Press Releases

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of 12 Russian intelligence officers for criminally interfering with the 2016 U.S. presidential election:

“Today’s indictment by the Department of Justice of 12 Russian spies for hacking our election is another testament to the quality and professionalism of the investigation being run by Special Counsel Robert Mueller. The President and his allies must cease and desist their baseless, inflammatory attacks on an investigation that, even before today, had already produced multiple indictments and secured guilty pleas from two Trump campaign aides as well as the President’s former national security adviser.    

“Just this morning in the United Kingdom, President Trump blamed the poor state of U.S.-Russia relations on ‘the rigged witch hunt,’ claiming that it ‘really hurts our country and it really hurts our relationship with Russia.’ The President is wrong. As today’s indictment makes crystal clear, tensions between our two nations exist because Russia attacked our democracy. 

“That’s all the more reason why he must not meet one-on-one with Vladimir Putin, who, in the absence of U.S. experts or advisers, will undoubtedly take full advantage of an ill-prepared President. And if the Administration is unwilling to make the facts laid out in today’s indictment a top priority for that discussion, then that meeting shouldn’t happen.”

 

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, joined Senate colleagues in urging the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees to include a Senate-passed amendment cosponsored by Sen. Warner that would reinstate penalties against ZTE in their upcoming NDAA FY2019 Conference Report. Earlier this year, intelligence leaders testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee warning that ZTE, Huawei, and other Chinese state-directed telecommunications companies have the capacity for espionage and intellectual property theft, posing clear threats to the national security, people, and economy of the United States. This week, President Trump’s Commerce Department announced an agreement to lift the ban preventing Chinese telecom giant ZTE from doing business with American suppliers.

Additionally, Senators urged the conferees to include the reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which were a part of the recently passed Senate NDAA bill. These reforms, also known as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), would ensure that foreign investments in the U.S. do not pose a national security risk.

Sen. Warner, a former technology executive, has long expressed concern that ZTE poses a significant threat to our national security. He recently wrote to the administration urging President Trump to re-consider a deal with the China-based company.

The text of the letter to NDAA conferees can be found here and below:

 

Dear Chairmen McCain and Thornberry, and Ranking Members Reed and Smith:

 

We write to express our strong support for measures in the Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2019 NDAA) that would reinstate U.S. government penalties against ZTE, a Chinese state-directed telecommunications company, and modernize the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  As you begin deliberations over the final version of the FY 2019 NDAA, we request that you include these two measures.

 

Section 6702:  Prohibition on Modification of Civil Penalties under Export Control and Sanctions Laws and Prohibition on Certain Telecommunications Equipment.

 

We strongly oppose the June 2018 deal with ZTE negotiated by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to lift the seven-year ban against the export of U.S. parts and components to ZTE.  BIS imposed this seven-year ban and other penalties against ZTE in April 2018 in response to its numerous violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions laws. 

 

We also note that our nation’s six top intelligence leaders testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2018 about their concern that ZTE, Huawei, and other Chinese state-directed telecommunications companies are beholden to the Chinese government and Communist Party, which provides the capacity for espionage and intellectual property theft, and therefore poses clear threats to the national security, people, and economy of the United States.  

 

As you prepare the Conference Report, we therefore urge you to retain—and further strengthen—Section 6702 of the Senate-passed FY 2019 NDAA, which would not only reinstate the April 2018 penalties against ZTE and prohibit the modification of any penalties against a Chinese telecommunications firm unless certain conditions are met, but also prohibit the U.S. government from using or procuring equipment from, or entering into a contract with ZTE or Huawei. 

 

Title XVII:  Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018

 

We also thank you for your work protecting our national security and intellectual property by ensuring that foreign countries are not engaged in illicit behavior when investing in the United States.

 

As you are aware, the Senate version of the FY 2019 NDAA includes important reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States that were part of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).  Those reforms are vital to protecting our national security and preventing intellectual property theft by foreign countries—including the People’s Republic of China. 

 

As you negotiate a conference report for the 2019 NDAA, we urge you to include the Senate-passed CFIUS reforms and ensure that the final language fully addresses our national security and competitiveness concerns.  We believe that efforts to weaken the robust protections in the FIRRMA will embolden our adversaries and present threats to our national security.

 

We thank you for your leadership, and we appreciate your consideration.

 

Sincerely,

  

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WASHINGTON – Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today sent a letter to Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dan Coats asking whether assessments by our nation’s Intelligence Community (IC) align with the Trump Administration’s public pronouncements regarding North Korean denuclearization. 

On July 8, 2018, following talks with North Korean officials, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “We had detailed, substantive conversations about the next steps toward a fully verified and complete denuclearization… There will be verification connected to the complete denuclearization. That’s what President Trump and Chairman Kim both agreed to.”

A joint statement issued by the President and the North Korean leader on June 12, 2018, similarly stated that “Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”  

Additionally, on June 13, 2018, the President declared via tweet that “everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took office. There is no longer a Nuclear Threat [sic] from North Korea.”

In light of those statements, Sen. Warner asked DNI Coats to produce and deliver to the congressional intelligence committees a definitive IC assessment regarding:

  • The willingness of Kim Jong Un to take concrete measures that would significantly reduce North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile or nuclear production capability in a way that would match his supposed commitment to “complete denuclearization”;
  • The willingness of Kim Jong Un to accept the kind of intrusive inspections that would verifiably demonstrate that North Korea has abandoned and dismantled its nuclear program;
  • What a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization process would look like from the IC’s perspective; and
  • A description of how North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program presents a persistent threat to the United States, U.S. territories, and our allies.

A copy of Sen. Warner’s letter to DNI Coats is available here. 

 

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC) and Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) released the Committee’s unclassified summary of its initial findings on the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Russian activities in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee finds that the overall judgments issued in the ICA were well-supported and the tradecraft was strong. The course of the Committee’s investigation has shown that the Russian cyber operations were more extensive than the hack of the Democratic National Committee and continued well through the 2016 election.  

“The Committee has spent the last 16 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft and analytic work underpinning the Intelligence Community Assessment and sees no reason to dispute the conclusions,” said Chairman Burr. “The Committee continues its investigation and I am hopeful that this installment of the Committee’s work will soon be followed by additional summaries providing the American people with clarity around Russia’s activities regarding U.S. elections.”  

“Our investigation thoroughly reviewed all aspects of the January 2017 ICA, which assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign to target our presidential election and to destabilize our democratic institutions,” said Vice Chairman Warner. “As numerous intelligence and national security officials in the Trump administration have since unanimously re-affirmed, the ICA findings were accurate and on point.  The Russian effort was extensive and sophisticated, and its goals were to undermine public faith in the democratic process, to hurt Secretary Clinton and to help Donald Trump.  While our investigation remains ongoing, we have to learn from 2016 and do more to protect ourselves from attacks in 2018 and beyond.”

The summary is the second unclassified installment in the Committee’s report on Russian election activities.  

The Committee held a closed door hearing in May to review the ICA on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections.” Members heard testimony from former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan and former Director of the National Security Agency Mike Rogers, which informed the Committee’s report. 

You can read a copy of the unclassified summary here.

 

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Washington, DC — Late yesterday, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) sent a letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and FBI Director Christopher Wray expressing deep concern that the Department of Justice and the FBI are bowing to pressure from President Trump’s congressional allies to disclose sensitive information and material that is not usually shared with Congress and that relate directly to the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation into President Trump, his own campaign, and his associates. 

The letter underscores that the recent provision of certain documents to a wider group in Congress violates assurances made to them that particular information would remain, properly, confined to the “Gang of 8.” It also cautions that DOJ and FBI’s departure in this matter from longstanding policy and precedent governing the agencies’ relationship with Congress risks a repeat of similar mistakes that the DOJ Office of the Inspector General recently identified in his review of the Clinton “Midyear” investigation.  

In the letter, the Members write: “With every disclosure, DOJ and FBI are reinforcing a precedent it will have to uphold, whether the Congress is in Republican or Democratic hands, of providing materials in pending or closed cases to the legislative branch upon request. As the attacks on the Special Counsel intensify, it is imperative that you withstand pressure on DOJ and FBI to violate established procedures and norms. Your role in preserving the integrity of the Special Counsel’s investigation and, most importantly, our justice system has become even more vital.”

 

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The full letter is below:

 

June 27, 2018

 

The Honorable Rod J. Rosenstein

Deputy Attorney General of the United States

United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

 

The Honorable Christopher Wray

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20535

 

Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Director Wray:

 

Earlier this month, you provided important verbal assurances in response to our June 5, 2018 letter to you. In that letter, we expressed deep and ongoing concern about President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful and appropriate activities. In particular, we underscored that, if fulfilled, demands by the President’s personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, that the White House and the President’s lawyers be given access to classified information and investigatory material of the utmost sensitivity – including information related to the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation that implicates the President’s own campaign and his associates – would grossly violate our system of checks and balances, long-standing, well-founded, and established procedure, and fundamental norms.

 

You confirmed that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will not provide the White House or any of the President’s attorneys with access to such sensitive information. You also assured that briefings and materials related to this matter would not be shared with others in Congress beyond the “Gang of 8.”

 

Unfortunately, it appears that part of this assurance has already been breached. As of June 20, 2018, the Department has made available to a wider group of Members and staff materials directly related, and similar in kind, to the information that was supposed to be restricted to the “Gang of 8.” This followed recent pressure from House and Senate Republicans on DOJ and FBI not to adhere to “Gang of 8” restrictions on access to and dissemination of information that can implicate sources and methods and/or ongoing investigations.

 

The Department and Bureau’s departure in this matter from longstanding policy and precedent governing your agencies’ relationship with Congress risks a repeat of similar mistakes that the DOJ Office of the Inspector General recently identified in his review of the Clinton “Midyear” investigation.

 

In 2016, DOJ broke with past practice by making investigative files in the Clinton investigation available to Congress, while the Bureau, in the name of “maximal transparency,” publicly disclosed information related to the investigation at key junctures. In his June 2018 report, the DOJ Inspector General correctly criticized this sharp deviation from DOJ and FBI guidelines:  

 

“The Department and the FBI do not practice “maximal transparency” in criminal investigations. It is not a value reflected in the regulations, policies, or customs guiding FBI actions in pending criminal investigations. To the contrary, the guidance to agents and prosecutors is precisely the opposite—no transparency except in rare and exceptional circumstances due to the potential harm to both the investigation and to the reputation of anyone under investigation.” 

 

This harmful cycle is now repeating itself with respect to the criminal and counterintelligence investigation into Russia’s 2016 election interference and any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Trump. The President’s congressional allies are applying growing pressure on your agencies, in line with the President’s improper demand for “total transparency,”  to disclose sensitive information and material that is not usually shared with Congress and that relate directly to the ongoing investigation into President Trump, his own campaign, and his associates.

 

Unfortunately, DOJ and FBI are increasingly bowing to this pressure, despite the corrosive implications. Unlike the Clinton investigation, your agencies are disclosing sensitive material to Congress even though the Russia investigation is ongoing under the leadership of the Special Counsel and your oversight. And given the pending nature of the Special Counsel’s investigation, these persistent and unrelenting document requests are not for legitimate oversight purposes. Rather, time and again, sensitive information shared with Congress has been selectively and misleadingly seeded into the public domain to advance the President and his legal team’s strategy of undermining public trust in DOJ and the FBI and attacking the legitimacy of the Special Counsel and his ongoing investigation. Every such disclosure to Congress, moreover, has and will continue to result in demands for more information about the ongoing investigation, which the Department and the Bureau will be unable to satisfy without further contravening its own policies and norms.

 

With every disclosure, DOJ and FBI are reinforcing a precedent it will have to uphold, whether the Congress is in Republican or Democratic hands, of providing materials in pending or closed cases to the legislative branch upon request.

 

As the attacks on the Special Counsel intensify, it is imperative that you withstand pressure on DOJ and FBI to violate established procedures and norms. Your role in preserving the integrity of the Special Counsel’s investigation and, most importantly, our justice system has become even more vital.

 

We would appreciate your written reply and your confirmation of this understanding.

 

Sincerely,

 

NANCY PELOSI

House Democratic Leader

CHUCK SCHUMER

Senate Democratic Leader

ADAM SCHIFF

Ranking Member, House Intelligence Committee 

MARK WARNER

Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee 

 

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC) and Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) announced the Committee approved the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 by a unanimous bipartisan vote of 15-0. The bill authorizes funding, provides appropriate legal authorities and enhances Congressional oversight for the U.S. Intelligence Community. It is named after Matt Pollard, a dedicated Committee staffer who passed away in April.

“The 2019 Intelligence Authorization Act represents a bipartisan effort to enhance America’s national security and increase government efficiency,” saidChairman Burr. “With ever-increasing threats from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, we recognize that the Intelligence Community (IC) must have the resources, authorities and personnel necessary to keep America safe, while still remaining accountable to Congress for their efforts and expenditures. New security clearance reforms included in this bill will help deter insider threats, protect classified information and ensure the IC has a capable, agile workforce. Lastly, in the wake of foreign efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections, which this Committee continues to investigate, I am pleased to see this bill contains comprehensive measures to enhance our election security. It is vital that we ensure our voting process remains fair and free from undue influence.” 

“It is important that the full Senate take up and pass this bipartisan legislation, so that the men and women of the Intelligence Community (IC) have the resources they need to do their jobs and keep us safe,” said Vice Chairman Warner. “This legislation includes a number of important provisions to modernize our antiquated security clearance process and reduce the 700,000-person security clearance backlog. It also includes my provision requiring the Director of National Intelligence to report on the IC’s outreach to U.S. businesses and other nongovernment entities on efforts by adversaries such as China to acquire technology, intellectual property and R&D. The bill continues initiatives this Committee has undertaken on a bipartisan basis to push the IC to foster innovation in its approach to overhead satellite systems. Finally, as we approach the 2018 elections, the bill includes important measures to protect U.S. federal and state election systems – including from Russian threats – and to improve information sharing with states to ensure the integrity of the election process.”

Background:

The 2019 IAA includes provisions that will help:

  • Deter and counter aggression from foreign state actors, such as Russia and China, both at home and abroad;
  • Protect the U.S. government’s supply chain from sabotage and counterintelligence threats;
  • Improve our security clearance process to make the Intelligence Community more robust, skilled, and agile;
  • Institute reforms for science, technology, engineering or mathematic (STEM) recruitment and retention in Intelligence Community positions, such as cybersecurity experts; and
  • Enhance election security to protect our voting process from foreign intelligence threats and efforts to influence the election process.

In May 2018, the Committee released the first installment in its Russia report, which provided recommendations to improve U.S. election security in the face of interference from foreign actors. Among the Committee’s recommendations to address ongoing vulnerabilities were creating effective deterrence, improving information sharing on threats and securing election-related systems. A summary of the Committee’s findings can be found here.

Last week, the Committee held a hearing to examine the policy response to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. Michael Daniel, former Special Assistant to the President and Cyber Security Coordinator under President Obama, testified that it is “highly likely” Russian actors scanned election systems in all 50 states for vulnerabilities. He also told the Committee that the U.S. should expect and be prepared to combat continued attempts at election interference. You can watch the hearing here.

 

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WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) sent a letter to President Trump, urging him to re-consider the deal lifting the ZTE ban, and to support the Senate-passed ban on government purchases of ZTE and Huawei equipment. Sen. Warner is the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Finance and Banking committees. Sen. Rubio is a member of Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees.  

In the letter to President Trump, the Senators wrote, “The Senate and the U.S. Intelligence Community are in agreement that ZTE poses a significant threat to our national security.  The Senate recently voted 85-10 to reimpose the April sanctions order and the ban on ZTE buying U.S. components, and to prohibit the U.S. federal government from purchasing ZTE or Huawei equipment and contracting with any entity that purchases such equipment.  We urge you to heed the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supported by a strong bipartisan consensus in the Senate, that we must pursue policies that prevent the widespread use of ZTE products in the U.S.”

The Senators noted that at a February 13, 2018 hearing in the Intelligence Committee, six of the nation’s top intelligence leaders – the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the heads of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) – testified about the risks posed to U.S. national security by ZTE and Huawei. Additionally, the nation’s top counterintelligence officer, Director of the National Counterintelligence Security Center Bill Evanina, testified at his May 15, 2018, confirmation hearing that Chinese telecom companies such as ZTE and Huawei pose a significant threat to American security.   

“As you know, this is not a new threat. Congressionally documented concerns date back to a 2012 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on the serious counterintelligence concerns associated with ZTE equipment, the ties between the company and government, and the risks to American national security,” the Senators added. “ZTE, though publicly traded, is a state-backed enterprise that is ultimately loyal not to its shareholders, but to the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government.  This patronage relationship poses unacceptable risks to American sovereignty; risks that will only increase if the company is permitted to establish itself deeply in America’s telecommunications infrastructure.”

The full letter is available here and below. 

 

June 26, 2018

 

The President

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC  20500

 

Dear Mr. President:

 

We urge you to reconsider your decision to amend the April ZTE sanctions order and lift the ban the Commerce Department imposed this year that prohibited ZTE from buying U.S. components, and we ask for your support for the Senate-passed ban on the government buying ZTE and Huawei equipment.  We strongly believe that the April sanctions order—which would have threatened ZTE’s survival—should not be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China on unrelated matters.  

 

The Senate and the U.S. Intelligence Community are in agreement that ZTE poses a significant threat to our national security.  The Senate recently voted 85-10 to reimpose the April sanctions order and the ban on ZTE buying U.S. components,  and to prohibit the U.S. federal government from purchasing ZTE or Huawei equipment and contracting with any entity that purchases such equipment.  We urge you to heed the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supported by a strong bipartisan consensus in the Senate, that we must pursue policies that prevent the widespread use of ZTE products in the U.S.

 

At the Senate Intelligence Committee’s hearing on February 13, 2018, six top intelligence leaders testified about the risk of ZTE and Huawei to American national security: 

 

·         FBI Director Wray stated: “We’re deeply concerned about the risks of allowing any company or entity that is beholden to foreign governments that don’t share our values to gain positions of power inside our telecommunications networks that provides the capacity to exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure.  It provides the capacity to maliciously modify or steal information, and it provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage.”  

·         Then-NSA Director Rogers warned:  “I would agree with Director Wray’s characterization here.  This is a challenge I think that's only going to increase, not lessen, over time for us.” To mayors, county judges, university presidents, and state legislatures, “I would say you need to look long and hard at companies like this.”

·         The Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of the CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, and NGA all indicated they would not use products or services from ZTE or Huawei; nor would they recommend private American citizens do so. 

 

Additionally, the nation’s top counterintelligence officer, Director of the National Counterintelligence Security Center Bill Evanina, testified at his May 15, 2018, confirmation hearing that “the Intelligence Community and law enforcement is clearly on the record, both in the public and in classified settings, with the threat from Chinese telecommunications companies.”

 

As you know, this is not a new threat. Congressionally documented concerns date back to a 2012 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report on the serious counterintelligence concerns associated with ZTE equipment, the ties between the company and government, and the risks to American national security. 

 

ZTE, though publicly traded, is a state-backed enterprise that is ultimately loyal not to its shareholders, but to the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government.  This patronage relationship poses unacceptable risks to American sovereignty; risks that will only increase if the company is permitted to establish itself deeply in America’s telecommunications infrastructure.

 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and for your assistance in ensuring we protect our nation’s future from authoritarian influence.

 

Sincerely,

 

Mark R. Warner

United States Senator

 

Marco Rubio

United States Senator

 

 

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WASHINGTON –U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, today sent letters to Twitter and Google parent company Alphabet, requesting information about any data sharing agreements between the companies and Chinese vendors. The letter follows a disclosure earlier this week by Facebook that the company has partnerships with Chinese telecom companies including Huawei that allow them to access Facebook users’ non-public data. 

“Since at least October 2012, when the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released its widely-publicized report, the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and equipment makers like Huawei and ZTE has been an area of national security concern. Since then, numerous articles in the tech trade press have focused on concerns by American and allied intelligence agencies that products from Chinese device makers, such as Lenovo, have security vulnerabilities that could allow Chinese intelligence to access data stored on, or transmitted by, devices.  And the New York Times reported in 2016 that firmware found in low-end smartphone devices, such as those of Huawei and ZTE, continually transmitted local data to Chinese severs, potentially for foreign intelligence purposes,” Sen. Warner wrote to the two companies today. 

It is publicly known that Alphabet has entered into strategic partnerships with Chinese mobile device manufacturers, including Huawei and Xiaomi, as well as with Chinese technology platform Tencent. In light of Facebook’s recent revelations, Sen. Warner requested that the company provide information about those partnerships, as well as any other agreements that Alphabet may have entered into with third-party vendors based in China. A similar request was posed to Twitter. 

Sen. Warner’s letter to Alphabet CEO Larry Page is available here. His letter to Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey is available here.  

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, released the following statement regarding the Commerce Department’s agreement with ZTE:

“It is the unanimous conclusion of our nation’s intelligence community that ZTE poses a significant threat to our national security. These concerns aren’t new; back in 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a report on the serious counterintelligence concerns associated with ZTE equipment. 

“It’s not only that ZTE was busted for evading sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and then lied about it; It’s that ZTE is a state-controlled telecommunications company that poses significant espionage risks, which this agreement appears to do little to address.” 

 

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today released the following statement:

“We are troubled to hear of the charges filed against a former member of the Committee staff. While the charges do not appear to include anything related to the mishandling of classified information, the Committee takes this matter extremely seriously. We were made aware of the investigation late last year, and have fully cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice since then. Working through Senate Legal Counsel, and as noted in a Senate Resolution, the Committee has made certain official records available to the Justice Department.

“This news is disappointing, as the former staffer in question served on the Committee for more than three decades, and in the Armed Forces with distinction. However, we trust the justice system to act appropriately and ensure due process as this case unfolds. This will in no way interfere with our ongoing investigation, and the Committee remains committed to carrying out our important work on behalf of the American people.”

 

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Washington, DC – Today, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) sent a letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and FBI Director Christopher Wray requesting that the Department of Justice confirm that they have not given the President’s outside counsel, White House staff or the President access to the same classified information briefed to Congress. 

“We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities,” the Members wrote in the letter. “These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power.”

In the letter, Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff also request confirmation that the DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information to the same individuals in the future outside of appropriate judicial proceedings, and that going forward, the DOJ will not brief additional Members of Congress beyond the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

After the May 24 briefing to the “Gang of 8,” Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff released the following statement: “Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

 

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The full letter is below:

 

Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Director Wray:

 

We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities.     

 

Most recently, Rudy Giuliani, one of the President’s personal attorneys, repeated publicly that the White House and the President’s lawyers expect access to classified information of the utmost sensitivity related to the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation. Executive agencies earlier had briefed this information to select Members of Congress in response to a publicly-announced directive from President Trump.  Giuliani also said that the President will refuse to be interviewed by the Special Counsel, unless the President’s attorneys are permitted to review related classified documents.

 

These demands, if fulfilled, would grossly violate our system of checks and balances, established procedure and fundamental norms. Although he has not been indicted, President Trump’s own conduct reportedly remains under examination by the Special Counsel. And absent an indictment, the subjects of federal investigation cannot access law enforcement or related national security information for any reason.

 

As the President’s attorney has made clear, his legal team wishes to obtain the classified information at issue, not for any legitimate purpose—but instead to frustrate and discredit publicly the work of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  

 

These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s personal or political benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power. 

 

We thus respectfully request that the Department of Justice confirm, in writing, by no later than 5 p.m. on Monday, June 11:  

 

(1)   that the following parties have not been given access to the classified information, which executive branch agencies briefed to the “Gang of 8” on May 24, 2018:

 

·         Rudy Giuliani, Jay Sekulow, or any other attorney who represents or has represented President Trump in his personal capacity;

 

·         White House staff, including attorneys from the White House Counsel’s office;

 

·         President Donald J. Trump;

 

(2)   that DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information in the future to the President and his attorneys outside of an appropriate judicial proceeding; and

 

(3)   that going forward, DOJ and FBI will not brief additional Members of Congress who are not part of the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

 

Thank you for your immediate attention to our concerns, which are of the utmost urgency.  We look forward to your reply. 

 

Sincerely,

 

NANCY PELOSI

House Democratic Leader

CHUCK SCHUMER

Senate Democratic Leader

ADAM SCHIFF

Ranking Member, House Intelligence Committee 

MARK WARNER

Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee 

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking and Finance Committees, released the following statement regarding the Trump administration’s deal on ZTE:

“This would be a big mistake. President Trump should listen to the advice of his intelligence leaders, who have unanimously said that ZTE poses a national security threat to the United States.” 

 

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Washington, D.C. –U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), and Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA) released the following joint statement regarding their Gang of Eight briefing with the Justice Department:

“Today’s Gang of Eight briefing was conducted to ensure protection of sources and methods.

“Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

 

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the following statement:

“The Gang of Eight exists in custom and in law to ensure that Congress can oversee intelligence matters without putting sensitive sources and methods at risk. If there is a clear and compelling need to brief Congress on sensitive intelligence matters, it should be handled through the Gang of Eight. The White House’s plan to provide a separate briefing for their political allies demonstrates that their interest is not in informing Congress, but in undermining an ongoing criminal investigation. 

“If they insist upon carrying out this farce, the White House and its Republican allies in the House will do permanent, longstanding damage to the practice of bipartisan congressional oversight of intelligence. They will also be sending a terrible message to anyone who works in or with our nation’s intelligence community that the White House will always prioritize partisan politics over protecting the people who help keep this country safe.” 

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WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) joined a group of bipartisan Senators in sending a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin, the Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, and the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, urging the Administration to protect national security interests when negotiating the U.S.-China trade relationship. This comes after President Trump has publicly pledged to lift a seven-year ban on American firms doing business with Chinese telecom company ZTE.

“There can be no question that China seeks to surpass the U.S. both economically and militarily and become the world’s foremost superpower, and neither the Federal Government nor private U.S. companies should aid and abet that effort,” the Senators wrote.  “As such, we implore you to reject any proposal to soften restrictions on the transfer to China of U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies, including semiconductors." 

“We urge you not to compromise lawful U.S. enforcement actions against serial and pre-meditated violators of U.S. law, such as ZTE.  This is particularly critical when the violators are state-owned and -influenced, part and parcel of China’s policies and practices designed to strengthen its own national security innovation base, and essential tools of efforts to spread China’s influence in other countries that pose national security threats to the United States. Export control and sanctions laws should not be negotiable, because fidelity to the rule of law is a key part of what distinguishes the U.S. from a country like China that is ruled by a Communist dictatorship,” the Senators concluded.

As the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Warner has publicly voiced his concern that rolling back trade restrictions on Chinese telecom company ZTE would pose significant national security risks to the United States. Last week, Sen. Warner joined a group of 34 Senators urging President Trump not reverse trade restrictions on ZTE. 

In addition to Sen. Warner, the letter was signed by Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), John Cornyn (R-TX), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Marco Rubio (R-FL), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Steve Daines (R-MT), Susan Collins (R-ME), Mike Rounds (R-SD), John Thune (R-SD), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Roy Blunt (R-MO), Bob Casey (D-PA), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Ben Sasse (R-NE), Joe Manchin (D-WV), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Jack Reed (D-RI), Bill Nelson (D-FL), David Perdue (R-GA), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tom Cotton (R-AR), Kamala Harris (D-CA), and Angus King (I-ME)

 

Full text of the letter can be found below.

 

The Honorable Steven Mnuchin        

Secretary of the Treasury             

U.S. Department of the Treasury   

1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW     

Washington, DC  20220              

 

The Honorable Wilbur Ross

Secretary of Commerce              

U.S. Department of Commerce

1401 Constitution Ave., NW     

Washington, DC  20230             

 

The Honorable Robert E. Lighthizer

U.S. Trade Representative

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

600 17th St., NW        

Washington, DC 20508

 

Dear Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Ross, and Ambassador Lighthizer:

 

As you work to secure a fair and equitable trading and investment relationship with China for the American people, we write to express serious concerns over reports that China, in the ongoing negotiations, is pushing for access to U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies.  We strongly support these critical negotiations to rebalance the U.S.-China economic relationship, but U.S. national security must remain the paramount consideration.  Therefore, we strongly urge you to reject any proposal by China to loosen existing restrictions on the export or other transfer of these sensitive U.S. technologies.  Any such move would bolster China’s aggressive military modernization and significantly undermine long-term U.S. national security interests.  

 

We agree with General Joe Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that within seven years, China will pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security of any nation.  Likewise, we concur with the Department of Defense’s most recent report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” which states that “China’s military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. military-technological advantages.  To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies . . . .  Several cases emerged in 2016 of China using its intelligence services, and employing other illicit approaches that violate U.S. laws and export controls, to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.” 

 

Clearly, the Chinese Communist Party regards these sensitive technologies as essential for China’s military modernization and is accelerating its efforts to acquire such technologies through both legal and illegal means, including cyber theft, civil-military integration policies, coercion through joint ventures with foreign companies, targeted investment, and exploitation of the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies.  We must guard against such efforts and remain vigilant in protecting our national security innovation base. 

 

As you know, export controls are designed to protect national security.  The relaxing of these or other technology transfer restrictions would directly contradict and undermine key parts of President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS).  The NSS states that, “China and Russia . . . are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime.  In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.”

 

There can be no question that China seeks to surpass the U.S. both economically and militarily and become the world’s foremost superpower, and neither the Federal Government nor private U.S. companies should aid and abet that effort.  As such, we implore you to reject any proposal to soften restrictions on the transfer to China of U.S.-made military technologies and advanced dual-use technologies, including semiconductors.  We do support a balanced and constructive relationship with China, but one that is clear-eyed about China’s predatory, comprehensive efforts to acquire sensitive technologies that would increase the risk China poses to the United States and our allies in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.  

 

In addition, we urge you not to compromise lawful U.S. enforcement actions against serial and pre-meditated violators of U.S. law, such as ZTE.  This is particularly critical when the violators are state-owned and -influenced, part and parcel of China’s policies and practices designed to strengthen its own national security innovation base, and essential tools of efforts to spread China’s influence in other countries that pose national security threats to the United States.  Export control and sanctions laws should not be negotiable, because fidelity to the rule of law is a key part of what distinguishes the U.S. from a country like China that is ruled by a Communist dictatorship. 

 

Thank you for your attention to these concerns. 

 

Sincerely,

 

 

CC:  The Honorable James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense

        The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State

         The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

 

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Warner (D-Va.), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, today requested three separate Inspector Generals open up probes into the Trump Administration’s failure to fully impose legally mandated sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). 

In a letter addressed to the Inspector Generals of the U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Intelligence Community, the senators listed a series of instances where the Trump administration’s mixed signals or inaction have resulted in flouting seven mandatory CAATSA provisions, despite clear evidence of sanctionable activity.

“In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent,” wrote the senators. “Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.” 

It has been ten months since Congress overwhelmingly passed CAATSA’s wide-ranging mandatory sanctions measures to hold Russia accountable for their destabilizing activities against our country and nations around the world. 

 

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

 

May 19, 2018

 

Mr. Steve A. Linick

Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors

U.S. Department of State

Office of Inspector General

1700 North Moore Street

Arlington, VA  22209

 

Mr. Eric M. Thorson

Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.  20220

 

Mr. Wayne A. Stone

Acting Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Investigations Division

Washington, D.C.  20511

 

 Dear Inspectors General Linick, Thorson, and Stone:

 

We are writing to request that you conduct a review of your respective department’s/community’s role in implementing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions law (CAATSA), signed by President Trump on August 2, 2017.  

 

Several mandatory provisions of the law have not been implemented by the administration, despite strong evidence that actions taken by or on behalf of the Russian government are in violation of the CAATSA sanctions law and applicable executive orders codified by CAATSA.  For example, the U.S. government released a joint statement on April 16, 2018 with British authorities that accused Russian government-backed hackers of conducting cyber attacks in other countries, including the U.S., which should trigger sanctions under Section 224 of CAATSA. Yet the administration has not imposed any such sanctions in response, nor has it issued waivers under this provision.  

 

Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then the administration did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.  This raises obvious questions about the provision of Russian technology or support to Syria in violation of Section 234 of the law.

 

Overall, CAATSA includes seven mandatory provisions (Sections 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233 and 234) which we believe merit further examination.    We also remain concerned that the administration has not formally determined whether individuals are conducting significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors under Section 231.   Without such determinations, it is impossible to ascertain whether individuals are substantially reducing significant transactions with these entities as outlined in the law.

 

In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions actions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent.  In general, with respect to mandatory measures, the President is required to make determinations in the event that he has established that sanctionable behavior has taken place, and then either impose sanctions or exercise a waiver.  We understand that only one determination, with respect to Section 224, has been made under new congressionally-mandated CAATSA sanctions since the law went into effect last August. 

 

As part of your respective reviews, we request that you address the following issues and make any necessary recommendations for improvement:

 

1.      Why have mandatory provisions of the law not been implemented, despite clear evidence of sanctions violations?

2.      What are the internal processes by which your respective agencies have contributed to the creation of Russia sanctions designation packages when CAATSA or applicable executive orders are violated?

3.      How has interagency coordination taken place with respect to CAATSA implementation, or other provisions of law or executive orders related to Russia, and is the inter-agency review process working as it should? 

4.      Are there obstacles in the inter-agency review process of which Congress should be made aware, as administration officials consider imposing additional sanctions on Russian actors consistent with current law?

 

Thank you for your consideration of our request.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on attempts to undermine the Special Counsel’s investigation:

“The first thing any new member of the Intelligence Committee learns is the critical importance of protecting sources and methods. Publicly outing a source risks not only their life, but the lives of every American, because when sources are burned it makes it that much harder for every part of the intelligence community to gather intelligence on those who wish to do us harm.

“It would be at best irresponsible, and at worst potentially illegal, for members of Congress to use their positions to learn the identity of an FBI source for the purpose of undermining the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in our election. Anyone who is entrusted with our nation’s highest secrets should act with the gravity and seriousness of purpose that knowledge deserves.”

 

###

WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, spoke on the floor of the U.S. Senate ahead of an expected vote to confirm Gina Haspel as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

“Gina Haspel is among the most qualified people to be nominated for the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. She’s served with the Agency for thirty three years, including tours as a case officer, four times as a station chief, the deputy chief of the National Resources Division, the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service, and currently as the Deputy Director of the Agency,” Sen. Warner said. “In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the Intelligence Community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm… I would also note that, as a Senator from Virginia, the home to thousands of CIA personnel, and the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have heard from many Agency officers, and for that matter, members of the rank and file of other Intelligence Community agencies. And almost to a person, this rank and file have supported her nomination.”

Sen. Warner also addressed concerns about Ms. Haspel’s participation in the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program.

“Let me be clear—this has not been an easy decision. Over the past several weeks I have held multiple meetings and calls with Ms. Haspel and many others about her record and her character. In our open committee hearing, I have raised questions about her involvement with the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program, and if she were to be confirmed, her willingness to push back if President Trump asked her to undertake any immoral, or legally questionable, activity… I strongly believe that we, as Americans, have a duty to look squarely at our mistakes, and to not sweep them under the rug, but to learn from them, and in the future do better,” said Sen. Warner. “Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President, who will speak truth to power if this President orders her to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. I believe this not just because she’s told me so, or because she wrote it in a letter, or even because she said it under oath in front of the committee. I believe it because I’ve heard it from people who worked with her and who have known her for years.” 

Concluded Sen. Warner, “I respect my colleagues who have made a different decision. This was not an easy choice. I too spent weeks working through it. But at the end of the day, and as we vote later this afternoon, I believe Gina Haspel should be confirmed. I look forward to supporting her, I look forward to her being a good Director of the CIA, and I look forward to her performance convincing those who could not support her today that her long-term value to our country will make our country safer and that she will act in accordance to the principles and values of our country.”

 

Below is the full text of his remarks:

 

Gina Haspel is among the most qualified people to be nominated for the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. She’s served with the Agency for thirty three years, including tours as a case officer, four times as a station chief, the deputy chief of the National Resources Division, the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service, and currently as the Deputy Director of the Agency.

 

In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the Intelligence Community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm.

 

In addition, while she’s not emphasized this, we should not overlook the historic nature of Ms. Haspel’s nomination as the first woman to be nominated as Director of the CIA. Seeing her portrait in the halls of the Agency next to the long line of former Directors will be a long overdue but important breakthrough for the Intelligence Community.

 

I would also note that, as a Senator from Virginia, the home to thousands of CIA personnel, and the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have heard from many Agency officers, and for that matter, members of the rank and file of other Intelligence Community agencies. And almost to a person, this rank and file have supported her nomination.

 

Let me be clear—this has not been an easy decision for me. Over the past several weeks I have held multiple meetings and calls with Ms. Haspel and many others about her record and her character. In our open committee hearing, I have raised questions about her involvement with the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program, and if she were to be confirmed her willingness to push back if President Trump asked her to undertake any immoral, or legally questionable, activity. 

 

I questioned her willingness to declassify to the extent possible more information about her background at the Agency.

 

I still wish more could be done to discuss her background in an open setting. The Agency just recently has declassified more information about her service with the Counter Terrorism Center. I thank them for that, but I still believe that it would have been preferable if we could have found a way to be even more transparent. If she’s confirmed as Director, I will encourage Ms. Haspel to keep this in mind.

 

To those here who have concluded that Ms. Haspel’s background with the RDI program should preclude her from leading the CIA. I respect their arguments, and I know the passion with which they put forward their position. I myself struggled with this point. 

 

Many people at the CIA participated in the program. They were told it was legal by the Justice Department and ordered by the President. But, some of the actions undertaken were repugnant and amounted to torture. 

 

Since those days, America’s had a long debate about the standards that we as a nation, can, and should, apply to the treatment of detainees, regardless of who they might be. That is why I was one of 17 cosponsors in the Senate of the McCain-Feinstein amendment to prohibit torture and to prohibit any interrogation technique not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual. That is why I voted to both approve and to declassify the Senate Intelligence Committee’s extensive study of the RDI program. 

 

I strongly believe that we, as Americans, have a duty to look squarely at our mistakes, and to not sweep them under the rug, but to learn from them, and in the future, to do better.

 

Nor do I believe that we can excuse torture or the way in which detainees – no matter who they were, or what crimes they were guilty of – were treated. We are better than that, and we need a CIA Director who will ensure – in an ironclad way – that we will never return to those dark days; that we will follow the law, as enacted by Congress.

 

This is why I have pushed Ms. Haspel, both in our hearing and in our private meetings on this very point—what is her view now of the RDI program? And how would she react if she were asked as Director to undertake something similar in the future?

 

In both our one-on-one meetings and in classified session before the Committee, I found Acting Director Haspel to be forthcoming regarding her views on the interrogation program. However, I thought it was important that she say this in public, not just privately, which is why I asked her to memorialize those comments in writing.

 

Gina Haspel wrote, “With the benefit of hindsight and my experience as a senior Agency leader, the enhanced interrogation program is not one the CIA should have undertaken.” I believe this is a clear statement of growth as a leader and learning from the mistakes of the past. And while I wish that she would be more forceful, I also understand her reluctance to condemn the many men and women at the Agency who thought they were doing the right thing at the time.

 

I first met Gina at one of her overseas postings. But I didn’t really get to work with her until this last year, when the former Director appointed her to be the Deputy Director of the Agency. Over this last year, I have found her to be professional and forthright with our Intelligence Committee.

 

I’ve had the ability to have candid, unfiltered discussions with her. Whether the challenge we confront is North Korea… ISIS terrorists… or the long-term challenge of countries like China and Russia, I will feel safer knowing that the CIA has Ms. Haspel at the helm.  

 

Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President, who will speak truth to power if this President orders her to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. 

 

I believe it because I’ve heard it from people who worked with her and who have known her for years. People we all know and trust—John Brennan, James Clapper, Leon Panetta, Jim Mattis, and many others who served presidents of both parties. Every one of them said they trusted her to push back on immoral, illegal, or just plain stupid orders from the President.

 

I furthermore believe that she is someone who will push back – and push back strongly – against any attempts by this President to undercut, denigrate, or ignore the professional men and women of CIA, and their responsibility, again, to speak truth to power whatever the political ramifications may be.

 

It is for these reasons that I am supporting Gina Haspel’s nomination to be Director of the CIA.

 

I respect my colleagues who have made a different decision. This was not an easy choice. I too spent weeks working through it. But at the end of the day, and as we vote later this afternoon, I believe Gina Haspel should be confirmed. I look forward to supporting her, I look forward to her being a good Director of the CIA, and I look forward to her performance convincing those who could not support her today that her long-term value to our country will our make our country safer and that she will act in accordance to the principles and values of our country.

 

###

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-founder of the Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, released the following statement after the White House eliminated the role of Cybersecurity Coordinator on the National Security Council, a position created to harmonize the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity and digital warfare:  

“It’s frankly mindboggling that the Trump Administration has eliminated the top White House official responsible for a whole-of-government cyber strategy, at a time when the cyber threat to our nation is greater than ever. Our adversaries are investing heavily in 21st century cyber warfare capabilities, and if we only view national security through a conventional 20th century lens, we’re going to find ourselves unable to respond to increasingly asymmetric cyber threats down the road.”
 

###

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today announced Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gina Haspel, was favorably reported out of the Committee by a vote of 10-5 to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

“Gina Haspel is the most qualified person the President could choose to lead the CIA and the most prepared nominee in the 70 year history of the Agency,” said Chairman Richard Burr.  “She has acted morally, ethically, and legally, over a distinguished 30-year career and is the right person to lead the Agency into an uncertain and challenging future.  I’m pleased to see the Committee favorably report her nomination to the full Senate, and I look forward to her swift confirmation.”

“As Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel will be the first operations officer in more than five decades to lead the Agency. I believe that she will be a strong advocate for the Agency’s workforce, and an independent voice who can and will stand up on behalf of our nation’s intelligence community,” said Vice Chairman Mark Warner.  “Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President if ordered to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture.”

 

###

 

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today held a closed hearing to complete its review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.”  The testimony of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of CIA John Brennan, and former Director of NSA Mike Rogers will inform the Committee’s final report on this “chapter” of its Russia inquiry.

Chairman Burr said, “The first task in our inquiry was to evaluate the Intelligence Community’s work on this important piece of analysis.  Committee staff have spent 14 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft, and analytic work, and we see no reason to dispute the conclusions.  There is no doubt that Russia undertook an unprecedented effort to interfere with our 2016 elections.  I look forward to completing the Committee’s inquiry and issuing our findings and recommendations to the American people.” 

“Despite the short time frame they had to prepare it, the intelligence community did a very good job with the ICA,” said Vice Chairman Warner.“After a thorough review, our staff concluded that the ICA conclusions were accurate and on point. The Russian effort was extensive, sophisticated, and ordered by President Putin himself for the purpose of helping Donald Trump and hurting Hillary Clinton. In order to protect our democracy from future threats, we must understand what happened in 2016. And while our Committee’s investigation remains ongoing, one thing is already abundantly clear – we have to do a better job in the future if we want to protect our elections from foreign interference.”

Today’s closed hearing is a bookend to the hearing the Committee held in January 10, 2017, on Russian Active Measures.  Staff will finalize this chapter of the report on the Intelligence Community’s work and submit it for a classification review. 

 

###

WASHINGTON – During a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today to consider the nomination of Bill Evanina to serve as the nation’s top counterintelligence official, U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), the Committee’s Vice Chairman, voiced concern that rolling back trade restrictions on Chinese telecom company ZTE would pose significant national security risks to the United States.

In recent days, President Trump has publicity expressed his desire to reverse trade restrictions placed on the company for violating sanctions on Iran and North Korea. 

“On the question of counterintelligence with China, a number of members of this committee have raised concerns about certain Chinese telecom companies and their penetration into the American market. I was actually pleased that the President acted on one of those companies, ZTE. Now it appears that that is simply a bargaining chip in negotiations with China. I don’t think that is the appropriate way,” said Sen. Warner during the nomination hearing. 

“If this is a security threat, then it is a security threat and needs to be dealt with as such — not as a bargaining chip in greater trade negotiations,” added Sen. Warner.

On Sunday, May 13 Trump tweeted, “President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done!” The next day, Trump followed with another tweet: “ZTE, the large Chinese phone company, buys a big percentage of individual parts from U.S. companies. This is also reflective of the larger trade deal we are negotiating with China and my personal relationship with President Xi.”

Earlier today, Sen. Warner joined a group of 34 Senators urging President Trump not to reverse trade restrictions on ZTE.

 

###

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, announced today that he will support the nomination of Gina Haspel to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 

“Gina Haspel has served our country with dedication for 33 years. In many ways, her story is representative of the thousands of people at the Agency and throughout the intelligence community who serve quietly, without recognition, and often at great personal risk, in order to keep our nation safe from those who wish to do us harm.  

“Over the last year I’ve had the opportunity to work with Ms. Haspel in her role as Deputy Director, and I have always found her to be professional and forthright with the Intelligence Committee. Most importantly, I believe she is someone who can and will stand up to the President if ordered to do something illegal or immoral – like a return to torture. 

“I acknowledge that this has been a difficult decision. There are valid questions that have been raised regarding the Acting Director’s record, and I have been frank with Ms. Haspel that I wish she had been more open with the American public during this process. However, in both our one-on-one meetings and in classified session before the Committee, I found Acting Director Haspel to be more forthcoming regarding her views on the interrogation program, which is why I asked her to memorialize those comments in writing. I also take to heart the strong support Ms. Haspel has among rank-and-file members of the intelligence community and from intelligence community leaders who served under President Obama. 

“I’m going to support Gina Haspel’s nomination to be Director of the CIA. I also respect my colleagues who have made a different decision.

“If she is confirmed, the Senate Intelligence Committee will continue to conduct thorough and vigorous oversight over the nation’s intelligence agencies.”
 

###

 

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) joined a group of 33 Senators calling on the Trump Administration to put American jobs and national security ahead of China. The Senators wrote a letter to the Administration in response to President Trump’s announcement that he has directed the Department of Commerce to look at easing penalties imposed on China-based company ZTE for violations that include selling sensitive U.S. technologies to Iran and North Korea in violation of U.S. sanctions laws.

“Offering to trade American sanctions enforcement to promote jobs in China is plainly a bad deal for American workers and for the security of all Americans,” the Senators wrote. “American workers and companies confront rampant theft of U.S. intellectual property, agricultural policies that disadvantage American farmers, restrictions on market access for U.S. service providers and manufacturers, and mercantilist industrial policies that have cost U.S. workers their jobs.  America’s policies toward China should put American workers, farmers and businesses first, not China’s.”

“We urge you to focus on identifying effective strategies to reshape China’s policy approach in each of these areas, such as through enforceable commitments to eliminate forced technology transfer policies, market distorting subsidies, data localization policies, and foreign investment restrictions, and ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment of U.S. firms in regulatory and other proceedings. Above all, we urge you to remain steadfast in enforcing America’s laws,” the Senators concluded.  

In addition to Sens. Warner and Kaine, the letter was signed by Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Tom Carper (D-DE), Bob Casey (D-PA) , Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Joe Donnelly (D-IN), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Ed Markey (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Tina Smith (D-MN), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Tom Udall (D-NM), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI). 

The full text of the letter can be found below:

Dear Mr. President:

Your recent remarks directing Secretary Ross to help ZTE – a Chinese company that has repeatedly sold sensitive U.S. technologies to Iran and North Korea in clear violation of American sanctions laws – call into grave doubt whether this administration will put American jobs and national security first.

If acted upon, your instruction would reverse a law enforcement decision by Secretary Ross to impose a seven-year denial of export privileges on ZTE, setting aside that decision made in the interests of U.S. national security to cushion the employment impact on the Chinese company.  ZTE not only violated US sanctions law but then repeatedly lied about steps it would take to remedy the problems. As Secretary Ross noted when he imposed the order, “ZTE made false statements to the U.S. Government when they were originally caught and put on the Entity List, made false statements during the reprieve it was given, and made false statements again during its probation. ZTE misled the Department of Commerce.  Instead of reprimanding ZTE staff and senior management, ZTE rewarded them. This egregious behavior cannot be ignored.” 

In addition to paying a fine of $1.2 billion, and pleading guilty to knowingly violating U.S. sanctions laws, ZTE agreed to a multi-year denial of export privileges, to be activated if any aspect of the agreement was not met and/or if the company committed additional violations of US export control regulations. Prompted by new violations, Commerce imposed the denial.

America’s national security must not be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations.  Offering to trade American sanctions enforcement to promote jobs in China is plainly a bad deal for American workers and for the security of all Americans. Bargaining away law enforcement power over bad actors such as ZTE undermines the historically sharp distinction between sanctions and export control enforcement and routine trade decisions made by the US.

Your order comes as your administration is in the midst of discussions with China to address China’s market-distorting policies and other tactics to undermine key American industries. Beyond appearing to risk American national security, the statement suggests that the administration is not serious about addressing the many economic challenges China presents.  The devastating effects of China’s trade policies are clear.  As your top trade negotiator recognized in his trade report on China less than six months ago, to address the “very serious and harmful problems generated by China’s trade regime”, China must “truly embrace a market-oriented approach, rooted in the fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency.”  There is no evidence that China has agreed to such a shift in approach.

American workers and companies confront rampant theft of U.S. intellectual property, agricultural policies that disadvantage American farmers, restrictions on market access for U.S. service providers and manufacturers, and mercantilist industrial policies that have cost U.S. workers their jobs.  America’s policies toward China should put American workers, farmers and businesses first, not China’s.

We urge you to focus on identifying effective strategies to reshape China’s policy approach in each of these areas, such as through enforceable commitments to eliminate forced technology transfer policies, market distorting subsidies, data localization policies, and foreign investment restrictions, and ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment of U.S. firms in regulatory and other proceedings. Above all, we urge you to remain steadfast in enforcing America’s laws.  

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and James Lankford (R-OK), members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the Committee’s unclassified summary of the first installment of the Committee’s Russia Report, including updated recommendations on election security and findings regarding Russian targeting of election infrastructure. In parallel, the Committee has prepared a comprehensive, classified report on threats to election infrastructure. The classified report will be submitted for declassification review, and the Committee anticipates releasing it to the public when that process is completed.

“Elections at all levels are central to our democracy, to our institutions, and to our government's legitimacy, and I remain concerned that we as a country are still not fully prepared for the 2018 midterm elections. That’s one reason why we, as a Committee, have decided that it is important to get out as much information as possible about the threat, so that governments at every level take it seriously and take the necessary steps to defend ourselves,” said Senator Mark Warner. “I am proud of the bipartisan work our Committee members have done on this issue, and I look forward to continuing in a bipartisan way to investigate what happened in 2016, and prevent future interference in our elections.” 

“I’m pleased to be able to release this summary of our findings and recommendations on election security to the American public,” said Senator Richard Burr. “Today’s primaries are the next step toward the 2018 midterms and another reminder of the urgency of securing our election systems. Our investigation has been a bipartisan effort from day one, and I look forward to completing the Committee’s work and releasing as much of it as possible.  We are working tirelessly to give Americans a complete accounting of what happened in 2016 and to prevent any future interference with our democratic process.” 

“While our investigation remains ongoing, one conclusion is clear: the Russians were relentless in attempting to meddle in the 2016 election, and they will continue their efforts,” said Senator Susan Collins.  “The findings and recommendations we are releasing today are a major step forward in our effort to thwart any attempt to meddle in our elections.  With the 2018 election fast approaching, the need to act now is urgent.  We must provide states the assistance they need to strengthen the security of their voting systems.”

“Our democracy hinges on Americans' ability to fairly choose our own leaders. With primary elections underway, and as we approach the midterm elections and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to protect the integrity of our voting process,” said Senator Martin Heinrich. “I am proud of how our whole Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, has taken on the task of getting to the bottom of Russia's interference in our election. Until we set up stronger protections of our election systems and take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to attack.”

 

“During the 2016 election, Russian entities targeted presidential campaign accounts, launched cyber-attacks against at least 21 state election systems, and hacked a US voting systems software company,” said Senator James Lankford. “We must proactively work to ensure the security of our election infrastructure for the possibility of interference from not just Russia, but possibly another adversary like Iran or North Korea or a hacktivist group. After 18 months of investigations and interviews, this bipartisan report underscores the importance of efforts to protect our democracy from foreign attacks on our elections.”

 

The Committee’s unclassified summary of this chapter of the Russia Report – Election Security Findings and Recommendations are embedded below:

 

Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election:

Summary of Initial Findings and Recommendations

 

May 8, 2018

 

Overview

 

In 2016, cyber actors affiliated with the Russian Government conducted an unprecedented, coordinated cyber campaign against state election infrastructure. Russian actors scanned databases for vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions, and in a small number of cases successfully penetrated a voter registration database. This activity was part of a larger campaign to prepare to undermine confidence in the voting process.  The Committee has not seen any evidence that vote tallies were manipulated or that voter registration information was deleted or modified.

 

·         The Committee has limited information about whether, and to what extent, state and local officials carried out forensic or other examination of election infrastructure systems in order to confirm whether election-related systems were compromised. It is possible that additional activity occurred and has not yet been uncovered.

 

Summary of Initial Findings

 

·         Cyber actors affiliated with the Russian government scanned state systems extensively throughout the 2016 election cycle. These cyber actors made attempts to access numerous state election systems, and in a small number of cases accessed voter registration databases.

 

o   At least 18 states had election systems targeted by Russian-affiliated cyber actors in some fashion.[1] Elements of the IC have varying levels of confidence about three additional states, for a possible total of at least 21. In addition, other states saw suspicious or malicious behavior the IC has been unable to attribute to Russia.

o   Almost all of the states that were targeted observed vulnerability scanning directed at their Secretary of State websites or voter registration infrastructure. Other scans were broader or less specific in their target. 

o   In at least six states, the Russian-affiliated cyber actors went beyond scanning and conducted malicious access attempts on voting-related websites.[2]

o   In a small number of states, Russian-affiliated cyber actors were able to gain access to restricted elements of election infrastructure. In a small number of states, these cyber actors were in a position to, at a minimum, alter or delete voter registration data; however, they did not appear to be in a position to manipulate individual votes or aggregate vote totals.

 

·         The Committee found that in addition to the cyber activity directed at state election infrastructure, Russia undertook a wide variety of intelligence-related activities targeting the U.S. voting process. These activities began at least as early as 2014, continued through Election Day 2016, and included traditional information gathering efforts as well as operations likely aimed at preparing to discredit the integrity of the U.S. voting process and election results.

 

·         The Committee’s assessments, as well as the assessments of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are based on self-reporting by the states. DHS has been clear in its representations to the Committee that the Department did not have perfect insight into these cyber activities. It is possible that more states were attacked, but the activity was not detected. In light of the technical challenges associated with cyber forensic analysis, it is also possible that states may have overlooked some indicators of compromise.

 

·         The Committee saw no evidence that votes were changed and found that, on balance, the diversity of our voting infrastructure is a strength. Because of the variety of systems and equipment, changing votes on a large scale would require an extensive, complex, and state or country-level campaign. However, the Committee notes that a small number of districts in key states can have a significant impact in a national election.

 

[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

2 In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

 

Actors and Motive

 

·         The Committee concurs with the IC that Russian government-affiliated actors were behind the cyber activity directed against state election infrastructure.

 

·         While the full scope of Russian activity against the states remains unclear because of collection gaps, the Committee found ample evidence to conclude that the Russian government was developing capabilities to undermine confidence in our election infrastructure, including voter processes.

 

·         The Committee does not know whether the Russian government-affiliated actors intended to exploit vulnerabilities during the 2016 elections and decided against taking action, or whether they were merely gathering information and testing capabilities for a future attack. Regardless, the Committee believes the activity indicates an intent to go beyond traditional intelligence collection.

 

DHS Efforts to Bolster Election Security

 

·         The Committee found that DHS’s initial response was inadequate to counter the threat. In the summer of 2016, as the threat to the election infrastructure emerged, DHS attempted outreach to the states, seeking to highlight the threat for information technology (IT) directors without divulging classified information.  By the fall of 2016, as the threat became clearer, DHS attempted a more extensive outreach to the states with limited success.

 

o   At the outset, DHS was not well-positioned to provide effective support to states confronting a hostile nation-state cyber actor.

o   In addition, members of the Obama administration were concerned that, by raising the alarm, they would create the very impression they were trying to avoid––calling into question the integrity of election systems.

 

·         DHS and FBI alerts to the states in the summer and fall of 2016 were limited in substance and distribution.  Although DHS provided warning to IT staff in the fall of 2016, notifications to state elections officials were delayed by nearly a year.  Therefore, states understood that there was a cyber threat, but did not appreciate the scope, seriousness, or implications of the particular threat they were facing.

 

o   Many state election officials reported hearing for the first time about the Russian attempts to scan and penetrate state systems from the press or from the public Committee hearing on June 21, 2017.  DHS’s notifications in the summer of 2016 and the public statement by DHS and the ODNI in October 2016 were not sufficient warning.

o   It was not until September of 2017, and only under significant pressure from this Committee and others, that DHS reached out directly to chief election officials in the targeted states to alert the appropriate election officials about the scanning activity and other attacks and the actor behind them.  (However, the Committee notes that in the small number of cases where election-related systems had been compromised, the federal government was in contact with senior election officials at the time the intrusion was discovered.)

 

·         The Committee found that DHS is engaging state election officials more effectively now than in the summer of 2016.  Although early interactions between state election officials and DHS were strained, states now largely give DHS credit for making tremendous progress over the last six months.

 

o   States have signed up for many of the resources that DHS has to offer, and DHS has hosted meetings of the Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council, as required under the critical infrastructure designation. Those interactions have begun to increase trust and communication between federal and state entities.

o   DHS hosted a classified briefing for state chief election officials and is working through providing security clearances for those officials.

o   An Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center has been established, focused on sharing network defense information with state and local election officials.

 

Ongoing Vulnerabilities

 

Despite the progress on communication and improvements to the security of our election process, the Committee remains concerned about a number of potential vulnerabilities in election infrastructure.

 

·         Voting systems across the United States are outdated, and many do not have a paper record of votes as a backup counting system that can be reliably audited, should there be allegations of machine manipulation. In addition, the number of vendors selling machines is shrinking, raising concerns about supply chain vulnerability.

 

o   Paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines––machines with electronic interfaces that electronically store votes (as opposed to paper ballots or optical scanners)––are used in jurisdictions in 30 states and are at highest risk for security flaws.  Five states use DREs exclusively.

 

·         Many aspects of election infrastructure systems are connected to and can be accessed over the internet.  Furthermore, systems that are not connected to the internet, such as voting machines, may still be updated via software downloaded from the internet.

 

o   These potentially vulnerable systems include some of the core components of U.S. election infrastructure, including systems affiliated with voter registration databases, electronic poll books, vote casting, vote tallying, and unofficial election night reporting to the general public and the media.  Risk-limiting audits are a best practice to mitigate risk.

 

·         Vendors of election software and equipment play a critical role in the U.S. election system, and the Committee continues to be concerned that vendors represent an enticing target for malicious cyber actors.  State local, territorial, tribal, and federal government authorities have very little insight into the cyber security practices of many of these vendors, and while the Election Assistance Commission issues guidelines for security, abiding by those guidelines is currently voluntary.

 

Summary of SSCI Recommendations

 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.  The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials have taken to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient.  The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.  The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

                       

1.      Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

·         States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

·         The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.  

·         The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

 

3.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

·         The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyberattacks both quickly and accurately.  Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.  

·         DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels.  We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication. 

·         Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.

·         DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.

·         The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

 

4.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

·         Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election systems. 

·         The Committee recommends State and Local officials prioritize the following:

o   Institute two-factor authentication for state databases.

o   Install monitoring sensors on state systems.  One option is to further expand DHS’s ALBERT network.

o   Identify the weak points in the network, including any under-resourced localities, and prioritize assistance towards those entities.

o   Update software in voter registration systems.  Create backups, including paper copies, of state voter registration databases. Include voter registration database recovery in state continuity of operations plans.

o   Consider a voter education program to ensure voters check registration well prior to an election.

o   Undertake intensive security audits of state and local voter registration systems, ideally utilizing an outside entity.

o   Perform risk assessments for any current or potential third-party vendors to ensure they are meeting the necessary cyber security standards in protecting their election systems.  

 

·         The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:

o   Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process. 

o   Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).

o   Maintain and more aggressively promote the catalog of services DHS has available for states to help secure their systems, and update the catalog as DHS refines their understanding of what states need.  

o   Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.

o   Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.

 

5.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

·         States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems.  At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability.  If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.

·         States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.  Risk-limiting audits, in particular, can be a cost-effective way to ensure that votes cast are votes counted.   

·         DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the potential vulnerabilities of both voting machines and the supply chains.

 

6.      Assistance for the States

·         States should use federal grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits. 

 

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[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

[2] In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.