

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 6, 2026

The Honorable Markwayne Mullin
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Mullin:

This November, Americans will cast their votes for their chosen representatives in the Senate, House of Representatives, and in races for governors, state attorneys general, secretaries of state, and state legislative chambers. I am confident that our elections are safe and secure thanks to the hard work of state and local election officials and the comprehensive security policies and procedures in place in election precincts across the country. However, I am gravely concerned about the lack of critical federal support to state and localities ahead of the 2026 midterms, in particular, election security services that were routinely provided through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

As you continue in your new role as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, I am writing to remind you that Article I Section 4 of the Constitution unambiguously assigns states and territories with the responsibility for administering federal elections. The Department of Justice, Intelligence Community, and particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are authorized and provided appropriations to fill the essential role of informing, training, and supporting states to protect their elections from foreign and domestic cyber and physical threats. In large part due to the leadership of Senate Republicans, Congress provided vital appropriations funding beginning in the FY2018 to empower states and territories in their election administration work. Within DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has one of the most important enablement roles for our nation's election security. Since President Trump created the agency in 2018, CISA has worked directly with both Republican and Democratic governed states and localities to provide education, training, and other election security services to state and local election officials, as well as sharing information about real time threats and incident-response reports. CISA has fulfilled this mission without infringing on states' constitutional duty to administer federal elections or weaponizing sensitive information and vulnerabilities shared through and with CISA.

Over the last several years, CISA's outreach has been well-received by state and local election officials and participation in CISA's election security programs has been consistently present in all 50 states, largely due to CISA's acknowledgement that their role is supplementary and that the agency has no constitutional, legal, or regulatory authority over the administration of elections. According to state and local election officials, CISA is not providing election security training, resources, and information that it provided in previous years. While the states are taking valiant and expensive measures to protect their elections, it is impossible for states to independently obtain intelligence, subject-matter expertise, and real-time incident reporting, and

information at the scale and speed required to protect state elections from physical and cyber threats. As such, it is vital that CISA be permitted to respond to election threats, vulnerabilities, and foreign interference or influence, and they must do so without the risk or threat of decontextualized or misrepresented threat intelligence from the Trump administration. CISA's work must never be used as fodder to limit states' constitutional authority to administer elections. CISA, and DHS broadly, must refrain from participating in or supporting unconstitutional, unilateral efforts to "nationalize" or "take over" elections.

The 2020 election of President Joe Biden, the 2024 election of President Trump, and thousands of down-ballot races, midterm, and off-year elections, including your own, were safe and secure because of the incredible work of state and local elections officials, work that was *enabled*, not *overseen*, by CISA. Against the backdrop of sustained efforts by foreign adversaries¹ and partisan domestic actors to undermine Americans' faith in our electoral processes, these successes were directly attributable to painstaking work across years and administrations to nurture trust, relationships, and credibility between state and local election officials and the federal government. President Trump and Secretary Noem squandered that trust in early 2025, firing over a third of CISA's nonpartisan career workforce and halting all elections security work². Despite the Intelligence Community's assessment of threats to the upcoming midterm elections³, DHS' April 7 Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Proposal recommends further decimation of CISA's election security mission by cutting fourteen CISA election security employees and the entire budget for CISA's election security program, including the information sharing program to support state election officials, as well as the removal of election security advisors, who have served as critical nodes for election security issues to the states⁴. Between the \$191 billion allocated to DHS in the One Big Beautiful Bill and Senate Republicans poised to deliver yet another \$79 billion for ICE, Border Patrol, and the White House ballroom, zeroing out CISA's election security work is an indefensible repudiation of DHS' mission and your responsibility to safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our democracy.

There is precious little time for CISA to prioritize its election security work and get states and localities the support they need. State and local election officials — and the American public — deserve to know whether CISA can and will protect and support the security of the midterm elections. Accordingly, please respond to the following questions by May 15, 2026:

¹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, & Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2024, November 4). *Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA statement*. Federal Bureau of Investigation. <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424>

² Geller, E. (2025, February 14). *Top US election security watchdog forced to stop election security work* [Article]. *Wired*. <https://www.wired.com/story/cisa-election-security-freeze-memo/>

³ U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. (2026, April 28). *Hearing to receive testimony on the posture of United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2027 and the future years defense program* [Transcript]. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/full_transcript-04-28-2026.pdf

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Financial Officer. (2026, April 3). *Congressional budget justification fiscal year 2027: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency*. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo-budget-cisa.pdf

1. Provide the number of CISA staff members that are currently working exclusively on election security matters at present. How many were assigned to election security duties on January 19, 2024? Please distinguish between career staff, political appointees, and contractors, and identify where the employees are based.
2. In March 2026, the White House told the New York Times that “the entire Trump administration is laser-focused on ensuring the safety and security of American elections.”⁵ Explain how CISA will ensure the safety and security of American elections without personnel or budget per your FY 27 budget proposal.
3. Provide a list of election security responses CISA provided to any and all states from January 20, 2025 to the present. Include a description of the response, who requested the support, and who provided the response.
4. Provide a list of election security trainings, briefings, tabletop exercises, or cybersecurity reviews provided to states or local election jurisdictions from January 20, 2025 to the present. Include a description of the training, briefing, or exercise, who provided the training, and who attended the training.
5. Provide a list of election security trainings, briefings, exercises, or cybersecurity reviews planned to be provided to states or local election jurisdictions from today through December 31, 2026. Include a description of the training, briefing or exercise, the intended audience for the engagement, and who will provide the training or brief.
6. Please provide a list of outreach DHS and CISA have received from states or localities relating to election security or requesting election security assistance, briefings, training, or information. Please summarize DHS and CISA’s responses to each request. Please include any invitations to election security related events to DHS or CISA employees, with the details of the event, the host, and who from DHS or CISA attended.
7. If any DHS or CISA staff participated in the FBI raid in Fulton County or ODNI’s taking possession and testing of voting machines in Puerto Rico, describe their role and involvement in the investigation.
8. In March 2025, CISA said it completed its election security review but has yet to release report and indicated it does not plan to release the report to the public. Please provide a copy of the report or an explanation of why the report has not been released to the public. Explain how your FY 27 budget supports the findings of the report.
9. On April 29, 2026, the Director of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency Chief testified that it is reasonable to expect foreign adversaries will seek to

⁵ Sell, Adam. (2026, March 17). Trump’s Gutting of Election Security Fuels Worries for Midterms. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/17/us/politics/trump-cisa-election-security.html>

interfere in the upcoming midterm elections.⁶ In 2024, CISA, FBI, and ODNI released guidance for securing election infrastructure against the tactics of foreign malign influence operations.⁷ What is CISA doing to communicate the risk of foreign interference in the midterm elections with state and local election officials and the public? Provide any specific guidance, briefings, trainings, or other materials on this topic.

Sincerely,



Mark R. Warner
United States Senator

⁶ U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. (2026, April 28). *To receive testimony on the posture of United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2027 and the future years defense program* [Hearing].

<https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-posture-of-united-states-special-operations-command-and-united-states-cyber-command-in-review-of-the-defense-authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2027-and-the-future-years-defense-program>

⁷ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, & Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024, April 17). *CISA, FBI, and ODNI release guidance for securing election infrastructure against the tactics of foreign malign influence operations* [Press release]. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-fbi-and-odni-release-guidance-securing-election-infrastructure-against-tactics-foreign-malign>