents conducting the operation, the individual(s) being apprehended, bystanders, and other law enforcement who may be called to the scene to respond to a suspected crime. We remain deeply concerned that ICE’s lack of transparency will lead the public to intercede in enforcement efforts, escalating an already tense interaction, and risking an entirely avoidable violent situation. 

Increased use of face coverings and lack of prompt and clear identification by ICE officers and agents in public is also having unintended consequences. Criminals are taking advantage of ICE’s anonymity and impersonating law enforcement officers and ICE agents.   Recently, this resulted in several criminal acts including harassment, theft, extortion, assault, battery, sexual assault, and kidnapping.  The uptick in ICE officers and agents concealing their identities and ICE affiliation blurs the public’s understanding of what ICE officers and agents look like and do while lawfully conducting their mission.  Bad actors have and will continue to take advantage of ICE’s lack of transparency to perpetrate crimes on the most vulnerable in our society.

We strongly urge you to take swift action to ensure the safety of the public and your officers and agents during the performance of their duties by reducing unnecessary intimidation tactics that escalate defensive reactions.  Additionally, we ask you to provide us with copies of any policies, guidance, memoranda, legal advice, training materials, and all other relevant documents produced by ICE and DHS that discuss when and how to use face coverings, organizational clothing, or reveal officer and agent identities during immigration enforcement operations by June 6, 2025.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Todd Young (R-IN) wrote to Secretary of State Marco Rubio urging him to work with President Trump to appoint a new Special Envoy for Sudan, build out key senior Africa roles at the State Department and the National Security Council, and to hold accountable both internal and foreign actors prolonging the conflict. Joining Sens. Warner and Young in the letter are U.S. Sens. Tim Kaine (D-VA), Mike Rounds (R-SD), and Cory Booker (D-NJ).

The ongoing violence in Sudan has led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Since the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began in April 2023, it’s estimated that the conflict has claimed the lives of tens of thousands to potentially over one hundred thousand individuals, and in the region, an estimated 30 million Sudanese are in need of immediate assistance.

Sen. Warner has led bipartisan efforts to address this crisis, including pushing the Biden administration to take steps to better address the chaos and violence displacing millions of people in Sudan and the surrounding regions. Following the senators' calls for a special envoy, President Biden appointed former U.S. Rep. Tom Perriello to the position, but the position has remained vacant under the Trump administration.

The senators wrote, “Since its outbreak, this conflict has displaced more than 14 million people – an estimated 11.5 million internally, plus an additional 3 million fleeing to neighboring countries and regions. Approximately 30 million people – more than half of Sudan’s population – are in urgent humanitarian need. By some estimates, the conflict has killed upwards of 150,000 people, in what the U.S. government has officially declared a genocide. Belligerents on both sides stand accused of atrocities, including killings, abductions of civilians, and horrific instances of sexual violence against women and children.”

The senators highlighted continued bipartisan efforts to respond to the crisis in Sudan and the need to fill crucial roles in countries impacted by the ongoing civil war. 

Added the senators, “We urge the Administration to fill the Special Envoy position, which would align with bipartisan Congressional intent expressed through the passage of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, which included provisions of the Response to Conflict in Sudan Act. We also strongly urge you to work with the President to nominate senior officials responsible for Africa, including the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, ambassadors to countries impacted by or otherwise implicated in the conflict, and push for the appointment of a Senior Director for Africa at the National Security Council to coordinate interagency efforts.”

In addition to the need to fill these crucial roles, the senators highlighted the impact that outside influences are having on this crisis, and the need for the U.S. to hold accountable any foreign actors exacerbating the crisis. 

“To date, the Office of Foreign Assets Control added SAF and RSF members to the Specially Designated Nationals List and taken action against numerous UAE companies for potentially violating U.S. sanctions. We encourage you, alongside allies and partners, to continue to hold accountable external actors that support and/or finance the conflict, using all available tools,” they wrote. 

Sen. Warner has been a leading voice in the Senate about the need for increased diplomatic and humanitarian support for Sudan since the war erupted. Last year, Sen. Warner pushed the Biden administration take more decisive action against foreign entities fueling the ongoing civil war in Sudan. In May 2023, he and Sen. Kaine requested that the Biden administration issue a new Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for Sudan, which was subsequently issued. Later that month, Sens. Warner and Kaine led a group of colleagues in urging the administration to offer all available support for humanitarian efforts in the region – and to be forward leaning on prioritizing local and community-based response efforts – as well as appoint a Special Envoy to Sudan tasked with coordinating and leading U.S. diplomatic efforts to address the crisis. In December 2023, the senators continued calling on the Biden administration to designate a Special Envoy to Sudan, and former U.S. Rep. Tom Perriello was subsequently appointed to the position. Sen. Warner has also continued his efforts to provide support to Sudan and the Sudanese diaspora and meeting with the Sudanese community in Virginia.  

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear Secretary Rubio,

Now into the third year of destructive conflict in Sudan, with escalating violence and atrocities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), U.S. engagement to bring a resolution to this conflict is more critical than ever. You can send a strong signal to the region by working with the President to appoint a new Special Envoy for Sudan and holding accountable both Sudanese and foreign actors prolonging the conflict. 

Since its outbreak, this conflict has displaced more than 14 million people – an estimated 11.5 million internally, plus an additional 3 million fleeing to neighboring countries and regions. Approximately 30 million people – more than half of Sudan’s population – are in urgent humanitarian need. By some estimates, the conflict has killed upwards of 150,000 people, in what the U.S. government has officially declared a genocide. Belligerents on both sides stand accused of atrocities, including killings, abductions of civilians, and horrific instances of sexual violence against women and children.

We urge the Administration to fill the Special Envoy position, which would align with bipartisan Congressional intent expressed through the passage of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, which included provisions of the Response to Conflict in Sudan Act.  We also strongly urge you to work with the President to nominate senior officials responsible for Africa, including the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, ambassadors to countries impacted by or otherwise implicated in the conflict, and push for the appointment of a Senior Director for Africa at the National Security Council to coordinate interagency efforts.

In addition to naming an envoy, we urge you to hold accountable external actors – including the UAE, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – and foreign businesses fueling the gruesome atrocities. The recent large-scale offensive by the RSF in Darfur – which has included storming and systematically burning down the Zamzam refugee camp, killing hundreds of people in a massacre that has also forced hundreds of thousands more to flee the camp in a matter of days – exemplifies the depravity that is being enabled by these external forces.

To date, the Office of Foreign Assets Control added SAF and RSF members to the Specially Designated Nationals List and taken action against numerous UAE companies for potentially violating U.S. sanctions. We encourage you, alongside allies and partners, to continue to hold accountable external actors that support and/or finance the conflict, using all available tools.

Conflicts rarely stay localized, and the longer this horrific war drags on, the more combustible this region becomes – an outcome that creates a power vacuum that extremists, terrorists, and our foreign adversaries will only be too happy to fill. The war’s continuation not only harms millions of innocent civilians, but also poses serious risk to American security interests in the region.

We strongly support U.S. engagement and leadership in Sudan. The appointment of a new Special Envoy would send a strong signal. We look forward to working together to support your efforts to end the conflict in Sudan, address the humanitarian crisis, hold accountable those responsible for atrocities, and stop the actors fueling this crisis inside and outside Sudan.

Sincerely,

###

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, led a coalition of senior Senate Democrats in sending a letter to President Donald J. Trump demanding an investigation into reports that senior White House advisor Elon Musk has used his government role to improperly advance his personal business interests abroad. The senators cited recent reporting on a disturbing pattern in which Musk allegedly leveraged high-level access to U.S. trade policy to pressure foreign governments – including India, South Africa, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Lesotho – into granting favorable treatment to his satellite internet provider Starlink in apparent exchange for U.S. policy concessions. These allegations, if true, would constitute a serious violation of federal ethics laws and a profound breach of public trust.

“Public servants must serve Americans, not their own bank accounts,” the senators wrote. “These alleged actions are an egregious breach of public trust, degrade our credibility with allies and partners, and potentially violate U.S. laws.”

In addition to Warner, the letter was signed by Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; Ron Wyden (D-OR), Ranking Member, Senate Finance Committee; Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair, Senate Appropriations Committee; Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Ranking Member, Senate Budget Committee; Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee; Chris Coons (D-DE), Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense; Brian Schatz (D-HI), Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; Ed Markey (D-MA), Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship; Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works; Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ranking Member, Senate Agriculture Committee; Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The letter details instances of Musk meeting with foreign leaders – including those from India and Bangladesh – inside the White House complex and the Blair House, shortly before their governments fast-tracked regulatory approvals for Starlink. In one example, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission issued what was described as “the swiftest recommendation” in its history for a Starlink license shortly after officials requested a delay in U.S.-imposed tariffs and met with Musk on White House grounds.

The senators noted that these developments came amid ongoing U.S. trade negotiations, raising serious questions about potential quid pro quo arrangements. The senators further warned that allowing a special government employee to influence foreign trade decisions to benefit their private ventures represents not only a potential legal violation but a corrosion of America’s international credibility.

The senators also condemned the misuse of taxpayer-funded government properties for personal business dealings, writing, “The White House and the Blair House are not merely buildings – they are enduring symbols of American democracy and service. To use this public property for personal enrichment is not only a betrayal of the public trust – it also sends a dangerous signal that power is not a solemn responsibility, but an asset to be exploited for personal gain.”

The lawmakers called on President Trump to launch a full investigation into Musk’s conduct, to publicly disclose the findings, and to provide Congress with a complete account of Musk and his associates’ use of government positions for personal benefit.

A copy of the letter is available here.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sen. Todd Young (R-IN), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, wrote to leadership at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) expressing the need for the agencies to exercise all available authorities to protect the sensitive genomic information of Americans, including in the bankruptcy proceedings of 23andMe, a personal genomics and biotechnology company that holds the DNA and sensitive information of millions of individuals.

The senators highlighted the attempts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other foreign adversaries to collect this type of genomic data from Americans and the various ways in which the PRC has used sensitive biometric data for surveillance efforts.

“As the Chinese government has realized, genomic data is incredibly valuable. Biological data is critical to biomedical discovery, particularly when, as here, it contains substantial amounts of personal genomic data. It can be used to create, design, and optimize everything from biopharmaceuticals and medical devices to optimizing AI models for medical applications,” the senators wrote. “The PRC also has demonstrated a sustained effort to leverage genomic and other biometric data for extensive surveillance; accessing this data - either directly or indirectly - could further enable PRC transnational surveillance, including posing counter-intelligence threats to the United States. In addition, genomic data can be used to create dual-use technologies that, on the one hand, could help create vaccines for diseases, but on the other hand, can be weaponized by our adversaries to for malign intent.”

While applauding the recent actions by the Justice Department in current proceedings, the senators underscored the need to take more steps to ensure that bad actors are prevented from acquiring, legally or illegally, Americans’ genomic information. 

The senators continued, “In addition to the Department's recent filing, and any anticipated CFIUS review, the Department, in conjunction with the Commission and other U.S. agencies as appropriate, must closely monitor the sale or transfer of, or access to, 23andMe's genomic databank, regardless of whether that activity is in the ordinary course of business, for compliance with all applicable statutes related to national security and consumer protection.”

This is the latest effort by Sen. Warner to safeguard Americans’ data and sensitive information from adversaries. As Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Warner has worked to ensure the U.S. is prepared to counter threats posed by foreign adversaries including the PRC across various sectors. Sen. Warner spearheaded the push to force CCP-based Bytedance to divest from TikTok in order to allow the app to continue operations in the United States. Last year, Sen. Warner introduced the Countering CCP Drones and Supporting Drones for Law Enforcement Act, legislation to cut off dangerous CCP drone companies from the U.S. telecommunication infrastructure. Sen. Warner also introduced bipartisan and bicameral legislation to improve information sharing between private companies and the Intelligence Community in order to mitigate the threat that foreign adversaries including the CCP pose to United States companies in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy generation and storage, including in the critical minerals industry, and earlier this year, Sen. Warner introduced legislation aimed at shoring up America’s response to financial threats stemming from the PRC.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear Attorney General Bondi and Chairman Ferguson:

We write to urge the Department of Justice ("Department") and the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") to exercise the full scope of their legal and statutory authorities in 23andMe Holding Co. ("23andMe")'s bankruptcy proceeding. We commend the Department on its April 22, 2025 filing in the 23andMe bankruptcy proceeding, recognizing that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should review this transaction in light of the substantial national security concerns involved. However, additional action from agencies are necessary in order to prevent adversaries, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), from acquiring millions of Americans' genomic data.

Chinese authorities have already collected genomic data on millions of their own citizens, and continue to actively target foreign companies, including in the U.S., for acquisition or investment, as well for theft, in order to obtain foreign individuals' genomic data, creating serious implications for national security, public health, economic security, and Americans' privacy. As the Chinese government has realized, genomic data is incredibly valuable. Biological data is critical to biomedical discovery, particularly when, as here, it contains substantial amounts of personal genomic data. It can be used to create, design, and optimize everything from biopharmaceuticals and medical devices to optimizing AI models for medical applications. The PRC also has demonstrated a sustained effort to leverage genomic and other biometric data for extensive surveillance; accessing this data - either directly or indirectly - could further enable PRC transnational surveillance, including posing counter-intelligence threats to the United States. In addition, genomic data can be used to create dual-use technologies that, on the one hand, could help create vaccines for diseases, but on the other hand, can be weaponized by our adversaries to for malign intent.

In order to prevent China from weaponizing this data, or outcompeting the U.S. economically, the U.S. must urgently prioritize the protection of biological and genomic data, particularly of Americans, starting with that held by 23andMe.

As the Department notes in its recent filing, its Data Security Program must be better utilized to ensure the protection, and prevent the acquisition, of Americans' sensitive genomic data. In addition to the Department's recent filing, and any anticipated CFIUS review, the Department, in conjunction with the Commission and other U.S. agencies as appropriate, must closely monitor the sale or transfer of, or access to, 23andMe's genomic databank, regardless of whether that activity is in the ordinary course of business, for compliance with all applicable statutes related to national security and consumer protection. Chairman Ferguson's letter to the Office of the U.S. Trustee lays out a clear rationale for robust oversight by the Justice Department over the legal obligations and protections that 23andMe owes its customers ("users"). 23andMe's users also should have the ability to remove their genetic data from acquisition by a foreign government or entities under the control or influence of a foreign government, including data associated with other personally-identifiable information and any other data generated by 23andMe that uses genetic data in the aggregate.

23andMe's users provided their sensitive, personal genetic data to a privately-owned U.S. company, potentially without fully understanding the implications of this data falling into the hands of adversaries, including cybercriminals and foreign nation-states. Further, the genetic information held in 23andMe's databank has implications for relatives of 23andMe users who share common genetic markers, creating additional privacy concerns for such individuals who had no opportunity to consent to how 23andMe's data could be used in ways that affect them.

Outside of this proceeding, we urge the Department, the Commission, and other relevant federal entities to closely monitor future transactions, and use all levers as appropriate, where foreign entities, particularly those under the control or influence of foreign nations of concern, are attempting to purchase - through bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise-Americans' sensitive biologic and genomic data. To this end, we encourage the DOJ to evaluate any appropriate updates to its recently-released Final Rule,6 implementing Executive Order 14117 on "Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern", to address any novel risks posed by potential acquisition (and resale) of 23andMe data by covered vendors.

In addition, the Department and the Commission must work with lead agencies to support the cybersecurity of genomic data. In March 2022, 23andMe suffered a security breach that compromised the genetic information of millions of users, underscoring concerns around genomic data privacy and misuse.

In short, it is paramount to our national and economic security that there is a whole-of­ government approach to protecting Americans' sensitive genomic data, including by preventing malign entities from gaining access to such data through commercial acquisition, cyberattacks, or other illicit means. We remain committed to working with the Department, the Commission, and the Administration broadly on this issue.

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WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) joined 23 of their Senate colleagues in urging U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Acting Director Todd Lyons to return Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a father who was living legally under protected status in Maryland with his family until he was wrongfully deported without due process by the Trump Administration last month and sent to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador. The Trump Administration has admitted Abrego Garcia’s deportation was the result of an “administrative error” but has not returned Abrego Garcia to his family and home in Maryland.  

Specifically, the senators call on the Trump Administration to comply with the court order requiring that they facilitate Abrego Garcia’s return and ask for responses to a series of questions regarding ICE’s enforcement policies that may have led to this grave error—and what measures they will take to ensure such an incident does not occur again.

“It is unacceptable that anyone would be deported without proper due process, especially where an immigration judge has granted the individual protected status that explicitly prohibits his return to El Salvador,” the senators wrote. “We demand that the Administration bring Mr. Abrego Garcia home immediately.”

“Per court filings, Mr. Abrego Garcia came to the United States in 2011 as a teenager fleeing gang threats in his home country of El Salvador. In 2019, ICE arrested Mr. Abrego Garcia over an unfounded and anonymous allegation that he was involved with MS-13, which placed him in deportation proceedings. The U.S. immigration judge in the case ultimately found that it was in fact Mr. Abrego Garcia who was at risk of being the victim of gang violence,” the senators continued. “This ruling was made under the Trump Administration in 2019 and was in fact required by law under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act once the immigration judge made the factual determination that Mr. Abrego Garcia faced a likelihood of torture in El Salvador. At the time, the Trump Administration made no effort to appeal the judge’s ruling or pursue Mr. Abrego Garcia’s deportation further. Court filings attest that Mr. Abrego Garcia has complied with regular ICE check-ins, has no criminal charges, and has had no contact with any other law-enforcement agency since his release in 2019.”

“Mr. Abrego Garcia is currently being held at CECOT, a maximum-security prison in El Salvador notorious for human rights abuses, after being deported in violation of the law to the very country where his return was impermissible,” they continued. “And when the Administration makes a mistake as severe as sending an individual with protected status to a foreign prison, it cannot simply shrug off responsibility and allege that there is nothing it can do to reunite him with his wife and child, who are American citizens.”

The senators concluded the letter with a series of questions for Secretary Noem and Acting Director Lyons about Abrego Garcia’s protected status, the Department of Homeland Security and ICE’s failure to follow well-established procedures and practices to avoid erroneous deportations and to promptly fix such errors if they do occur, and to demand evidence for unsupported accusations from Vice President J.D. Vance and Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt that Abrego Garcia is a member of MS-13 gang. The senators requested a response by April 22.

In addition to Sens. Warner and Kaine, the letter was signed by U.S. Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Ron Wyden (D-OR).

Full text of the letter can be found here and below:

Dear Secretary Noem and Acting Director Lyons, 

We write to express our concerns regarding the deportation of Kilmar Abrego Garcia to El Salvador, an action which the Administration admitted in a recent court filing was an “administrative error.” It is unacceptable that anyone would be deported without proper due process, especially where an immigration judge has granted the individual protected status that explicitly prohibits his return to El Salvador. We demand that the Administration bring Mr. Abrego Garcia home immediately.  

According to court filings, on March 12, 2025, shortly after Mr. Abrego Garcia had picked up his son from the boy’s grandmother’s house, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) stopped Mr. Abrego Garcia, inaccurately telling him that his protected status had changed. After giving his wife a few minutes to arrive to take custody of his son, ICE arrested and detained him without any further explanation as to the reason for his arrest. ICE then transferred Mr. Abrego Garcia and other detainees to Texas, where on March 15, 2025, they were loaded onto planes and deported to El Salvador. Mr. Abrego Garcia was reportedly on the only plane that was not sent under the authority of the Alien Enemies Act but instead was transporting migrants with formal removal orders signed by a judge. This occurred despite the fact that ICE knew, as the Administration conceded in court, that his protected legal status specifically prohibited his removal to El Salvador.  

Per court filings, Mr. Abrego Garcia came to the United States in 2011 as a teenager fleeing gang threats in his home country of El Salvador. In 2019, ICE arrested Mr. Abrego Garcia over an unfounded and anonymous allegation that he was involved with MS-13, which placed him in deportation proceedings. The U.S. immigration judge in the case ultimately found that it was in fact Mr. Abrego Garcia who was at risk of being the victim of gang violence. The judge found that Mr. Abrego Garcia and his relatives credibly testified that gang members had been trying to extort his family and recruit him and his brother to join the gang, forcing his family to move multiple times, ultimately compelling both him and his brother to flee to the United States out of fear.  

The immigration judge agreed that Mr. Abrego Garcia would likely face persecution if deported back to El Salvador and thus granted him a form of legally mandated protection known as “withholding of removal.” Withholding of removal, which may only be granted by an immigration judge, provided Mr. Abrego Garcia the ability to stay and work in the United States despite being the subject of a deportation order. This ruling was made under the Trump Administration in 2019 and was in fact required by law under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act once the immigration judge made the factual determination that Mr. Abrego Garcia faced a likelihood of torture in El Salvador. At the time, the Trump Administration made no effort to appeal the judge’s ruling or pursue Mr. Abrego Garcia’s deportation further. Court filings attest that Mr. Abrego Garcia has complied with regular ICE check-ins, has no criminal charges, and has had no contact with any other law-enforcement agency since his release in 2019.  

Mr. Abrego Garcia is currently being held at CECOT, a maximum-security prison in El Salvador notorious for human rights abuses, after being deported in violation of the law to the very country where his return was impermissible. Though the Administration has admitted in court that his deportation was a mistake, it alleges that there is nothing it can do to address this injustice, given that Mr. Abrego Garcia is now in the jurisdiction of the government of El Salvador as part of an agreement to imprison U.S. deportees in exchange for financial compensation.  

Your unwillingness to immediately rectify this “administrative error” is unacceptable. Under multiple Democratic and Republican administrations, the Department of Homeland Security and ICE followed the rule of law and worked to quickly return people who were wrongfully deported, in the rare instances where such “administrative errors” occurred. The Administration’s mass deportation agenda does not transcend immigration law or the need for due process. And when the Administration makes a mistake as severe as sending an individual with protected status to a foreign prison, it cannot simply shrug off responsibility and allege that there is nothing it can do to reunite him with his wife and child, who are American citizens. On Friday, a U.S. District Court judge in the District of Maryland ordered the government to return Mr. Abrego Garcia to the United States, and on Monday the Fourth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the order. The Administration should promptly comply with the district court’s order.

To address our concerns about this matter and to provide clarity on the Department of Homeland Security and ICE’s policy regarding the immigration enforcement actions against immigrants with protected status, we ask that your Administration answer the following questions by April 22, 2025: 

1. The standard and legal course for the government to take to deport someone with protected status would be to reopen the case, introduce evidence that grounds for terminating the protected status exist, and then allow an immigration judge to make a determination as to their status. Why was that course of action not taken in this case?  
2. In the past, DHS and ICE worked to quickly return people to the U.S. who were erroneously deported. Why is DHS and ICE no longer following these well-established procedures and practices?   
3. Vice President J.D. Vance and Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt have both claimed that Mr. Abrego Garcia is an MS-13 gang member, but the government was unable or unwilling to provide any evidence to substantiate that claim to the court. Please provide any evidence of Mr. Abrego Garcia’s membership in MS-13.
4. Given that the Administration is reportedly paying $6 million to El Salvador to detain deported immigrants at CECOT, why does it believe that there is nothing it can do to return Mr. Abrego Garcia to his family in the United States? Please provide a copy of the agreement between the U.S. and El Salvador on the detention of people deported from the U.S. in CECOT.
5. Are there any other cases that the Administration is aware of in which an immigrant with protected status was illegally deported without due process? If so, identify those cases and explain what, if anything the government is doing to rectify those errors. 
6. Will the Administration commit to reviewing all of the cases of its deportees to ensure that it has appropriately identified all of the errors? 
7. What actions will the Administration take in the future to ensure that immigrants with protected status are afforded their appropriate due process? 

We appreciate your prompt attention to this vital matter and look forward to reviewing your fulsome, timely response. 

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee Jack Reed (D-RI), and Ranking Member on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Chris Coons (D-DE), led their committee colleagues in a letter to President Trump regarding the firing of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), General Timothy Haugh, as well as the reassignment of the Deputy Director of the NSA, Wendy Noble.

Joining Vice Chairman Warner and Ranking Members Reed and Coons in this letter are Sens. Patty Murray (D-WA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Gary Peters (D-MI), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), and Chris Murphy (D-CT).

“These actions severely compromise our ability to keep Americans safe. As you are well aware, our nation currently faces serious cyber threats from foreign adversaries, such as from China’s Salt Typhoon, with near-daily attacks against our critical infrastructure,” the senators wrote. “In addition, our nation’s military is engaged in ongoing operations against multiple threats, from the Houthis in Yemen to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Given the dangers facing the United States, it is inexplicable that the Administration would remove the senior leaders of NSA/CYBERCOM without cause or warning, and risk disrupting critical ongoing intelligence operations.”

The senators also highlighted the impact this move would have on the dual-hat arrangement, in which a single officer leads both the NSA and CYBERCOM, and stressed that prematurely severing this agreement could put U.S. national security at risk.

They continued, “Premature termination of the dual-hat arrangement would severely degrade the speed and effectiveness of NSA’s and CYBERCOM’s abilities to execute their missions and could have dire consequence for our national security. As Congress on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis has repeatedly made clear in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2017, 2018, and 2020, clear criteria must be met before any termination can be considered and both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must together certify that separation will not “pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the national security interests of the United States.”

As members of the key committees tasked with conducting oversight over NSA, the senators requested written justification for why Director Timothy Haugh and Ms. Wendy Noble were removed from their posts, and asked for a Congressional briefing regarding any additional actions the administration plans to take with respect to NSA and CYBERCOM, including but not limited to the separation of the dual-hat.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear President Trump,

We write with alarm at the sudden and inexplicable firing of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, General Timothy Haugh, as well as the reassignment of the Deputy Director of the NSA, Wendy Noble. Not only have both dutifully served this nation for decades under both Democratic and Republican administrations, but their removals were conducted in the middle of the night with no consultation with Congress and, according to reports, at the behest of a private citizen who has a record of promoting conspiracy theories.

These actions severely compromise our ability to keep Americans safe. As you are well aware, our nation currently faces serious cyber threats from foreign adversaries, such as from China’s Salt Typhoon, with near-daily attacks against our critical infrastructure. In addition, our nation’s military is engaged in ongoing operations against multiple threats, from the Houthis in Yemen to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Given the dangers facing the United States, it is inexplicable that the Administration would remove the senior leaders of NSA/CYBERCOM without cause or warning, and risk disrupting critical ongoing intelligence operations.

Furthermore, we urge you to exercise careful consideration and consultation with Congress on any further actions that may impact NSA’s or CYBERCOM’s abilities to provide the critical intelligence and operational support to policymakers and warfighters. This includes, but is not limited to, any considerations to terminate the dual-hat arrangement. Premature termination of the dual-hat arrangement would severely degrade the speed and effectiveness of NSA’s and CYBERCOM’s abilities to execute their missions and could have dire consequence for our national security. As Congress on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis has repeatedly made clear in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2017, 2018, and 2020, clear criteria must be met before any termination can be considered and both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must together certify that separation will not “pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the national security interests of the United States.”

As Members of the respective committees of oversight, we request that you formally provide in writing a justification for why Director Timothy Haugh and Ms. Wendy Noble were removed from their posts and provide a briefing to Congress on any additional actions you plan to take with respect to NSA and CYBERCOM, including but not limited to the separation of the dual-hat.

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking Committee, wrote to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Andrew Ferguson and to Attorney General Pam Bondi expressing concern over continued prevalence of fraud in the digital advertising industry, highlighting how this fraud hurts U.S. Government (USG) customers, and therefore, American taxpayers.

“The failures and misrepresentations of these verification vendors amount to far more than simple contradictions of their marketing puffery,” wrote Sen. Warner. “As publishers and advertisers rely on these services’ asserted ability to avoid bot traffic and deliver content to customers, these verification firms serve as cover for the systemic failure by key ecosystem stakeholders, potentially compromising a significant sector of the online ad market.”

The phenomenon of digital fraud has skyrocketed in recent years, with reports indicating that as of 2023, digital fraud has grown to $84 billion, up from $7.4 billion in 2017.

He continued, “Failure to meet the terms of contracts result in the misuse of taxpayer dollars, and undermine the efficacy of government public awareness and job recruitment campaigns. These failures drive inflated ad costs and reduced effectiveness for thousands of small and midsize businesses and charities that rely on digital advertising to succeed, and these increased costs trickle down to consumers who end up paying more for basic goods and services.”

In his letter to the FTC, Sen. Warner requested the commission investigate this wide-spread fraud:

1. Did verification vendors such as Integral Ad Science (“IAS”), DoubleVerify (“DV”), and HUMAN Security, among others, claim in their marketing materials to be able to perform real-time bot filtering and have the capability to prevent ads from serving to declared bots, such as those on the IAB Bots & Spiders List?
2. Do these verification vendors receive access to the “User Agent” field in real-time programmatic ad auctions from demand side platforms like Google DV360 and the Trade Desk?
3. Can the verification vendors’ pre-bid technology actually stop ads from serving to declared bots on the IAB Bots & Spiders List, or merely prevent ads from serving on website domains with historically high levels of bot traffic? If the latter, what evidence exists that can demonstrate specific websites are getting blocked, deliberately or inadvertently, from ad campaigns and thus de-monetized?
4. If the verification vendors do not receive access to the User-Agent and cannot block declared bots, did these vendors make false advertising claims and engage in deceptive trade practices when promoting their pre-bid bot avoidance or suspicious activity blocking technology?
5. What is the extent of the resulting financial harm to the United States government and non-profit advertisers, as well as to publishers that paid for this ineffective bot avoidance technology?

Additionally, Senator Warner requested that the Justice Department investigate the following:

1. Whether ad verification companies such as IAS, DV, and HUMAN have knowingly misrepresented their capabilities to federal government clients or government contractors, particularly regarding their ability to detect and filter bot traffic in real-time.
2. Whether the ad verification firms involved in these failures violated the False Claims Act by charging the government – or government contractors – for services they did not deliver.

Sen. Warner has been vocal about the harm caused by this continued fraud for years, and as the digital space continues to grow in reach and importance, he has stressed the need to reign it in. In 2016, Sen. Warner first called on the FTC to protect consumers from this digital fraud. In 2018, he expressed concern over its continued prevalence following a detailed reporting about inaction by the FTC and Google to curb these efforts.

A copy of the letter to the FTC is available here. A copy of the letter to the DOJ is available here.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) wrote to leadership at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) regarding their enforcement practices, specifically highlighting a March 5^th incident where a U.S. citizen and Virginia resident was stopped and interrogated by ICE. The individual reports that he made multiple attempts to prove his citizenship, but despite these efforts, was handcuffed and questioned about his immigration status.

In an interview with local media, the citizen provided details of his arrest, claiming that officers, who were looking for a different individual with a deportation order, rebuffed multiple attempts to provide identification and despite being told he was a U.S. citizen, continued to question his immigration status.

“All Virginians, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status, deserve to be treated with respect and must be properly afforded their rights as expressed in the U.S. Constitution. Any law enforcement performing immigration enforcement must abide by the U.S. Constitution and federal law. When ICE agents violate or create the appearance of a violating the rights of their fellow citizens, it does harm to all Virginians and all Americans,” Sen. Warner wrote.

He continued, “Undisciplined, hostile, or threatening enforcement actions by ICE will hinder relationships with local communities, further compromising trust and safety and risk potentially degrading ICE’s enforcement efforts and officer safety. Given DHS’ recent emphasis on the safety of its law enforcement agents, particularly ICE, I expect you share my concern for the risks to Virginians and law enforcement alike created by a perception of capricious or unjustified action taken against U.S. citizens.”

In the letter, Sen. Warner requested clarity on ICE enforcement methods in Virginia, and a detailed account of the March 5^th arrest:

1. Please provide a detailed description of the events leading up to and during ICE’s arrest of a U.S. citizen in Manassas, Virginia on March 5, 2025.

1. Did ICE partner or collaborate with any state or local law enforcement entities for this enforcement action? If so, please list the entities and the extent of the collaboration.
2. Did the ICE agents present at the scene identify themselves as law enforcement? If so, how did they identify themselves? Were the individuals dressed in ICE uniform and/or was there a badge easily visible or a car plate to distinguish themselves as federal law enforcement?
3. If the agents did identify themselves as federal law enforcement, did they do so prior to drawing their weapons? Please provide a detailed timeline.
4. Were the ICE agents (and any other law enforcement involved in the incident) qualified to perform the detention and apprehension of the U.S. citizen and the other vehicle occupants? Were the ICE agents current on ICE’s use of force training and weapons qualifications?

2. Who were the ICE agents originally seeking when they misidentified and detained the U.S. citizen? What authority did ICE utilize to proceed with deportation orders for the individual with whom they were originally seeking?
3. How are ICE agents trained to investigate and verify U.S. citizenship or other lawful status when seeking persons of interest? How do ICE agents make an accurate determination of U.S. citizenship or other lawful status? What are the steps that ICE takes to ensure that its agents do not subject U.S. citizens and other individuals with lawful status to unnecessary and mistaken law enforcement encounters with ICE, including apprehension, arrest, detention, or deportation?
4. What tools or resources does ICE utilize to make an accurate citizenship or lawful status determination prior to an individual’s interaction with ICE?
5. Does ICE have all the adequate training, tools, or resources to prevent U.S. citizens from being mistakenly subject to ICE enforcement? If not, what additional training, tools, and resources does ICE need to ensure it does not mistakenly subject such individuals to enforcement?
6. What identifying information about the person of interest did ICE have prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? What steps did ICE take to verify this information prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? Did ICE properly apply its own policies and procedures for verifying U.S. citizenship and did ICE exhaust all the tools and resources at their disposal to verify U.S. citizenship prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? Did the ICE agents contact the ICE Office of Principal Legal Advisor prior to detaining the U.S. citizen or after his release?
7. Does the Department of Homeland Security systematically collect and maintain data of its encounters with individuals for whom there is evidence of U.S. citizenship or lawful status? If so, please provide data on how many U.S. citizens have been mistakenly subjected to ICE enforcement, including being apprehend, detained, or deported since January 20, 2025. If ICE does not collect this data, why not?
8. How will ICE ensure that it is properly applying the policies and procedures regarding the investigation and verification of citizenship or lawful status prior to encounters with ICE?
9. What steps does ICE take to remedy an encounter whereby they mistakenly applied enforcement actions to an individual who is not subject to ICE enforcement, such as a U.S. citizen? How will the agency prevent future instances?
10. In a statement that ICE provided on March 7th, the agency states that the U.S. citizen “matched the description of the subject of an operation” and that ICE agents operated “based on reasonable suspicion, including a likeness to the description of the target.”4 Please provide additional information to support the reasonable suspicion referenced in the statement, including any evidence that the U.S. citizen does indeed have a “likeness to the description of the target.” If there is a photograph of the person of interest the ICE agents mistook for the U.S. citizen, please provide the photograph.
11. Were the ICE agents involved in the U.S. citizen’s detention counseled or disciplined following the encounter based on mistaken identity? Please explain.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear Secretary Noem, Mr. Homan, Acting Director Lyons, and Director Hott:

I write to you regarding ICE’s recent enforcement efforts, and, in particular, the alarming treatment of a U.S. citizen and Virginia resident whom ICE stopped and interrogated in Manassas, Virginia on March 5, 2025.

In an interview with NBC4 Washington, a U.S. citizen described that he was driving to work when ICE agents stopped and surrounded his truck, exited their vehicles with their weapons drawn and ordered him to “turn off the car, give [them] the keys, open the window.” When the agents shared the name of the individual that ICE was seeking for deportation orders, the U.S. citizen responded that was not him and sought to verify his identify by offering to show his Real ID-compliant driver’s license. As you are aware, proof of legal presence is required to obtain a Real ID-compliant driver’s license. The U.S. citizen’s attempts to prove his U.S. citizenship were refused and ICE agents demanded he exit his vehicle and placed him in handcuffs. While handcuffed, the U.S. citizen reports that he was interrogated by the ICE agents on his entry to the U.S. and if he was awaiting any court orders. The U.S. citizen continued to attempt to his prove his U.S. citizenship, and in response, he reported that one of the ICE agents communicated doubt as to his U.S. citizenship despite his efforts to prove otherwise. The ICE agents released this U.S. citizen only after they permitted him to show his Real ID-compliant driver’s license.

I recognize the important work of federal, state, and local law enforcement in keeping Virginians safe and understand that law enforcement, including ICE agents, in the field have a complex and challenging job. It is because of that concern for both officer and Virginian safety that I express deep concern over the apprehension and treatment of this U.S. citizen and the disturbing potential or perception of what this treatment may indicate about ICE’s law enforcement practices in Virginia.

All Virginians, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status, deserve to be treated with respect and must be properly afforded their rights as expressed in the U.S. Constitution. Any law enforcement performing immigration enforcement must abide by the U.S. Constitution and federal law. When ICE agents violate or create the appearance of a violating the rights of their fellow citizens, it does harm to all Virginians and all Americans.

Undisciplined, hostile, or threatening enforcement actions by ICE will hinder relationships with local communities, further compromising trust and safety and risk potentially degrading ICE’s enforcement efforts and officer safety. Given DHS’ recent emphasis on the safety of its law enforcement agents, particularly ICE, I expect you share my concern for the risks to Virginians and law enforcement alike created by a perception of capricious or unjustified action taken against U.S. citizens.

U.S. citizens interacting with ICE who seek to prove their identity with identification or other documents that would assist ICE in determining their identity and immigration status should be permitted to do so. In this case, it is clear that the ICE agents misidentified this U.S. citizen, wasting valuable time and resources, and damaging ICE’s public image in the process.

To better understand the circumstances surrounding ICE’s immigration enforcement efforts in Virginia, I ask that you respond to these questions by no later than Friday, April 4, 2025.

1. Please provide a detailed description of the events leading up to and during ICE’s arrest of a U.S. citizen in Manassas, Virginia on March 5, 2025.

1. Did ICE partner or collaborate with any state or local law enforcement entities for this enforcement action? If so, please list the entities and the extent of the collaboration.
2. Did the ICE agents present at the scene identify themselves as law enforcement? If so, how did they identify themselves? Were the individuals dressed in ICE uniform and/or was there a badge easily visible or a car plate to distinguish themselves as federal law enforcement?
3. If the agents did identify themselves as federal law enforcement, did they do so prior to drawing their weapons? Please provide a detailed timeline.
4. Were the ICE agents (and any other law enforcement involved in the incident) qualified to perform the detention and apprehension of the U.S. citizen and the other vehicle occupants? Were the ICE agents current on ICE’s use of force training and weapons qualifications?

2. Who were the ICE agents originally seeking when they misidentified and detained the U.S. citizen? What authority did ICE utilize to proceed with deportation orders for the individual with whom they were originally seeking?
3. How are ICE agents trained to investigate and verify U.S. citizenship or other lawful status when seeking persons of interest? How do ICE agents make an accurate determination of U.S. citizenship or other lawful status? What are the steps that ICE takes to ensure that its agents do not subject U.S. citizens and other individuals with lawful status to unnecessary and mistaken law enforcement encounters with ICE, including apprehension, arrest, detention, or deportation?
4. What tools or resources does ICE utilize to make an accurate citizenship or lawful status determination prior to an individual’s interaction with ICE?
5. Does ICE have all the adequate training, tools, or resources to prevent U.S. citizens from being mistakenly subject to ICE enforcement? If not, what additional training, tools, and resources does ICE need to ensure it does not mistakenly subject such individuals to enforcement?
6. What identifying information about the person of interest did ICE have prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? What steps did ICE take to verify this information prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? Did ICE properly apply its own policies and procedures for verifying U.S. citizenship and did ICE exhaust all the tools and resources at their disposal to verify U.S. citizenship prior to stopping the U.S. citizen? Did the ICE agents contact the ICE Office of Principal Legal Advisor prior to detaining the U.S. citizen or after his release?
7. Does the Department of Homeland Security systematically collect and maintain data of its encounters with individuals for whom there is evidence of U.S. citizenship or lawful status? If so, please provide data on how many U.S. citizens have been mistakenly subjected to ICE enforcement, including being apprehend, detained, or deported since January 20, 2025. If ICE does not collect this data, why not?
8. How will ICE ensure that it is properly applying the policies and procedures regarding the investigation and verification of citizenship or lawful status prior to encounters with ICE?
9. What steps does ICE take to remedy an encounter whereby they mistakenly applied enforcement actions to an individual who is not subject to ICE enforcement, such as a U.S. citizen? How will the agency prevent future instances?
10. In a statement that ICE provided on March 7th, the agency states that the U.S. citizen “matched the description of the subject of an operation” and that ICE agents operated “based on reasonable suspicion, including a likeness to the description of the target.”4 Please provide additional information to support the reasonable suspicion referenced in the statement, including any evidence that the U.S. citizen does indeed have a “likeness to the description of the target.” If there is a photograph of the person of interest the ICE agents mistook for the U.S. citizen, please provide the photograph.
11. Were the ICE agents involved in the U.S. citizen’s detention counseled or disciplined following the encounter based on mistaken identity? Please explain.

Additionally, I respectfully request that the appropriate individuals in your agencies provide a briefing on the events surrounding the U.S. citizen’s encounter with ICE, including the sharing of information that may be law enforcement sensitive.

It is my hope that ICE can carry out its mission while upholding the rights of all Virginians and abiding by the U.S. Constitution. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

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