Press Releases

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the following statement after President Trump’s former campaign manager Paul Manafort pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy against the United States and one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, and agreed to cooperate with the Special Counsel’s investigation:

“Today’s admission of criminal guilt by Paul Manafort clearly demonstrates that the President’s 2016 campaign manager conducted illegal activity in conspiracy with Russian-backed entities and was beholden to Kremlin-linked officials. The guilty plea also underscores the seriousness of this investigation. The Special Counsel must be permitted to follow the facts wherever and however high they might lead, because in the United States of America no one is above the law. Any attempt by the President to pardon Mr. Manafort or otherwise interfere in this investigation would be a gross abuse of power and require immediate action by Congress.”

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking Committee, released the following statement after President Trump signed an executive order “Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election”:

“In order to deter foreign interference in future elections, we must make it clear to Russia and other adversaries that interference is unacceptable, and will have painful consequences.

“Unfortunately, President Trump demonstrated in Helsinki and elsewhere that he simply cannot be counted upon to stand up to Putin when it matters. While the Administration has yet to share the full text, an executive order that inevitably leaves the President broad discretion to decide whether to impose tough sanctions against those who attack our democracy is insufficient.

“If we are going to actually deter Russia and others from interfering in our elections in the future, we need to spell out strong, clear consequences, without ambiguity. We remain woefully underprepared to secure the upcoming elections, and an executive order is simply no substitute for congressional action, such as the strong measures included in the bipartisan DETER Act.”

Sen. Warner is a co-sponsor of the Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines (DETER) Act.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the following statement after George Papadopoulos, a former Trump campaign adviser, was sentenced for lying to the FBI about his interactions with suspected Russian intermediaries during the 2016 presidential campaign:

“Despite constant attacks by the President and his allies, Special Counsel Robert Mueller and his team have once again demonstrated that they are conducting a serious, professional investigation into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russians during the 2016 election.

“As an influential foreign policy adviser to the Trump campaign, Mr. Papadopoulos was informed that Russia had ‘dirt’ on Hillary Clinton in the form of ‘thousands of emails’ at a critical time during the campaign. He also had access to, and communications with, the campaign’s top leaders. That’s not conjecture – that is according to Mr. Papadopoulos himself.

“I still have significant questions about how high that information went, and I know the Senate Intelligence Committee would like to hear directly from Mr. Papadopoulos.”

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC) and Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) released the following statement:

“We have obviously followed today’s reporting about Michael Cohen with great interest. He appears to be pleading guilty to very serious charges, however, we have no insight into any agreements he and his legal team have allegedly reached with prosecutors in New York.

“What we can say is that we recently re-engaged with Mr. Cohen and his team following press reports that suggested he had advance knowledge of the June 2016 meeting between campaign officials and Russian lawyers at Trump Tower. Mr. Cohen had testified before the Committee that he was not aware of the meeting prior to its disclosure in the press last summer. As such, the Committee inquired of Mr. Cohen’s legal team as to whether Mr. Cohen stood by his testimony. They responded that he did stand by his testimony.

“We hope that today’s developments and Mr. Cohen’s plea agreement will not preclude his appearance before our Committee as needed for our ongoing investigation.”

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after Facebook announced that it had removed 652 fraudulent Iranian-backed pages, groups, and accounts from Facebook and Instagram — as well as a number of pages, groups, and accounts linked to Russian military intelligence from Facebook. This announcement comes just weeks ahead of the September 5^th open hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee with the leadership of Facebook, Twitter, and Google on the subject of social media manipulation.

“This is further evidence that foreign adversaries are actively using social media to divide Americans and undermine our democratic institutions. I’ve been saying for months that there’s no way the problem of social media manipulation is limited to a single troll farm in St. Petersburg, and that fact is now beyond a doubt. We also learned today that the Iranians are now following the Kremlin’s playbook from 2016. While I’m encouraged to see Facebook taking steps to rid their platforms of these bad actors, there’s clearly more work to be done. I look forward to questioning the leadership of Facebook, Twitter, and Google about this at the Intelligence Committee’s hearing on September 5^th.”

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after Facebook announced that it removed 32 Pages and accounts from Facebook and Instagram that showed connections to and activity consistent with previous Russian disinformation efforts:

“Today’s disclosure is further evidence that the Kremlin continues to exploit platforms like Facebook to sow division and spread disinformation, and I am glad that Facebook is taking some steps to pinpoint and address this activity. I also expect Facebook, along with other platform companies, will continue to identify Russian troll activity and to work with Congress on updating our laws to better protect our democracy in the future.”

In October, Sen. Warner – along with Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and John McCain (R-AZ) – introduced the Honest Ads Act to help prevent foreign interference in elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

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Washington, DC – Senators Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) led 14 Democratic members of the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees in asking leaders at the Department of Justice to detail the ethical agreements binding the newly confirmed head of the Department’s Criminal Division, Brian Benczkowski. The information would shed light on whether Benczkowski—a nominee noted as uniquely underqualified, who served as an aide to then-Senator Jeff Sessions and on the Trump transition team, and who represented a Russian bank some suspect may have served as a clandestine back channel between Russia and the Trump Organization—has done enough to insulate himself from potentially serious conflicts of interest, including those involving Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian attacks on the 2016 election.

Joining Whitehouse and Durbin in sending the letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General for Administration Lee Lofthus are Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), and Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Chris Coons (D-DE), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Kamala Harris (D-CA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Jack Reed (D-RI).

Among the senators’ concerns is the potential for Benczkowski, now privy to details of a broad array of Justice Department investigations and prosecutions, to access information on the Special Counsel investigation. They also raise Benczkowski’s commitment to recuse himself from matters related to the Russian bank linked to the Trump Organization, Alfa Bank—a recusal that does not encompass the bank’s parent company, Alfa Group Consortium. Events of the past week illustrate several of the issues with Benczkowski’s past employment and current position, the senators point out, suggesting the only remedy is a blanket recusal.

“Without recusal,” the senators write, “there is a risk that Mr. Benczkowski would have oversight of investigative steps such as the Special Counsel’s recent request for use immunity for five witnesses in the SCO’s prosecution of Paul Manafort. Likewise, last Tuesday, the Department indicted a Russian national, Mariia Butina, for acting and conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government. . . . Mr. Benczkowski’s involvement in these actions could, at a minimum, create the appearance of a conflict or undue influence over these decisions.”

The senators continue, “Given Mr. Benczkowski’s prior relationship with the Attorney General and his representation of Alfa Bank—particularly in connection to the Steele Dossier—we believe Mr. Benczkowski should be recused from all aspects of the Special Counsel investigation, as well as from all matters related to the Alfa Group Consortium and its principals. A categorical recusal is the only way for the Department to ensure public confidence in those and any associated investigations.”

The Criminal Division is responsible for overseeing a stable of over 700 criminal attorneys charged with overseeing and prosecuting high-profile federal cases nationwide. Benczkowski has no prosecutorial experience and has spent virtually no time in a courtroom.

Full text of the senators’ letter is below. A PDF version is available here.

July 24, 2018

The Honorable Rod J. Rosenstein

Deputy Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

The Honorable Lee J. Lofthus

Assistant Attorney General for Administration

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General Lofthus:

On Wednesday, July 11, 2018, the Senate confirmed Brian Benczkowski to be Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (“Department”). Today, we write for further information concerning Mr. Benczkowski’s ethics agreement with the Department, the scope of his recusals, any waivers he has been granted, and any other information relevant to the Department’s review of Mr. Benczkowski’s prior work at it relates to his compliance with the Ethics in Government Act, associated regulations, Department policy, and the Trump Ethics Pledge, Executive Order 13770.

The context of Mr. Benczkowski’s selection to lead the Criminal Division raises concerns that must be addressed in your review. With no prosecutorial experience and barely any time in a courtroom of any sort, Mr. Benczkowski appears to have been nominated at least in part as a result of his prior, political relationship with Attorney General Sessions. With the Attorney General recused from the Department’s Russia investigation, President Trump repeatedly violating rules and norms designed to protect the independence of that investigation, and House Republicans engaged in an active campaign to discredit the Department and FBI and make confidential investigative materials public, the Department and its ethics officials should take the utmost precautions to prevent any backchannel, unauthorized disclosures of the Special Counsel’s work.

The issues with Mr. Benczkowski extend to his experience, as well as his lack of experience. During the course of his confirmation proceedings, it came to light that as a lawyer in private practice, Mr. Benczkowski recently represented the Russian Alfa Bank in connection with allegations that its servers had maintained a clandestine back channel to the Trump Organization. Mr. Benczkowski’s representation of Alfa Bank also included a review of the so-called “Steele dossier,” the private intelligence report by Christopher Steele that bears on issues central to the ongoing Special Counsel investigation into Russian election interference and related matters.

Before his confirmation, Mr. Benczkowski committed to recuse himself, if confirmed as AAG, from all matters related to Alfa Bank.[1] He did not, however, commit to recuse himself from all matters related to the Alfa Group Consortium, the parent company of Alfa Bank, or individuals related to that entity. He also did not commit to recuse himself from the Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian election interference. Three individuals with ownership interests in Alfa Group Consortium—Mikhail Fridman, Pyotr Aven, and German Khan—have been identified to Congress by the United States Department of Treasury as among “senior foreign officials and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.”[2] A son-in-law of Mr. Khan, Alex Van der Zwaan, pleaded guilty to lying to federal investigators.[3]

With respect to those matters, Mr. Benczkowski told the Senate Judiciary Committee:

Because I do not know the scope of [the Department’s investigation into Russian interference with the 2016 election or Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation], I cannot commit to such a recusal at this time. If I am confirmed and a matter comes before me in the Criminal Division where I believe recusal might be warranted, I will review the facts, consult with career ethics officials at the Department, and make a decision as warranted by the law and the facts.[4]

In prior correspondence with the Senate, the Department has confirmed that the Special Counsel’s Office (SCO) may need to “seek approvals from the Criminal Division as required by statute, regulation, or policy[.]”[5] The Department has also committed that “if Mr. Benczkowski is confirmed as AAG, the Department will require his consultation with appropriate ethics experts within the Department prior to his participation in or supervision of the SCO’s interaction with the Criminal Division.”[6]

The significance of these determinations was underscored by two steps taken by the Department just last week. For example, without recusal, there is a risk that Mr. Benczkowski would have oversight of investigative steps such as the Special Counsel’s recent request for use immunity for five witnesses in the SCO’s prosecution of Paul Manafort. Likewise, last Tuesday, the Department indicted a Russian national, Mariia Butina, for acting and conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government. The indictment was handed down by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and signed by the District’s United States Attorney, Jessie Liu. Mr. Benczkowski’s involvement in these actions could, at a minimum, create the appearance of a conflict or undue influence over these decisions.

Given Mr. Benczkowski’s prior relationship with the Attorney General and his representation of Alfa Bank—particularly in connection to the Steele Dossier—we believe Mr. Benczkowski should be recused from all aspects of the Special Counsel investigation, as well as from all matters related to the Alfa Group Consortium and its principals. A categorical recusal is the only way for the Department to ensure public confidence in those and any associated investigations. To further understand the Department’s position and decisions related to Mr. Benczkowski’s conflicts of interest, we request that you provide the following documentation and, as applicable, address the following questions:

All ethics agreements, recusals, waivers, or other documentation pertaining to the scope of Mr. Benczkowski’s duties at the Department.
All counseling notes, emails, and any other communication between Mr. Benczkowski, the Department’s Ethics Office, and the Office of Government Ethics.
A copy of Mr. Benczkowski’s signed “Ethics Pledge.”
If Mr. Benczkowski has not been recused from all matters related to the Alfa Group Consortium, please explain why.
If Mr. Benczkowski has not been recused from all matters related to Mikhail Fridman, Pyotr Aven, and/or German Khan, please explain why.
What was Mr. Benczkowski’s involvement, if any, in the Department’s request for use immunity for five witnesses in the SCO’s prosecution of Paul Manafort, and in the Department’s decision to charge Mariia Butina?
If Mr. Benczkowski has not been recused from all matters related to the Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election, or related investigations and prosecutions conducted by the Department or United States Attorneys’ offices, please explain why.

In Mr. Lofthus’s February 26, 2018, letter to Office of Government Ethics Acting Director David Apol, he stated that Mr. Benczkowski would meet with ethics officials during his first week of service and complete document compliance with his ethics agreement within 90 days of service. The critical importance and pendency of matters before the Department demand assurances that Mr. Benczkowski will have no role, consultative or otherwise, in them until his ethics arrangements are complete. Accordingly, we request a response to this letter no later than July 31, 2018.

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[1] See Response from Brian Benczkowski to Question for the Record #2 from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, August 1, 2017 (“I have decided to recuse myself from any matter involving Alfa Bank for the duration of my service as the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, if I am confirmed.”).

[2] Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 241 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 Regarding Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federation and Russian Parastatal Entities, January 29, 2018.

[3] The Special Counsel referenced Mr. Khan in his sentencing memorandum for Mr. Van der Zwaan: “Van der Zwaan is a person of ample financial means—both personally and through his father-in-law, a prominent Russian oligarch, who has paid substantial sums to the defendant and his wife. He can pay any fine imposed.” Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, Crim. No. 18-31 (D.D.C) filed Mar. 27, 2018.

[4] Response from Brian Benczkowski to Question for the Record #3 from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, August 1, 2017.

[5] Letter from Hon. Stephen Boyd to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Dec. 11, 2017.

[6] Id.

WASHINGTON – Today U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) announced new cosponsors of bipartisan Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines (DETER) Act: Senators Mark R. Warner (D-Va.), Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Ben Sasse (R-Neb), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa).

The legislation sends a powerful message to Russia and any other foreign actor seeking to disrupt our elections: if you attack American candidates, campaigns, or voting infrastructure, you will face severe consequences. The DETER Act uses the threat of powerful sanctions to dissuade hostile foreign powers from meddling in our elections by ensuring that they know well in advance that the costs will outweigh the benefits.

“In the face of unequivocal evidence that Russia worked to undermine our elections in 2016 and continued aggression from the Kremlin just four months until our next federal elections, we must take action,” said Senator Van Hollen. “The DETER Act would send a clear signal that attacks on our democracy will not be tolerated. We’re proud to announce this new support from our colleagues, and we hope the Senate will take up this bipartisan legislation without delay.”

“The most meaningful measure that we can take right now to protect our democracy is to pass the bipartisan DETER Act, which imposes specific and serious sanctions against foreign countries that meddle in our future elections. We must make sure Putin understands that we will not overlook his hostilities, and he will face punishing consequences if he tries to interfere in our elections again,” said Senator Rubio.

“We have to do everything we can to protect our elections from foreign interference. The 2018 midterm elections are just around the corner, and Director National Intelligence Dan Coats just recently cautioned that the ‘warning lights are blinking red again.’ On the heels of the President’s weak performance in Helsinki, it’s critical that we make clear to Putin that interference in our democratic process will not be tolerated. I thank Senator Van Hollen and Senator Rubio for their leadership on this issue,” said Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Warner.

“As the U.S. intelligence services have reported, it is an incontrovertible fact that Russia sought to influence the 2016 elections in the United States – a fact that President Putin openly confirmed during the recent U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki,” Senator Gardner said. “We know Russia will try again, so we must also be forward thinking to prevent this assault on our democracy from ever happening again. As we get closer to our next elections, we should be making it clear to the KGB thug Vladimir Putin, and anyone else who dares meddle in our elections, that this type of behavior will never be tolerated and will be met with severe and immediate consequences.”

“Russia’s interference in our elections cannot be dismissed or ignored. Congress has a responsibility to take action and impose costs on those who would attack American democracy,” said Senator Baldwin. “This bipartisan effort puts country over party, stands up for our democracy and will send a powerful message to bad actors like Putin’s Russia and other adversarial nations that future attacks on our elections will be met with severe consequences.”

“Our Intelligence Community has made it clear that Russia interfered in our 2016 elections and will do so again - unless we take actions to prevent it,” said Senator Coons. “The DETER Act will impose penalties on Russia – or any other adversary – that seeks to undermine our democratic processes and traditions. I commend Senator Rubio and Senator Van Hollen for introducing this bill and I look forward to working with them to pass it into law.”

“Vladimir Putin wants to make the Soviet Union great again and he hates the very stuff that makes America great – our First Amendment freedoms and our free and fair elections,” said Senator Sasse. “Russia is coming back in 2018, 2020, and 2022 to sow chaos and distrust. We cannot fall asleep on the watch. These attacks deserve consequences -- and sanctions send a strong message.

“The conclusion of American intelligence agencies is crystal clear: Russian interference in our elections is a fact. We must take immediate action to protect and secure our elections from future meddling by Russia or anyone else. Deterring foreign enemies from attacking our election systems and other critical infrastructure is just the first step we must take to protect our national security and democratic institutions,” said Senator Cantwell.

Senator Grassley said, “While no vote tallies were changed in the 2016 presidential election, Russian cyberattacks and propaganda efforts undermined confidence in our democratic process. Vladimir Putin would like nothing more than to continue sowing discord and meddling in Western democracies without consequence. Passing this legislation would help improve Americans’ faith in their system of government and send an unmistakable signal to the Kremlin that it’s not worth trying it again.”

BACKGROUND

Reporting Requirements

· The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) must issue to Congress a determination on whether any foreign government has interfered in that election within one month after every federal election.

Actions That Will Elicit Retaliation

· A foreign government, or an agent acting on its behalf, cannot purchase advertisements to influence an election, including online ads.

· A foreign government, or an agent acting on its behalf, cannot use social and traditional media to spread significant amounts of false information to Americans.

· A foreign government, or an agent acting on its behalf, cannot hack and release or modify election and campaign infrastructure, including voter registration databases and campaign emails

· A foreign government, or an agent acting on its behalf, cannot block or otherwise hinder access to elections infrastructure, such as websites providing information on polling locations.

Russia-Specific Sanctions

· If the DNI determines that the Kremlin has once again interfered in an American federal election, the bill mandates a set of severe sanctions that must be implement within ten days of the DNI's determination.

· This includes sanctions on major sectors of the Russian economy, including finance, energy, defense, and metals and mining.

· Every senior Russian political figure or oligarch, identified in the report required by the Countering America's Adversaries Act of 2017, will be blacklisted from entering the United States and will have their assets blocked.

· The Administration is also required to work with the European Union to enlist their support in adopting a sanctions regime to broaden the impact.

Preparing for Other Potential Attacks

· The DNI has identified China, Iran, and North Korea as our other major foreign government cyber threats, and they may also seek to exploit American vulnerabilities in the next election cycle.

· The Administration should present Congress with a plan for preventing interference in our elections for each of these countries, and any other foreign state of significant concern.

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WASHINGTON— Following President Trump’s meeting and press conference with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, where he accepted Putin’s election meddling denial, top Senate Democrats sent a letter to President Trump listing a series of questions to clarify what commitments he may have made to Putin during their secretive and lengthy meeting.

U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Senate Foreign Relations Ranking Member Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Senate Armed Services Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI), and Senate Banking Ranking Member Sherrod Brown (D-OH) signed the letter to President Trump.

“American citizens and the whole world watched the leader of the free world align with an authoritarian leader who orchestrated an attack on our own democracy. President Putin and his government are wasting no time capitalizing on yesterday’s meeting and using it to advance their national interests. We cannot afford to be blindsided or outmaneuvered,” wrote the Senators before listing 13 questions to be answered by the President. “Your cursory description of what was discussed at a two-and-a-half-hour meeting does little to assuage these concerns. To adequately protect America’s interests, we need to know what commitments you may have made to President Putin.”

The Senators also called on the Trump Administration to allow the U.S. Ambassador to Russia and the Secretary of Defense to testify before Congress about the repercussions of the Helsinki summit. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is already scheduled to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday July 25th.

The text of the letter can be found here and below:

Mr. President:

Yesterday was a stunning day for American democracy. American citizens and the whole world watched the leader of the free world align with an authoritarian leader who orchestrated an attack on our own democracy. In doing so, you turned your back on our own intelligence community, which unanimously agrees that the Russian government carried out attacks intended to disrupt and interfere with our elections and influence public opinion.

We as a nation must now wonder exactly what you discussed and may have promised to President Putin. Congress and the American public have a right to know. President Putin and his government are wasting no time capitalizing on yesterday’s meeting and using it to advance their national interests. We cannot afford to be blindsided or outmaneuvered. Just today the Russian Ministry of Defense publicly stated that it is prepared to start implementing an agreement you apparently struck in Helsinki with President Putin, an agreement that neither Congress nor the American people have been informed about.

Your cursory description of what was discussed at a two-and-a-half-hour meeting does little to assuage these concerns. To adequately protect America’s interests, we need to know what commitments you may have made to President Putin. Specifically:

1. What is the full list of topics you discussed?

2. What were the “suggestions” President Putin made to you?

3. Did you discuss any changes to international security agreements?

4. Did you advocate for the removal to the U.S. of the 12 Russian intelligence officers indicted last Friday?

5. Did you make any commitments regarding the future of the U.S. military presence in Syria?

6. Did you call upon President Putin to uphold Russia’s commitments, agreed to at the Presidential level last year in Da Nang, Vietnam, with respect to the de-escalation zone in southwest Syria, especially the presence of Iran and Iranian-aligned forces?

7. Did you press Russia to return to compliance with the INF treaty and halt its nuclear threats against Europe?

8. Did you discuss relaxing U.S. sanctions on Russia, including CAATSA sanctions? If so, what was said, and what concessions, if any, were made by you and/or President Putin?

9. Did you call upon President Putin to withdraw from Crimea and eastern Ukraine so that both areas are returned to Ukrainian Government control?

10. Did you discuss NATO military exercises scheduled for this fall? Did you agree to roll back or change the nature of those exercises?

11. Did you discuss U.S. security assistance to Ukraine or make any concessions regarding its continuation?

12. Did you raise the issue of political prisoners with President Putin, including that of Oleg Sentsov, the Ukrainian filmmaker who has been detained for 4 years and is on hunger strike?

13. What, if anything, did you commit to?

Mr. President, the answers to these questions are of critical importance to U.S. national security. Answering them in full, without hesitation, will demonstrate that you do still hold America’s interests first. Some of us will press Secretary Pompeo on these issues next week. In addition, we urge you to immediately send the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, an appropriately high-ranking Intelligence Community official, and the Secretary of Defense to testify before Congress and explain how they will continue to advance America’s interests in light of yesterday’s summit.

We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today following President Trump’s comments during a joint press conference at the Trump-Putin summit:

“For the President of the United States to stand next to Vladimir Putin — who personally ordered one of the largest state-sponsored cyber-attacks in our history — and side with Putin over America’s military and intelligence leaders is a breach of his duty to defend our country against its adversaries.

“If the President cannot defend the United States and its interests in public, how can we trust him to stand up for our country in private?”

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WASHINGTON – Today, a group of top Senate Democrats wrote to President Trump, urging him in the strongest possible terms to avoid meeting alone with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In a letter to the White House, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Senate Foreign Relations Ranking Member Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Senate Judiciary Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Senate Armed Services Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI), Senate Appropriations Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Senate Banking Committee Ranking Member Sherrod Brown (D-OH) all encouraged the President to cancel the summit if he is not prepared to press Putin on Russia’s attack on the 2016 election and demand that Russian intelligence officials indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice be handed over to stand trial.

“If you insist on meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, Finland, on Monday, we write to urge that you include senior members of your team and not meet one-on-one with Mr. Putin, as reportedly planned. Mr. Putin is a trained KGB intelligence veteran who will come to this meeting well-prepared. As the Kremlin said last week, a one-on-one meeting with you ‘absolutely suits’ him. There must be other Americans in the room,” the Senators wrote.

The Senators also urged Trump to make Russia’s attack on the U.S. elections the top issue of the meeting, and pressed him to follow up on yesterday’s indictment of 12 Russians for hacking Democratic campaign officials and state elections boards.

“If you are not prepared to make Russia’s attack on our election the top issue you will discuss, then you should cancel the Helsinki summit. Mr. Putin is not a friend of the United States. The unanimous judgment of the professional men and women of the United States intelligence community is that Russia, at Mr. Putin’s direction, undertook a sophisticated campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election – a judgment that was just last week upheld in a bipartisan report by the Senate Intelligence Committee,” said the Senators. “Just yesterday, the Justice Department indicted 12 Russian military intelligence agents with hacking the computer networks of U.S. political organizations. These follow previous indictments of 13 Russians associated with the St. Petersburg ‘troll factory.’ These individuals must be brought to the United States so that they can stand trial, and you should demand that Mr. Putin hand them over.”

Added the Senators, “We hope that you will use the opportunity of a meeting with Mr. Putin to advance a well-coordinated U.S. message, supported by senior leaders in your own administration, to hold Russia accountable for its unacceptable behavior. To do so, you must rely on the expertise and the experts of the State Department, Defense Department, CIA and other U.S. government agencies – not wing it on your own.”

The summit is part of a foreign trip planned by the White House which included visits to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels and London. During this trip, President Trump threatened to pull out of the military alliance. Undermining the U.S.- NATO relationship has been a longtime goal of Putin.

“Our intelligence leaders unanimously assess that Mr. Putin will continue to try to interfere in upcoming U.S. elections. Russia continues its aggressive policy to undermine NATO, European solidarity, and Western institutions and norms. It continues to support a murderous regime in Syria, and to destabilize and occupy parts of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin wants to see the West divided and weakened. You must not play into his aims,” the Senators counseled.

The letter was sent a day after the U.S. Justice Department announced new charges against 12 Russian intelligence officers accused of hacking the Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and the Clinton campaign. The indictments are part of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

The full text of the letter can be found here and below:

July 14, 2018

President Donald J. Trump

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Trump:

If you insist on meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, Finland, on Monday, we write to urge that you include senior members of your team and not meet one-on-one with Mr. Putin, as reportedly planned. Mr. Putin is a trained KGB intelligence veteran who will come to this meeting well-prepared. As the Kremlin said last week, a one-on-one meeting with you “absolutely suits” him. There must be other Americans in the room.

If you are not prepared to make Russia’s attack on our election the top issue you will discuss, then you should cancel the Helsinki summit. Mr. Putin is not a friend of the United States. The unanimous judgment of the professional men and women of the United States intelligence community is that Russia, at Mr. Putin’s direction, undertook a sophisticated campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election – a judgment that was just last week upheld in a bipartisan report by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Just yesterday, the Justice Department indicted 12 Russian military intelligence agents with hacking the computer networks of U.S. political organizations. These follow previous indictments of 13 Russians associated with the St. Petersburg “troll factory.” These individuals must be brought to the United States so that they can stand trial, and you should demand that Mr. Putin hand them over.

Our intelligence leaders unanimously assess that Mr. Putin will continue to try to interfere in upcoming U.S. elections. Russia continues its aggressive policy to undermine NATO, European solidarity, and Western institutions and norms. It continues to support a murderous regime in Syria, and to destabilize and occupy parts of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin wants to see the West divided and weakened. You must not play into his aims.

We hope that you will use the opportunity of a meeting with Mr. Putin to advance a well-coordinated U.S. message, supported by senior leaders in your own administration, to hold Russia accountable for its unacceptable behavior. To do so, you must rely on the expertise and the experts of the State Department, Defense Department, CIA and other U.S. government agencies – not wing it on your own.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of 12 Russian intelligence officers for criminally interfering with the 2016 U.S. presidential election:

“Today’s indictment by the Department of Justice of 12 Russian spies for hacking our election is another testament to the quality and professionalism of the investigation being run by Special Counsel Robert Mueller. The President and his allies must cease and desist their baseless, inflammatory attacks on an investigation that, even before today, had already produced multiple indictments and secured guilty pleas from two Trump campaign aides as well as the President’s former national security adviser.

“Just this morning in the United Kingdom, President Trump blamed the poor state of U.S.-Russia relations on ‘the rigged witch hunt,’ claiming that it ‘really hurts our country and it really hurts our relationship with Russia.’ The President is wrong. As today’s indictment makes crystal clear, tensions between our two nations exist because Russia attacked our democracy.

“That’s all the more reason why he must not meet one-on-one with Vladimir Putin, who, in the absence of U.S. experts or advisers, will undoubtedly take full advantage of an ill-prepared President. And if the Administration is unwilling to make the facts laid out in today’s indictment a top priority for that discussion, then that meeting shouldn’t happen.”

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC) and Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) released the Committee’s unclassified summary of its initial findings on the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Russian activities in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee finds that the overall judgments issued in the ICA were well-supported and the tradecraft was strong. The course of the Committee’s investigation has shown that the Russian cyber operations were more extensive than the hack of the Democratic National Committee and continued well through the 2016 election.

“The Committee has spent the last 16 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft and analytic work underpinning the Intelligence Community Assessment and sees no reason to dispute the conclusions,” said Chairman Burr. “The Committee continues its investigation and I am hopeful that this installment of the Committee’s work will soon be followed by additional summaries providing the American people with clarity around Russia’s activities regarding U.S. elections.”

“Our investigation thoroughly reviewed all aspects of the January 2017 ICA, which assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign to target our presidential election and to destabilize our democratic institutions,” said Vice Chairman Warner. “As numerous intelligence and national security officials in the Trump administration have since unanimously re-affirmed, the ICA findings were accurate and on point. The Russian effort was extensive and sophisticated, and its goals were to undermine public faith in the democratic process, to hurt Secretary Clinton and to help Donald Trump. While our investigation remains ongoing, we have to learn from 2016 and do more to protect ourselves from attacks in 2018 and beyond.”

The summary is the second unclassified installment in the Committee’s report on Russian election activities.

The Committee held a closed door hearing in May to review the ICA on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections.” Members heard testimony from former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan and former Director of the National Security Agency Mike Rogers, which informed the Committee’s report.

You can read a copy of the unclassified summary here.

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WASHINGTON – Ahead of President Trump’s scheduled trip to Europe for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit and a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA)—Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence—and top Senate Democrats laid out expectations for President Trump to stay focused on reaffirming America’s commitment to our longstanding transatlantic NATO allies and against Russian aggression around the world.

In a letter signed by Vice Chairman Warner and Sens. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Dick Durbin (D-IL), Senate Democratic Whip; and Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senators warned the President not to make any concessions that could further compromise the post-World War II order.

“Clear U.S. leadership is necessary to counter President Putin’s efforts to undermine the NATO alliance and its founding values,” wrote the Senators, citing Russia’s interference in democratic elections, aggressions in Ukraine, occupation of Crimea, and its steadfast support of the Assad regime in Syria. “While there is a place for dialogue between nations on disagreements and common challenges, such as reducing nuclear dangers, we are deeply concerned that your Administration continues to send mixed messages regarding the Russian security threat.”

The Senators also listed critical topics for President Trump to discuss with NATO allies, adding, “it is imperative that you make a strong statement of support for the democratic nations that make up the Alliance and make clear that the United States stands with—not in opposition to—our oldest and closest allies.”

“We stand ready to engage with your Administration, and with our NATO partners, to further the implementation of [CAATSA] and a coherent, coordinated U.S. policy toward Russia that reflects the realities of Russia’s aggression and our nation’s deepest democratic values,” concludes the letter.

A copy of the letter to President Trump can be found here and below.

July 2, 2018

The Honorable Donald J. Trump

President of the United States

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We strongly disagree with your past statements praising Russian President Vladimir Putin, in spite of overwhelming evidence from our intelligence community that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 U.S. election, its illegal occupation of Crimea, its support for a war criminal in Syria, as well as its other destabilizing actions against the United States and our allies. If you continue with your plan to meet with President Putin, you must hold him accountable for these actions. During your trip to Europe, we urge you to remember at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Brussels that NATO’s collective security principles have served to keep our nation secure and prosperous since the end of the Second World War.

Clear U.S. leadership is necessary to counter President Putin’s efforts to undermine the NATO alliance and its founding values. In the last few years, the Kremlin has conducted a widespread campaign of interference in democratic processes around the globe, including in our own U.S. elections. From its violent aggression in eastern Ukraine, to its illegal occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, to its support for the brutal regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria – there is no evidence that the Government of the Russian Federation has changed or plans to change its behavior. If anything, the Kremlin appears to feel emboldened that it can launch attacks against the U.S. and our NATO allies – in the form of cyber attacks, disinformation, misinformation, and political interference, including the use of chemical agents on UK soil – with impunity.

While there is a place for dialogue between nations on disagreements and common challenges, such as reducing nuclear dangers, we are deeply concerned that your Administration continues to send mixed messages regarding the Russian security threat.

During your meeting with President Putin, we ask that you convey that there will be clear consequences for Russia’s interference in democratic processes in the United States and elsewhere, its support for violence and bloodshed in Ukraine and Syria, and the illegal occupation of Crimea. We strongly urge you to stand steadfast on the U.S. commitment to the mutual defense of our Allies and to the people of Ukraine. Congress will strongly oppose any step to degrade our strong bilateral relationship with Ukraine, including decreasing security assistance. In keeping with the United States’ longstanding support for human rights, we urge you to also raise the plight of prisoners in Russia and areas under Russian control who have been detained simply for peacefully expressing their political views and/or religious beliefs.

We agree with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement on April 27, 2018 that NATO has been “an essential pillar of American security interests for decades” and that, “In light of Russia’s unacceptable actions, NATO is more indispensable than ever.” In addition to urging NATO allies to meet their commitments to spend 2% of GDP on defense, working to boost NATO rapid mobility and readiness capacities, and addressing cyber threats and other evolving forms of hybrid warfare, it is imperative that you make a strong statement of support for the democratic nations that make up the Alliance and make clear that the United States stands with—not in opposition to—our oldest and closest allies.

The United States’ NATO allies rushed to collectively defend the security and freedom of the United States when—for the first and only time—Article 5 of the NATO treaty was invoked following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. Brave citizens of our NATO allies have since put their lives on the line alongside U.S. military and civilians, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to combat terrorism and to tackle a range of security threats, sometimes paying the ultimate sacrifice in the process. This is a legacy that merits renewed efforts by the United States to reinforce the alliance, rather than diminish it.

Secretary Pompeo also said in April that “NATO should not return to business as usual with Russia until Moscow shows a clear change in its actions and complies with international law.” As you know, Congress is virtually unanimous on its concerns over Russia, as demonstrated by the passage of last year’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act which you signed into law in August 2017. We stand ready to engage with your Administration, and with our NATO partners, to further the implementation of this law and a coherent, coordinated U.S. policy toward Russia that reflects the realities of Russia’s aggression and our nation’s deepest democratic values.

Sincerely,

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WASHINTON- U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ranking Member of the Senate Rules Committee, and Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, urged the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to implement the strongest possible transparency and accountability requirements for online advertisements in response to the proposed rulemaking. The letter comes as the FEC begins public hearings today on online advertisements.

“During the 2016 election cycle, Russians took advantage of weak online disclaimer and disclosure rules to purchase online political advertisements. As we rapidly approach the 2018 election, intelligence officials have warned that Russia is currently working to disrupt our elections again,” the senators wrote.

“People have a right to know who is behind the information they receive, and in particular who is trying to influence their vote. This necessitates new disclaimer and disclosure requirements for all online advertisements. Primary elections are already upon us and the general election is only 131 days away. Therefore, we encourage you to quickly adopt the strongest possible rule to increase transparency and accountability for online advertisements.”

Klobuchar, Warner and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) are the authors of the bipartisan Honest Ads Act, legislation to help prevent foreign interference in future elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements. The Honest Ads Act would prevent foreign actors from influencing our elections by ensuring that political ads sold online are covered by the same rules as ads sold on TV, radio, and satellite.

The full text of the letter can be found below:

Dear Commissioners:

As you conduct hearings this week on “Internet Disclaimers and Definition of Public Communication”, we encourage you to issue the strongest possible rule that will increase transparency and accountability for online advertisements.

During the 2016 election cycle, Russians took advantage of weak online disclaimer and disclosure rules to purchase online political advertisements. As part of a wide social media exploitation effort, Russia spent at least $100,000 dollars—in rubles—on Facebook ads to influence the 2016 election. According to Facebook responses to investigations by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Judiciary Committee, Russian disinformation reached more than 126 million Americans online.

As we rapidly approach the 2018 election, intelligence officials have warned that Russia is currently working to disrupt our elections again. As Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats stated earlier this year, “[t]he 2018 U.S. midterm elections are a potential target for Russian influence operations” and Russia will conduct “bolder and more disruptive cyber operations.” Senate Intelligence Committee members determined that foreign actors illegally influenced the 2016 presidential election and that something has to be done to stop this from occurring in the future.

Online platforms dwarf broadcast, satellite, and cable providers. The largest internet platform has over 210 million American users. The largest cable provider only has 22 million subscribers – nearly an order of magnitude greater. That is why we introduced the Honest Ads Act earlier this year. Our legislation would apply the same rules to online political advertisements that already exist for traditional media and require digital advertisers to maintain a public record of political ads purchased. By requiring the same rules across all advertising platforms, we can limit foreign attempts to influence our elections, increase transparency in political advertising, and promote greater accountability.

People have a right to know who is behind the information they receive, and in particular who is trying to influence their vote. This necessitates new disclaimer and disclosure requirements for all online advertisements. Primary elections are already upon us and the general election is only 131 days away. Therefore, we encourage you to quickly adopt the strongest possible rule to increase transparency and accountability for online advertisements.

Sincerely,

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Washington, DC – Today, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) sent a letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and FBI Director Christopher Wray requesting that the Department of Justice confirm that they have not given the President’s outside counsel, White House staff or the President access to the same classified information briefed to Congress.

“We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities,” the Members wrote in the letter. “These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power.”

In the letter, Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff also request confirmation that the DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information to the same individuals in the future outside of appropriate judicial proceedings, and that going forward, the DOJ will not brief additional Members of Congress beyond the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

After the May 24 briefing to the “Gang of 8,” Schumer, Pelosi, Warner and Schiff released the following statement: “Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

***

The full letter is below:

Dear Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Director Wray:

We remain deeply troubled by President Donald Trump and his legal team’s persistent efforts to interfere with the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation and undermine your agencies’ lawful activities.

Most recently, Rudy Giuliani, one of the President’s personal attorneys, repeated publicly that the White House and the President’s lawyers expect access to classified information of the utmost sensitivity related to the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation. Executive agencies earlier had briefed this information to select Members of Congress in response to a publicly-announced directive from President Trump. Giuliani also said that the President will refuse to be interviewed by the Special Counsel, unless the President’s attorneys are permitted to review related classified documents.

These demands, if fulfilled, would grossly violate our system of checks and balances, established procedure and fundamental norms. Although he has not been indicted, President Trump’s own conduct reportedly remains under examination by the Special Counsel. And absent an indictment, the subjects of federal investigation cannot access law enforcement or related national security information for any reason.

As the President’s attorney has made clear, his legal team wishes to obtain the classified information at issue, not for any legitimate purpose—but instead to frustrate and discredit publicly the work of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

These developments leave us concerned that, through his legal team or otherwise, the President will continue to pressure your agencies to divulge investigative information which he, his attorneys, and his congressional allies then could manipulate or even disclose publicly for the President’s personal or political benefit. That would be a terrible abuse of power.

We thus respectfully request that the Department of Justice confirm, in writing, by no later than 5 p.m. on Monday, June 11:

(1) that the following parties have not been given access to the classified information, which executive branch agencies briefed to the “Gang of 8” on May 24, 2018:

· Rudy Giuliani, Jay Sekulow, or any other attorney who represents or has represented President Trump in his personal capacity;

· White House staff, including attorneys from the White House Counsel’s office;

· President Donald J. Trump;

(2) that DOJ and FBI have no plans to convey such information in the future to the President and his attorneys outside of an appropriate judicial proceeding; and

(3) that going forward, DOJ and FBI will not brief additional Members of Congress who are not part of the “Gang of 8” on these matters.

Thank you for your immediate attention to our concerns, which are of the utmost urgency. We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

NANCY PELOSI

House Democratic Leader

CHUCK SCHUMER

Senate Democratic Leader

ADAM SCHIFF

Ranking Member, House Intelligence Committee

MARK WARNER

Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee

###

Washington, D.C. –U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Vice Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), and Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA) released the following joint statement regarding their Gang of Eight briefing with the Justice Department:

“Today’s Gang of Eight briefing was conducted to ensure protection of sources and methods.

“Nothing we heard today has changed our view that there is no evidence to support any allegation that the FBI or any intelligence agency placed a ‘spy’ in the Trump Campaign, or otherwise failed to follow appropriate procedures and protocols.”

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the following statement:

“The Gang of Eight exists in custom and in law to ensure that Congress can oversee intelligence matters without putting sensitive sources and methods at risk. If there is a clear and compelling need to brief Congress on sensitive intelligence matters, it should be handled through the Gang of Eight. The White House’s plan to provide a separate briefing for their political allies demonstrates that their interest is not in informing Congress, but in undermining an ongoing criminal investigation.

“If they insist upon carrying out this farce, the White House and its Republican allies in the House will do permanent, longstanding damage to the practice of bipartisan congressional oversight of intelligence. They will also be sending a terrible message to anyone who works in or with our nation’s intelligence community that the White House will always prioritize partisan politics over protecting the people who help keep this country safe.”

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on attempts to undermine the Special Counsel’s investigation:

“The first thing any new member of the Intelligence Committee learns is the critical importance of protecting sources and methods. Publicly outing a source risks not only their life, but the lives of every American, because when sources are burned it makes it that much harder for every part of the intelligence community to gather intelligence on those who wish to do us harm.

“It would be at best irresponsible, and at worst potentially illegal, for members of Congress to use their positions to learn the identity of an FBI source for the purpose of undermining the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in our election. Anyone who is entrusted with our nation’s highest secrets should act with the gravity and seriousness of purpose that knowledge deserves.”

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Warner (D-Va.), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, today requested three separate Inspector Generals open up probes into the Trump Administration’s failure to fully impose legally mandated sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

In a letter addressed to the Inspector Generals of the U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Intelligence Community, the senators listed a series of instances where the Trump administration’s mixed signals or inaction have resulted in flouting seven mandatory CAATSA provisions, despite clear evidence of sanctionable activity.

“In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent,” wrote the senators. “Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.”

It has been ten months since Congress overwhelmingly passed CAATSA’s wide-ranging mandatory sanctions measures to hold Russia accountable for their destabilizing activities against our country and nations around the world.

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

May 19, 2018

Mr. Steve A. Linick

Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors

U.S. Department of State

Office of Inspector General

1700 North Moore Street

Arlington, VA 22209

Mr. Eric M. Thorson

Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20220

Mr. Wayne A. Stone

Acting Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Investigations Division

Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Inspectors General Linick, Thorson, and Stone:

We are writing to request that you conduct a review of your respective department’s/community’s role in implementing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions law (CAATSA), signed by President Trump on August 2, 2017.

Several mandatory provisions of the law have not been implemented by the administration, despite strong evidence that actions taken by or on behalf of the Russian government are in violation of the CAATSA sanctions law and applicable executive orders codified by CAATSA. For example, the U.S. government released a joint statement on April 16, 2018 with British authorities that accused Russian government-backed hackers of conducting cyber attacks in other countries, including the U.S., which should trigger sanctions under Section 224 of CAATSA. Yet the administration has not imposed any such sanctions in response, nor has it issued waivers under this provision.

Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then the administration did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President. This raises obvious questions about the provision of Russian technology or support to Syria in violation of Section 234 of the law.

Overall, CAATSA includes seven mandatory provisions (Sections 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233 and 234) which we believe merit further examination. We also remain concerned that the administration has not formally determined whether individuals are conducting significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors under Section 231. Without such determinations, it is impossible to ascertain whether individuals are substantially reducing significant transactions with these entities as outlined in the law.

In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions actions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent. In general, with respect to mandatory measures, the President is required to make determinations in the event that he has established that sanctionable behavior has taken place, and then either impose sanctions or exercise a waiver. We understand that only one determination, with respect to Section 224, has been made under new congressionally-mandated CAATSA sanctions since the law went into effect last August.

As part of your respective reviews, we request that you address the following issues and make any necessary recommendations for improvement:

1. Why have mandatory provisions of the law not been implemented, despite clear evidence of sanctions violations?

2. What are the internal processes by which your respective agencies have contributed to the creation of Russia sanctions designation packages when CAATSA or applicable executive orders are violated?

3. How has interagency coordination taken place with respect to CAATSA implementation, or other provisions of law or executive orders related to Russia, and is the inter-agency review process working as it should?

4. Are there obstacles in the inter-agency review process of which Congress should be made aware, as administration officials consider imposing additional sanctions on Russian actors consistent with current law?

Thank you for your consideration of our request.

Sincerely,

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today held a closed hearing to complete its review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.” The testimony of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of CIA John Brennan, and former Director of NSA Mike Rogers will inform the Committee’s final report on this “chapter” of its Russia inquiry.

Chairman Burr said, “The first task in our inquiry was to evaluate the Intelligence Community’s work on this important piece of analysis. Committee staff have spent 14 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft, and analytic work, and we see no reason to dispute the conclusions. There is no doubt that Russia undertook an unprecedented effort to interfere with our 2016 elections. I look forward to completing the Committee’s inquiry and issuing our findings and recommendations to the American people.”

“Despite the short time frame they had to prepare it, the intelligence community did a very good job with the ICA,” said Vice Chairman Warner.“After a thorough review, our staff concluded that the ICA conclusions were accurate and on point. The Russian effort was extensive, sophisticated, and ordered by President Putin himself for the purpose of helping Donald Trump and hurting Hillary Clinton. In order to protect our democracy from future threats, we must understand what happened in 2016. And while our Committee’s investigation remains ongoing, one thing is already abundantly clear – we have to do a better job in the future if we want to protect our elections from foreign interference.”

Today’s closed hearing is a bookend to the hearing the Committee held in January 10, 2017, on Russian Active Measures. Staff will finalize this chapter of the report on the Intelligence Community’s work and submit it for a classification review.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and James Lankford (R-OK), members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the Committee’s unclassified summary of the first installment of the Committee’s Russia Report, including updated recommendations on election security and findings regarding Russian targeting of election infrastructure. In parallel, the Committee has prepared a comprehensive, classified report on threats to election infrastructure. The classified report will be submitted for declassification review, and the Committee anticipates releasing it to the public when that process is completed.

“Elections at all levels are central to our democracy, to our institutions, and to our government's legitimacy, and I remain concerned that we as a country are still not fully prepared for the 2018 midterm elections. That’s one reason why we, as a Committee, have decided that it is important to get out as much information as possible about the threat, so that governments at every level take it seriously and take the necessary steps to defend ourselves,” said Senator Mark Warner. “I am proud of the bipartisan work our Committee members have done on this issue, and I look forward to continuing in a bipartisan way to investigate what happened in 2016, and prevent future interference in our elections.”

“I’m pleased to be able to release this summary of our findings and recommendations on election security to the American public,” said Senator Richard Burr. “Today’s primaries are the next step toward the 2018 midterms and another reminder of the urgency of securing our election systems. Our investigation has been a bipartisan effort from day one, and I look forward to completing the Committee’s work and releasing as much of it as possible. We are working tirelessly to give Americans a complete accounting of what happened in 2016 and to prevent any future interference with our democratic process.”

“While our investigation remains ongoing, one conclusion is clear: the Russians were relentless in attempting to meddle in the 2016 election, and they will continue their efforts,” said Senator Susan Collins. “The findings and recommendations we are releasing today are a major step forward in our effort to thwart any attempt to meddle in our elections. With the 2018 election fast approaching, the need to act now is urgent. We must provide states the assistance they need to strengthen the security of their voting systems.”

“Our democracy hinges on Americans' ability to fairly choose our own leaders. With primary elections underway, and as we approach the midterm elections and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to protect the integrity of our voting process,” said Senator Martin Heinrich. “I am proud of how our whole Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, has taken on the task of getting to the bottom of Russia's interference in our election. Until we set up stronger protections of our election systems and take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to attack.”

“During the 2016 election, Russian entities targeted presidential campaign accounts, launched cyber-attacks against at least 21 state election systems, and hacked a US voting systems software company,” said Senator James Lankford. “We must proactively work to ensure the security of our election infrastructure for the possibility of interference from not just Russia, but possibly another adversary like Iran or North Korea or a hacktivist group. After 18 months of investigations and interviews, this bipartisan report underscores the importance of efforts to protect our democracy from foreign attacks on our elections.”

The Committee’s unclassified summary of this chapter of the Russia Report – Election Security Findings and Recommendations are embedded below:

Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election:

Summary of Initial Findings and Recommendations

May 8, 2018

Overview

In 2016, cyber actors affiliated with the Russian Government conducted an unprecedented, coordinated cyber campaign against state election infrastructure. Russian actors scanned databases for vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions, and in a small number of cases successfully penetrated a voter registration database. This activity was part of a larger campaign to prepare to undermine confidence in the voting process. The Committee has not seen any evidence that vote tallies were manipulated or that voter registration information was deleted or modified.

· The Committee has limited information about whether, and to what extent, state and local officials carried out forensic or other examination of election infrastructure systems in order to confirm whether election-related systems were compromised. It is possible that additional activity occurred and has not yet been uncovered.

Summary of Initial Findings

· Cyber actors affiliated with the Russian government scanned state systems extensively throughout the 2016 election cycle. These cyber actors made attempts to access numerous state election systems, and in a small number of cases accessed voter registration databases.

o At least 18 states had election systems targeted by Russian-affiliated cyber actors in some fashion.[1] Elements of the IC have varying levels of confidence about three additional states, for a possible total of at least 21. In addition, other states saw suspicious or malicious behavior the IC has been unable to attribute to Russia.

o Almost all of the states that were targeted observed vulnerability scanning directed at their Secretary of State websites or voter registration infrastructure. Other scans were broader or less specific in their target.

o In at least six states, the Russian-affiliated cyber actors went beyond scanning and conducted malicious access attempts on voting-related websites.[2]

o In a small number of states, Russian-affiliated cyber actors were able to gain access to restricted elements of election infrastructure. In a small number of states, these cyber actors were in a position to, at a minimum, alter or delete voter registration data; however, they did not appear to be in a position to manipulate individual votes or aggregate vote totals.

· The Committee found that in addition to the cyber activity directed at state election infrastructure, Russia undertook a wide variety of intelligence-related activities targeting the U.S. voting process. These activities began at least as early as 2014, continued through Election Day 2016, and included traditional information gathering efforts as well as operations likely aimed at preparing to discredit the integrity of the U.S. voting process and election results.

· The Committee’s assessments, as well as the assessments of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are based on self-reporting by the states. DHS has been clear in its representations to the Committee that the Department did not have perfect insight into these cyber activities. It is possible that more states were attacked, but the activity was not detected. In light of the technical challenges associated with cyber forensic analysis, it is also possible that states may have overlooked some indicators of compromise.

· The Committee saw no evidence that votes were changed and found that, on balance, the diversity of our voting infrastructure is a strength. Because of the variety of systems and equipment, changing votes on a large scale would require an extensive, complex, and state or country-level campaign. However, the Committee notes that a small number of districts in key states can have a significant impact in a national election.

[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

2 In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

Actors and Motive

· The Committee concurs with the IC that Russian government-affiliated actors were behind the cyber activity directed against state election infrastructure.

· While the full scope of Russian activity against the states remains unclear because of collection gaps, the Committee found ample evidence to conclude that the Russian government was developing capabilities to undermine confidence in our election infrastructure, including voter processes.

· The Committee does not know whether the Russian government-affiliated actors intended to exploit vulnerabilities during the 2016 elections and decided against taking action, or whether they were merely gathering information and testing capabilities for a future attack. Regardless, the Committee believes the activity indicates an intent to go beyond traditional intelligence collection.

DHS Efforts to Bolster Election Security

· The Committee found that DHS’s initial response was inadequate to counter the threat. In the summer of 2016, as the threat to the election infrastructure emerged, DHS attempted outreach to the states, seeking to highlight the threat for information technology (IT) directors without divulging classified information. By the fall of 2016, as the threat became clearer, DHS attempted a more extensive outreach to the states with limited success.

o At the outset, DHS was not well-positioned to provide effective support to states confronting a hostile nation-state cyber actor.

o In addition, members of the Obama administration were concerned that, by raising the alarm, they would create the very impression they were trying to avoid––calling into question the integrity of election systems.

· DHS and FBI alerts to the states in the summer and fall of 2016 were limited in substance and distribution. Although DHS provided warning to IT staff in the fall of 2016, notifications to state elections officials were delayed by nearly a year. Therefore, states understood that there was a cyber threat, but did not appreciate the scope, seriousness, or implications of the particular threat they were facing.

o Many state election officials reported hearing for the first time about the Russian attempts to scan and penetrate state systems from the press or from the public Committee hearing on June 21, 2017. DHS’s notifications in the summer of 2016 and the public statement by DHS and the ODNI in October 2016 were not sufficient warning.

o It was not until September of 2017, and only under significant pressure from this Committee and others, that DHS reached out directly to chief election officials in the targeted states to alert the appropriate election officials about the scanning activity and other attacks and the actor behind them. (However, the Committee notes that in the small number of cases where election-related systems had been compromised, the federal government was in contact with senior election officials at the time the intrusion was discovered.)

· The Committee found that DHS is engaging state election officials more effectively now than in the summer of 2016. Although early interactions between state election officials and DHS were strained, states now largely give DHS credit for making tremendous progress over the last six months.

o States have signed up for many of the resources that DHS has to offer, and DHS has hosted meetings of the Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council, as required under the critical infrastructure designation. Those interactions have begun to increase trust and communication between federal and state entities.

o DHS hosted a classified briefing for state chief election officials and is working through providing security clearances for those officials.

o An Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center has been established, focused on sharing network defense information with state and local election officials.

Ongoing Vulnerabilities

Despite the progress on communication and improvements to the security of our election process, the Committee remains concerned about a number of potential vulnerabilities in election infrastructure.

· Voting systems across the United States are outdated, and many do not have a paper record of votes as a backup counting system that can be reliably audited, should there be allegations of machine manipulation. In addition, the number of vendors selling machines is shrinking, raising concerns about supply chain vulnerability.

o Paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines––machines with electronic interfaces that electronically store votes (as opposed to paper ballots or optical scanners)––are used in jurisdictions in 30 states and are at highest risk for security flaws. Five states use DREs exclusively.

· Many aspects of election infrastructure systems are connected to and can be accessed over the internet. Furthermore, systems that are not connected to the internet, such as voting machines, may still be updated via software downloaded from the internet.

o These potentially vulnerable systems include some of the core components of U.S. election infrastructure, including systems affiliated with voter registration databases, electronic poll books, vote casting, vote tallying, and unofficial election night reporting to the general public and the media. Risk-limiting audits are a best practice to mitigate risk.

· Vendors of election software and equipment play a critical role in the U.S. election system, and the Committee continues to be concerned that vendors represent an enticing target for malicious cyber actors. State local, territorial, tribal, and federal government authorities have very little insight into the cyber security practices of many of these vendors, and while the Election Assistance Commission issues guidelines for security, abiding by those guidelines is currently voluntary.

Summary of SSCI Recommendations

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials have taken to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient. The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done. The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

1. Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

· States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2. Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

· The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.

· The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

3. Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

· The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyberattacks both quickly and accurately. Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.

· DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels. We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication.

· Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.

· DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.

· The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

4. Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

· Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election systems.

· The Committee recommends State and Local officials prioritize the following:

o Institute two-factor authentication for state databases.

o Install monitoring sensors on state systems. One option is to further expand DHS’s ALBERT network.

o Identify the weak points in the network, including any under-resourced localities, and prioritize assistance towards those entities.

o Update software in voter registration systems. Create backups, including paper copies, of state voter registration databases. Include voter registration database recovery in state continuity of operations plans.

o Consider a voter education program to ensure voters check registration well prior to an election.

o Undertake intensive security audits of state and local voter registration systems, ideally utilizing an outside entity.

o Perform risk assessments for any current or potential third-party vendors to ensure they are meeting the necessary cyber security standards in protecting their election systems.

· The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:

o Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process.

o Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).

o Maintain and more aggressively promote the catalog of services DHS has available for states to help secure their systems, and update the catalog as DHS refines their understanding of what states need.

o Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.

o Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.

5. Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

· States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability. If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.

· States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results. Risk-limiting audits, in particular, can be a cost-effective way to ensure that votes cast are votes counted.

· DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the potential vulnerabilities of both voting machines and the supply chains.

6. Assistance for the States

· States should use federal grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits.

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[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

[2] In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement after Reddit announced that it had taken action against nearly a thousand accounts that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA):

“I welcome Reddit’s announcement, nearly a year and a half after election day, that it has taken action to investigate and suspend hundreds of Russian-backed accounts responsible for interfering in the U.S. political system.

“While I recognize that Reddit is fairly distinct among social media platforms in that its users are largely responsible for moderating content, I also believe that all the platform companies have a responsibility to do everything in their power to prevent foreign adversaries like Russia from interfering in our elections. As the 2018 elections approach, I will continue pressing the nation’s intelligence leaders and social media companies to be far more aggressive and proactive in responding to this threat.

“It’s clear that the Kremlin will use any means at its disposal to spread propaganda and misinformation, and we each bear some responsibility for exercising good judgment and a healthy amount of skepticism when it comes to the things we read and spread on social media.”

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after Facebook announced that it removed 70 Facebook and 65 Instagram accounts — as well as 138 Facebook pages — that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA):

“For many months now, I have been pushing Facebook to more aggressively investigate and identify Russian-linked fake accounts on their platform. Given the scale and scope of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign, it was always clear that Russian activity on Facebook extended far beyond the 470 fake accounts and pages that the company shut down in September. Today’s disclosure of more IRA-linked accounts is evidence that the Kremlin continues to exploit platforms like Facebook to sow division, spread disinformation, and influence political debates around the globe.

“I am glad that Facebook is taking some steps to pinpoint and address this activity, but I also expect Facebook and Mr. Zuckerberg, along with other platform companies, to continue to identify Russian troll activity and to work with Congress on updating our laws to better protect our democracy in the future.”

In October, Sen. Warner – along with Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and John McCain (R-AZ) – introduced the Honest Ads Act to help prevent foreign interference in elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

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WASHINGTON – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in advance of today’s press conference with Committee members, made available the Committee’s initial recommendations on election security after investigating Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.

The Committee will hold an open hearing on Wednesday, March 21, 2018, on the threats to election infrastructure. The hearing will cover attempted attacks on state election infrastructure in 2016, DHS and FBI efforts to improve election security, and the view from the states on their cybersecurity posture.

The Committee’s initial recommendations are embedded below and available here.

RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 2016 ELECTION

SUMMARY OF DRAFT SSCI RECOMMENDATIONS

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials take to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient. The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.

The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

1. Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2. Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.
The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

3. Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyber-attacks both quickly and accurately. Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.
DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels. We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication.
Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.
DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.
The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

4. Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election-related systems. Basic but crucial security steps like two-factor authentication for those logging into voter databases can improve the overall election security posture. States and localities should also take advantage of DHS offerings, to include DHS’s network monitoring capabilities.
The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:
Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process.

Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).
Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.
Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.

5. Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability. If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.
States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.
DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the vulnerabilities of both the machines and the supply chains.

6. Assistance for the States

The Committee recommends Congress urgently pass legislation increasing assistance and establishing a voluntary grant program for the states.
States should use grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps.
Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits.

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