Press Releases

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Warner (D-Va.), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, today requested three separate Inspector Generals open up probes into the Trump Administration’s failure to fully impose legally mandated sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). 

In a letter addressed to the Inspector Generals of the U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Intelligence Community, the senators listed a series of instances where the Trump administration’s mixed signals or inaction have resulted in flouting seven mandatory CAATSA provisions, despite clear evidence of sanctionable activity.

“In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent,” wrote the senators. “Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.” 

It has been ten months since Congress overwhelmingly passed CAATSA’s wide-ranging mandatory sanctions measures to hold Russia accountable for their destabilizing activities against our country and nations around the world. 

 

A copy of the letter can be found here and below.

 

May 19, 2018

 

Mr. Steve A. Linick

Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors

U.S. Department of State

Office of Inspector General

1700 North Moore Street

Arlington, VA  22209

 

Mr. Eric M. Thorson

Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Office of Inspector General

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.  20220

 

Mr. Wayne A. Stone

Acting Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Investigations Division

Washington, D.C.  20511

 

 Dear Inspectors General Linick, Thorson, and Stone:

 

We are writing to request that you conduct a review of your respective department’s/community’s role in implementing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions law (CAATSA), signed by President Trump on August 2, 2017.  

 

Several mandatory provisions of the law have not been implemented by the administration, despite strong evidence that actions taken by or on behalf of the Russian government are in violation of the CAATSA sanctions law and applicable executive orders codified by CAATSA.  For example, the U.S. government released a joint statement on April 16, 2018 with British authorities that accused Russian government-backed hackers of conducting cyber attacks in other countries, including the U.S., which should trigger sanctions under Section 224 of CAATSA. Yet the administration has not imposed any such sanctions in response, nor has it issued waivers under this provision.  

 

Likewise, it seems clear that several weeks ago the administration had identified specific Russian entities that had played a role in supplying or otherwise supporting the government of Syria’s chemical weapons program, had prepared a list of such entities for sanctions designation, and Ambassador Nikki Haley publicly announced their imminent designation -- but then the administration did not designate them, reportedly at the direction of the President.  This raises obvious questions about the provision of Russian technology or support to Syria in violation of Section 234 of the law.

 

Overall, CAATSA includes seven mandatory provisions (Sections 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233 and 234) which we believe merit further examination.    We also remain concerned that the administration has not formally determined whether individuals are conducting significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors under Section 231.   Without such determinations, it is impossible to ascertain whether individuals are substantially reducing significant transactions with these entities as outlined in the law.

 

In light of these apparent violations and the lack of corresponding sanctions actions, we are concerned about whether the sanctions implementation process within the administration is fulfilling CAATSA’s mandate and intent.  In general, with respect to mandatory measures, the President is required to make determinations in the event that he has established that sanctionable behavior has taken place, and then either impose sanctions or exercise a waiver.  We understand that only one determination, with respect to Section 224, has been made under new congressionally-mandated CAATSA sanctions since the law went into effect last August. 

 

As part of your respective reviews, we request that you address the following issues and make any necessary recommendations for improvement:

 

1.      Why have mandatory provisions of the law not been implemented, despite clear evidence of sanctions violations?

2.      What are the internal processes by which your respective agencies have contributed to the creation of Russia sanctions designation packages when CAATSA or applicable executive orders are violated?

3.      How has interagency coordination taken place with respect to CAATSA implementation, or other provisions of law or executive orders related to Russia, and is the inter-agency review process working as it should? 

4.      Are there obstacles in the inter-agency review process of which Congress should be made aware, as administration officials consider imposing additional sanctions on Russian actors consistent with current law?

 

Thank you for your consideration of our request.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on attempts to undermine the Special Counsel’s investigation:

“The first thing any new member of the Intelligence Committee learns is the critical importance of protecting sources and methods. Publicly outing a source risks not only their life, but the lives of every American, because when sources are burned it makes it that much harder for every part of the intelligence community to gather intelligence on those who wish to do us harm.

“It would be at best irresponsible, and at worst potentially illegal, for members of Congress to use their positions to learn the identity of an FBI source for the purpose of undermining the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in our election. Anyone who is entrusted with our nation’s highest secrets should act with the gravity and seriousness of purpose that knowledge deserves.”

 

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today held a closed hearing to complete its review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.”  The testimony of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of CIA John Brennan, and former Director of NSA Mike Rogers will inform the Committee’s final report on this “chapter” of its Russia inquiry.

Chairman Burr said, “The first task in our inquiry was to evaluate the Intelligence Community’s work on this important piece of analysis.  Committee staff have spent 14 months reviewing the sources, tradecraft, and analytic work, and we see no reason to dispute the conclusions.  There is no doubt that Russia undertook an unprecedented effort to interfere with our 2016 elections.  I look forward to completing the Committee’s inquiry and issuing our findings and recommendations to the American people.” 

“Despite the short time frame they had to prepare it, the intelligence community did a very good job with the ICA,” said Vice Chairman Warner.“After a thorough review, our staff concluded that the ICA conclusions were accurate and on point. The Russian effort was extensive, sophisticated, and ordered by President Putin himself for the purpose of helping Donald Trump and hurting Hillary Clinton. In order to protect our democracy from future threats, we must understand what happened in 2016. And while our Committee’s investigation remains ongoing, one thing is already abundantly clear – we have to do a better job in the future if we want to protect our elections from foreign interference.”

Today’s closed hearing is a bookend to the hearing the Committee held in January 10, 2017, on Russian Active Measures.  Staff will finalize this chapter of the report on the Intelligence Community’s work and submit it for a classification review. 

 

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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and James Lankford (R-OK), members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released the Committee’s unclassified summary of the first installment of the Committee’s Russia Report, including updated recommendations on election security and findings regarding Russian targeting of election infrastructure. In parallel, the Committee has prepared a comprehensive, classified report on threats to election infrastructure. The classified report will be submitted for declassification review, and the Committee anticipates releasing it to the public when that process is completed.

“Elections at all levels are central to our democracy, to our institutions, and to our government's legitimacy, and I remain concerned that we as a country are still not fully prepared for the 2018 midterm elections. That’s one reason why we, as a Committee, have decided that it is important to get out as much information as possible about the threat, so that governments at every level take it seriously and take the necessary steps to defend ourselves,” said Senator Mark Warner. “I am proud of the bipartisan work our Committee members have done on this issue, and I look forward to continuing in a bipartisan way to investigate what happened in 2016, and prevent future interference in our elections.” 

“I’m pleased to be able to release this summary of our findings and recommendations on election security to the American public,” said Senator Richard Burr. “Today’s primaries are the next step toward the 2018 midterms and another reminder of the urgency of securing our election systems. Our investigation has been a bipartisan effort from day one, and I look forward to completing the Committee’s work and releasing as much of it as possible.  We are working tirelessly to give Americans a complete accounting of what happened in 2016 and to prevent any future interference with our democratic process.” 

“While our investigation remains ongoing, one conclusion is clear: the Russians were relentless in attempting to meddle in the 2016 election, and they will continue their efforts,” said Senator Susan Collins.  “The findings and recommendations we are releasing today are a major step forward in our effort to thwart any attempt to meddle in our elections.  With the 2018 election fast approaching, the need to act now is urgent.  We must provide states the assistance they need to strengthen the security of their voting systems.”

“Our democracy hinges on Americans' ability to fairly choose our own leaders. With primary elections underway, and as we approach the midterm elections and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to protect the integrity of our voting process,” said Senator Martin Heinrich. “I am proud of how our whole Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, has taken on the task of getting to the bottom of Russia's interference in our election. Until we set up stronger protections of our election systems and take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to attack.”

 

“During the 2016 election, Russian entities targeted presidential campaign accounts, launched cyber-attacks against at least 21 state election systems, and hacked a US voting systems software company,” said Senator James Lankford. “We must proactively work to ensure the security of our election infrastructure for the possibility of interference from not just Russia, but possibly another adversary like Iran or North Korea or a hacktivist group. After 18 months of investigations and interviews, this bipartisan report underscores the importance of efforts to protect our democracy from foreign attacks on our elections.”

 

The Committee’s unclassified summary of this chapter of the Russia Report – Election Security Findings and Recommendations are embedded below:

 

Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election:

Summary of Initial Findings and Recommendations

 

May 8, 2018

 

Overview

 

In 2016, cyber actors affiliated with the Russian Government conducted an unprecedented, coordinated cyber campaign against state election infrastructure. Russian actors scanned databases for vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions, and in a small number of cases successfully penetrated a voter registration database. This activity was part of a larger campaign to prepare to undermine confidence in the voting process.  The Committee has not seen any evidence that vote tallies were manipulated or that voter registration information was deleted or modified.

 

·         The Committee has limited information about whether, and to what extent, state and local officials carried out forensic or other examination of election infrastructure systems in order to confirm whether election-related systems were compromised. It is possible that additional activity occurred and has not yet been uncovered.

 

Summary of Initial Findings

 

·         Cyber actors affiliated with the Russian government scanned state systems extensively throughout the 2016 election cycle. These cyber actors made attempts to access numerous state election systems, and in a small number of cases accessed voter registration databases.

 

o   At least 18 states had election systems targeted by Russian-affiliated cyber actors in some fashion.[1] Elements of the IC have varying levels of confidence about three additional states, for a possible total of at least 21. In addition, other states saw suspicious or malicious behavior the IC has been unable to attribute to Russia.

o   Almost all of the states that were targeted observed vulnerability scanning directed at their Secretary of State websites or voter registration infrastructure. Other scans were broader or less specific in their target. 

o   In at least six states, the Russian-affiliated cyber actors went beyond scanning and conducted malicious access attempts on voting-related websites.[2]

o   In a small number of states, Russian-affiliated cyber actors were able to gain access to restricted elements of election infrastructure. In a small number of states, these cyber actors were in a position to, at a minimum, alter or delete voter registration data; however, they did not appear to be in a position to manipulate individual votes or aggregate vote totals.

 

·         The Committee found that in addition to the cyber activity directed at state election infrastructure, Russia undertook a wide variety of intelligence-related activities targeting the U.S. voting process. These activities began at least as early as 2014, continued through Election Day 2016, and included traditional information gathering efforts as well as operations likely aimed at preparing to discredit the integrity of the U.S. voting process and election results.

 

·         The Committee’s assessments, as well as the assessments of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are based on self-reporting by the states. DHS has been clear in its representations to the Committee that the Department did not have perfect insight into these cyber activities. It is possible that more states were attacked, but the activity was not detected. In light of the technical challenges associated with cyber forensic analysis, it is also possible that states may have overlooked some indicators of compromise.

 

·         The Committee saw no evidence that votes were changed and found that, on balance, the diversity of our voting infrastructure is a strength. Because of the variety of systems and equipment, changing votes on a large scale would require an extensive, complex, and state or country-level campaign. However, the Committee notes that a small number of districts in key states can have a significant impact in a national election.

 

[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

2 In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

 

Actors and Motive

 

·         The Committee concurs with the IC that Russian government-affiliated actors were behind the cyber activity directed against state election infrastructure.

 

·         While the full scope of Russian activity against the states remains unclear because of collection gaps, the Committee found ample evidence to conclude that the Russian government was developing capabilities to undermine confidence in our election infrastructure, including voter processes.

 

·         The Committee does not know whether the Russian government-affiliated actors intended to exploit vulnerabilities during the 2016 elections and decided against taking action, or whether they were merely gathering information and testing capabilities for a future attack. Regardless, the Committee believes the activity indicates an intent to go beyond traditional intelligence collection.

 

DHS Efforts to Bolster Election Security

 

·         The Committee found that DHS’s initial response was inadequate to counter the threat. In the summer of 2016, as the threat to the election infrastructure emerged, DHS attempted outreach to the states, seeking to highlight the threat for information technology (IT) directors without divulging classified information.  By the fall of 2016, as the threat became clearer, DHS attempted a more extensive outreach to the states with limited success.

 

o   At the outset, DHS was not well-positioned to provide effective support to states confronting a hostile nation-state cyber actor.

o   In addition, members of the Obama administration were concerned that, by raising the alarm, they would create the very impression they were trying to avoid––calling into question the integrity of election systems.

 

·         DHS and FBI alerts to the states in the summer and fall of 2016 were limited in substance and distribution.  Although DHS provided warning to IT staff in the fall of 2016, notifications to state elections officials were delayed by nearly a year.  Therefore, states understood that there was a cyber threat, but did not appreciate the scope, seriousness, or implications of the particular threat they were facing.

 

o   Many state election officials reported hearing for the first time about the Russian attempts to scan and penetrate state systems from the press or from the public Committee hearing on June 21, 2017.  DHS’s notifications in the summer of 2016 and the public statement by DHS and the ODNI in October 2016 were not sufficient warning.

o   It was not until September of 2017, and only under significant pressure from this Committee and others, that DHS reached out directly to chief election officials in the targeted states to alert the appropriate election officials about the scanning activity and other attacks and the actor behind them.  (However, the Committee notes that in the small number of cases where election-related systems had been compromised, the federal government was in contact with senior election officials at the time the intrusion was discovered.)

 

·         The Committee found that DHS is engaging state election officials more effectively now than in the summer of 2016.  Although early interactions between state election officials and DHS were strained, states now largely give DHS credit for making tremendous progress over the last six months.

 

o   States have signed up for many of the resources that DHS has to offer, and DHS has hosted meetings of the Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council, as required under the critical infrastructure designation. Those interactions have begun to increase trust and communication between federal and state entities.

o   DHS hosted a classified briefing for state chief election officials and is working through providing security clearances for those officials.

o   An Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center has been established, focused on sharing network defense information with state and local election officials.

 

Ongoing Vulnerabilities

 

Despite the progress on communication and improvements to the security of our election process, the Committee remains concerned about a number of potential vulnerabilities in election infrastructure.

 

·         Voting systems across the United States are outdated, and many do not have a paper record of votes as a backup counting system that can be reliably audited, should there be allegations of machine manipulation. In addition, the number of vendors selling machines is shrinking, raising concerns about supply chain vulnerability.

 

o   Paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines––machines with electronic interfaces that electronically store votes (as opposed to paper ballots or optical scanners)––are used in jurisdictions in 30 states and are at highest risk for security flaws.  Five states use DREs exclusively.

 

·         Many aspects of election infrastructure systems are connected to and can be accessed over the internet.  Furthermore, systems that are not connected to the internet, such as voting machines, may still be updated via software downloaded from the internet.

 

o   These potentially vulnerable systems include some of the core components of U.S. election infrastructure, including systems affiliated with voter registration databases, electronic poll books, vote casting, vote tallying, and unofficial election night reporting to the general public and the media.  Risk-limiting audits are a best practice to mitigate risk.

 

·         Vendors of election software and equipment play a critical role in the U.S. election system, and the Committee continues to be concerned that vendors represent an enticing target for malicious cyber actors.  State local, territorial, tribal, and federal government authorities have very little insight into the cyber security practices of many of these vendors, and while the Election Assistance Commission issues guidelines for security, abiding by those guidelines is currently voluntary.

 

Summary of SSCI Recommendations

 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.  The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials have taken to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient.  The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.  The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

                       

1.      Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

·         States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

·         The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.  

·         The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

 

3.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

·         The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyberattacks both quickly and accurately.  Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.  

·         DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels.  We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication. 

·         Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.

·         DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.

·         The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

 

4.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

·         Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election systems. 

·         The Committee recommends State and Local officials prioritize the following:

o   Institute two-factor authentication for state databases.

o   Install monitoring sensors on state systems.  One option is to further expand DHS’s ALBERT network.

o   Identify the weak points in the network, including any under-resourced localities, and prioritize assistance towards those entities.

o   Update software in voter registration systems.  Create backups, including paper copies, of state voter registration databases. Include voter registration database recovery in state continuity of operations plans.

o   Consider a voter education program to ensure voters check registration well prior to an election.

o   Undertake intensive security audits of state and local voter registration systems, ideally utilizing an outside entity.

o   Perform risk assessments for any current or potential third-party vendors to ensure they are meeting the necessary cyber security standards in protecting their election systems.  

 

·         The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:

o   Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process. 

o   Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).

o   Maintain and more aggressively promote the catalog of services DHS has available for states to help secure their systems, and update the catalog as DHS refines their understanding of what states need.  

o   Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.

o   Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.

 

5.      Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

·         States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems.  At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability.  If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.

·         States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.  Risk-limiting audits, in particular, can be a cost-effective way to ensure that votes cast are votes counted.   

·         DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the potential vulnerabilities of both voting machines and the supply chains.

 

6.      Assistance for the States

·         States should use federal grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits. 

 

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[1] These numbers only account for state or local government targets. DHS did not include states which may have witnessed attacks on political parties, political organizations, or NGOs. In addition, the numbers do not include any potential attacks on third-party vendors.

[2] In the majority of these instances, Russian government-affiliated cyber actors used Structure Query Language (SQL) injection - a well-known technique for cyberattacks on public-facing websites.

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement after Reddit announced that it had taken action against nearly a thousand accounts that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA): 

“I welcome Reddit’s announcement, nearly a year and a half after election day, that it has taken action to investigate and suspend hundreds of Russian-backed accounts responsible for interfering in the U.S. political system.   

“While I recognize that Reddit is fairly distinct among social media platforms in that its users are largely responsible for moderating content, I also believe that all the platform companies have a responsibility to do everything in their power to prevent foreign adversaries like Russia from interfering in our elections. As the 2018 elections approach, I will continue pressing the nation’s intelligence leaders and social media companies to be far more aggressive and proactive in responding to this threat. 

“It’s clear that the Kremlin will use any means at its disposal to spread propaganda and misinformation, and we each bear some responsibility for exercising good judgment and a healthy amount of skepticism when it comes to the things we read and spread on social media.” 

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after Facebook announced that it removed 70 Facebook and 65 Instagram accounts — as well as 138 Facebook pages — that were controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA):

“For many months now, I have been pushing Facebook to more aggressively investigate and identify Russian-linked fake accounts on their platform. Given the scale and scope of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign, it was always clear that Russian activity on Facebook extended far beyond the 470 fake accounts and pages that the company shut down in September. Today’s disclosure of more IRA-linked accounts is evidence that the Kremlin continues to exploit platforms like Facebook to sow division, spread disinformation, and influence political debates around the globe.

“I am glad that Facebook is taking some steps to pinpoint and address this activity, but I also expect Facebook and Mr. Zuckerberg, along with other platform companies, to continue to identify Russian troll activity and to work with Congress on updating our laws to better protect our democracy in the future.”  

In October, Sen. Warner – along with Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and John McCain (R-AZ) – introduced the Honest Ads Act to help prevent foreign interference in elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

 

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WASHINGTON – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in advance of today’s press conference with Committee members, made available the Committee’s initial recommendations on election security after investigating Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections.

The Committee will hold an open hearing on Wednesday, March 21, 2018, on the threats to election infrastructure.  The hearing will cover attempted attacks on state election infrastructure in 2016, DHS and FBI efforts to improve election security, and the view from the states on their cybersecurity posture.  

The Committee’s initial recommendations are embedded below and available here.

 

RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 2016 ELECTION

 

SUMMARY OF DRAFT SSCI RECOMMENDATIONS

 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has examined evidence of Russian attempts to target election infrastructure during the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee has reviewed the steps state and local election officials take to ensure the integrity of our elections and agrees that U.S. election infrastructure is fundamentally resilient. The Department of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, state and local governments, and other groups have already taken beneficial steps toward addressing the vulnerabilities exposed during the 2016 election cycle, including some of the measures listed below, but more needs to be done.

 

The Committee recommends the following steps to better defend against a hostile nation-state who may seek to undermine our democracy:

 

1. Reinforce States’ Primacy in Running Elections

  • States should remain firmly in the lead on running elections, and the Federal government should ensure they receive the necessary resources and information.

2. Build a Stronger Defense, Part I: Create Effective Deterrence

  • The U.S. Government should clearly communicate to adversaries that an attack on our election infrastructure is a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly.
  • The Federal government, in particular the State Department and Defense Department, should engage allies and partners to establish new international cyber norms.

3. Build a Stronger Defense, Part II: Improve Information Sharing on Threats

  • The Intelligence Community should put a high priority on attributing cyber-attacks both quickly and accurately. Similarly, policymakers should make plans to operate prior to attribution.
  • DHS must create clear channels of communication between the Federal government and appropriate officials at the state and local levels. We recommend that state and local governments reciprocate that communication. 
  • Election experts, security officials, cybersecurity experts, and the media should develop a common set of precise and well-defined election security terms to improve communication.
  • DHS should expedite security clearances for appropriate state and local officials.
  • The Intelligence Community should work to declassify information quickly, whenever possible, to provide warning to appropriate state and local officials.

4. Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Systems

  • Cybersecurity should be a high priority for those managing election-related systems. Basic but crucial security steps like two-factor authentication for those logging into voter databases can improve the overall election security posture. States and localities should also take advantage of DHS offerings, to include DHS’s network monitoring capabilities.
  • The Committee recommends DHS take the following steps:
  • Working closely with election experts, develop a risk management framework that can be used in engagements with state and local election infrastructure owners to document and mitigate risks to all components of the electoral process. 
    • Create voluntary guidelines on cybersecurity best practices and a public awareness campaign to promote election security awareness, working through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).
    • Expand capacity to reduce wait times for DHS cybersecurity services.
    • Work with GSA to establish a list of credible private sector vendors who can provide services similar to those provided by DHS.
 

5. Build a Stronger Defense, Part IV: Take Steps to Secure the Vote Itself

  • States should rapidly replace outdated and vulnerable voting systems. At a minimum, any machine purchased going forward should have a voter-verified paper trail and no WiFi capability. If use of paper ballots becomes more widespread, election officials should re-examine current practices for securing the chain of custody of all paper ballots and verify no opportunities exist for the introduction of fraudulent votes.
  • States should consider implementing more widespread, statistically sound audits of election results.
  • DHS should work with vendors to educate them about the vulnerabilities of both the machines and the supply chains.

 

6. Assistance for the States

  • The Committee recommends Congress urgently pass legislation increasing assistance and establishing a voluntary grant program for the states.
  • States should use grant funds to improve cybersecurity by hiring additional Information Technology staff, updating software, and contracting vendors to provide cybersecurity services, among other steps. 
  • Funds should also be available to defray the costs of instituting audits.

 

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking Committee, issued a statement after the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on five Russian entities and 19 individuals for interference in the 2016 election:         

“This is a welcome, if long-overdue, step by the Trump Administration to punish Russia for interfering in the 2016 election. Our nation’s top intelligence officials have testified that Russia continues to interfere in our democracy, with no intention to stop. Yet these sanctions do not go far enough. Nearly all of the entities and individuals who were sanctioned today were either previously under sanction during the Obama Administration, or had already been charged with federal crimes by the Special Counsel. With the midterm elections fast approaching, the Administration needs to step it up, now, if we have any hope of deterring Russian meddling in 2018.”

 

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WASHINGTON – Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today made the following statement on Russia’s culpability in the nerve agent attack in England:

“We stand with our British allies and the rest of the civilized world in denouncing the brazen and brutal chemical attack carried out against the United Kingdom.  It has become clear that Russia is behind this effort to kill innocent civilians with a banned nerve agent.  This reckless and hostile act violates every international and diplomatic norm.  The Kremlin may deny it and spread misinformation through its propaganda machine, but we know the truth.  We must come together as a global community and stand against Russia and the malicious actions of the Putin regime.”

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued a statement following today's release of the Democratic House Intelligence Committee memo:  

"It is deeply unfortunate that House Republicans decided to the release classified information in order to mislead the American people for partisan political purposes. Americans deserve an accurate picture of the actions taken by the FBI, which were fully appropriate and entirely lawful. This memo makes clear that there is no reasonable basis to suggest otherwise, except to undermine the Special Counsel’s investigation. Now that the Nunes memo has been thoroughly debunked, the White House and its allies in Congress must put a stop to the dangerous partisan sideshows that jeopardize classified sources and methods and focus on Russia’s unprecedented interference in our election, which is a real and ongoing threat to our national security.??"



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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement today after the Special Counsel announced the indictment of 13 Russian nationals and three Russian companies for criminally interfering with the 2016 U.S. presidential election:

“The Senate Intelligence Committee, as a part of our bipartisan investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 election, has been focused on uncovering and exposing the role that social media disinformation played in that effort.

“I'm glad to see that work vindicated today by the Special Counsel’s indictment of the ‘Internet Research Agency,’ the Russian troll farm that was a key component of Russia’s attempts to interfere in the U.S. elections in 2016, and which continues to spew divisive and false content aimed at undermining the United States. With this indictment, the Special Counsel and his team have taken an important step to hold Russia accountable.

“As we heard this week from the nation’s top intelligence officials, Russia is still using social media to attack our democratic institutions and sow division amongst Americans. In Tuesday’s hearing, I was frustrated to hear that there is still no one leading a coordinated, organized effort within the intelligence community to monitor and combat Russian disinformation campaigns on social media. As Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I will continue pressing the nation’s intelligence leaders and the social media companies to be far more aggressive and proactive in responding to this threat.

 

“While platforms like Facebook and Twitter are allowing Americans to communicate and share ideas in ways unimaginable just a decade ago, we’re also learning that we each bear some responsibility for exercising good judgment and a healthy amount of skepticism when it comes to the things we read and share on social media.”

Sen. Warner has been a leader in recognizing the challenges posed by Russian use of social media. While companies like Facebook and Twitter initially denied that Russia used their platforms to influence the 2016 election, Warner publicly and privately pressed the companies to conduct thorough internal investigations of Russian misinformation and disinformation. In September, Facebook announced that the Internet Research Agency purchased approximately $100,000 worth of advertisements in connection with the 2016 election. Later estimates from the company found that as many as 150 million Americans may have been exposed to content from the Internet Research Agency. Twitter has also announced that at least 1.4 million people on Twitter engaged with content created by Russian trolls during the 2016 presidential election, and Google has uncovered evidence of Russian ad purchases and other activity on its platforms such as YouTube.

Russian use of misinformation and disinformation was the prime topic of the very first public hearing held by the Senate Intelligence Committee as part of its investigation. On March 30, 2017 – almost one year ago – the Committee held an open hearing on “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns.” On November 1, 2017, the Senate Intelligence Committee held a public hearing with the top legal officials from the three companies on “Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Elections.”

In October, Sen. Warner introduced  bipartisan legislation, the Honest Ads Act, to help prevent foreign interference in future elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the below statement on the release of the partisan, misleading memo seeking to discredit the Russia investigation:   

"The release of this memo by House Intelligence Committee Republicans and the White House, over the objections of the FBI and the Department of Justice, is reckless and demonstrates an astonishing disregard for the truth.

"This unprecedented public disclosure of classified material during an ongoing criminal investigation is dangerous to our national security. This will make it far more difficult for the Intelligence Committees to conduct meaningful, bipartisan oversight of intelligence activities in the future. This action was also taken without regard to the damage it could do to our ability to protect Americans from threats around the globe.

"Unlike almost every House member who voted in favor of this memo's release, I have actually read the underlying documents on which the memo was based. They simply do not support its conclusions.

"The Senate Intelligence Committee will continue our bipartisan investigation into what happened in the 2016 election and the dedicated men and women of the FBI continue to have my full support."

 

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Washington, DC – In a new letter to President Trump, top Senate and House Democrats today warned the president that using the newly-released partisan Nunes Memo as a pretext to fire either Special Counsel Bob Mueller or Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein – who is overseeing Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia investigation – would be considered an attempt to obstruct justice and spark a constitutional crisis not seen since the Saturday night massacre. 

The letter, signed by Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin, House Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer, Assistant Senate Democratic Leader Patty Murray, House Democratic Caucus Chair Joe Crowley, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark Warner, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Ranking Member Adam Schiff,  Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein and House Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Jerrold Nadler, notes that House Intel Chairman Devin Nunes’ selective and misleading partisan memo seeks to discredit the FBI and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, all as a means of protecting President Trump and undermining Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia investigation.

 

Text of the Democrats’ letter to President Trump can be found below:

 

Dear President Trump:

The decision to release a partisan and misleading memo over the objections of your own Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director and the Department of Justice (DOJ) was a transparent attempt to discredit the hard-working men and women of law enforcement who are investigating Russia’s interference with our Presidential election and that nation’s ties to your campaign. 

We are alarmed by reports that you may intend to use this misleading document as a pretext to fire Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, in an effort to corruptly influence or impede Special Counsel Bob Mueller’s investigation. 

We write to inform you that we would consider such an unwarranted action as an attempt to obstruct justice in the Russia investigation. Firing Rod Rosenstein, DOJ Leadership, or Bob Mueller could result in a constitutional crisis of the kind not seen since the Saturday Night Massacre. 

Sincerely,

 

Senator Chuck Schumer

Representative Nancy Pelosi

Senator Dick Durbin

Representative Steny Hoyer

Senator Patty Murray

Representative Joe Crowley

Senator Mark Warner

Representative Adam Schiff

Senator Dianne Feinstein

Representative Jerrold Nadler 

 

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on the New York Times report that President Trump ordered the firing of Special Counsel Robert Mueller last June:   

“I’ve said it before, and I am saying it again: firing the Special Counsel is a red line that the President cannot cross. Any attempt to remove the Special Counsel, pardon key witnesses, or otherwise interfere in the investigation, would be a gross abuse of power, and all members of Congress, from both parties, have a responsibility to our Constitution and to our country to make that clear immediately.”

Last month, Sen. Warner spoke on the floor of the U.S. Senate to warn of threats to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election and highlight the constitutional crisis that would likely ensue if the President were to interfere in the Mueller probe. 

 

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on the guilty plea by former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn:  

“The Special Counsel’s probe has found illegal behavior stretching into the senior most levels of the White House. Mike Flynn has pled guilty to criminal conduct, while he was serving as National Security Adviser to the President of the United States, involving his contact with Russian officials. This follows the guilty plea of a Trump campaign aide; charges against a Trump campaign manager; and charges against a key aide to the Trump campaign and transition.

“This guilty plea also comes on the heels of a new report about the President’s efforts to silence the independent, bipartisan Senate investigation into ties between Trump associates and Russia. It is part of an alarming pattern in which the President has already fired the FBI Director; pressured the Attorney General and top U.S. intelligence officials to interfere with an ongoing investigation; and contemplated issuing pardons for his associates or firing the special counsel, according to numerous press reports. Members of Congress from both parties must make clear that those actions would be fundamentally unacceptable and incompatible with the rule of law.

“The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence takes seriously our responsibility to continue a thorough, bipartisan probe that follows the facts wherever they may lead.”

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Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) led a group of 15 Senators in urging the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to take immediate action to improve transparency for political advertisements online. Today is the final day of a month-long comment period considering whether the FEC should update rules that currently exempt many online ads from the requirements applied to political ads that air on television and radio.

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on the indictments of former Trump campaign officials Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, and the news that former campaign adviser George Papadopoulos has pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI: 

“Today’s indictments of two top Trump campaign officials, including former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort, is a significant and sobering step in what will be a complex and likely lengthy investigation by the Special Counsel. That is why it is imperative that Congress take action now to protect the independence of the Special Counsel, wherever or however high his investigation may lead. Members of Congress, Republican and Democrat, must also make clear to the President that issuing pardons to any of his associates or to himself would be unacceptable, and result in immediate, bipartisan action by Congress.

“We have also learned this morning that, during this investigation, George Papadopoulos made false statements to the FBI about his contacts with Russians at the same time he was serving as an adviser to the Trump campaign. This is just the latest in a series of undisclosed contacts, misleading public statements, potentially compromising information, and highly questionable actions from the time of the Trump campaign that together, remain a cause for deep concern and continued investigation. 

“The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will continue its bipartisan probe into Russian meddling in the 2016 Presidential election.”  

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WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ranking Member of the Senate Rules Committee, U.S. Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services today introduced the Honest Ads Act to help prevent foreign interference in future elections and improve the transparency of online political advertisements.

 “Online political advertising represents an enormous marketplace, and today there is almost no transparency. The Russians realized this, and took advantage in 2016 to spread disinformation and misinformation in an organized effort to divide and distract us,” Senator Warner said. “Our bipartisan Honest Ads Act extends transparency and disclosure to political ads in the digital space. At the end of the day, it is not too much to ask that our most innovative digital companies work with us by exercising additional judgment and providing some transparency.” 

 “First and foremost this is an issue of national security – Russia attacked us and will continue to use different tactics to undermine our democracy and divide our country, including by purchasing disruptive online political ads. We have to secure our election systems and we have to do it now – the next election is only 383 days away,” Senator Klobuchar said. “This bipartisan legislation would help protect our democracy by updating our laws to ensure that political ads sold online are covered by the same rules as TV or radio stations – and make them public so Americans can see who is trying to influence them.”

 “In the wake of Russia’s attack on the 2016 election, it is more important than ever to strengthen our defenses against foreign interference in our elections,” said Senator McCain.“Unfortunately, U.S. laws requiring transparency in political campaigns have not kept pace with rapid advances in technology, allowing our adversaries to take advantage of these loopholes to influence millions of American voters with impunity. Our bipartisan legislation would address this serious challenge by expanding landmark campaign finance law to apply to internet and digital communications platforms that command a significant audience. I have long fought to increase transparency and end the corrupting influence of special interests in political campaigns, and I am confident this legislation will modernize existing law to safeguard the integrity of our election system.”

Russia attempted to influence the 2016 presidential election by buying and placing political ads on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Google. The content and purchaser(s) of those online advertisements are a mystery to the public because of outdated laws that have failed to keep up with evolving technology. The Honest Ads Act would prevent foreign actors from influencing our elections by ensuring that political ads sold online are covered by the same rules as ads sold on TV, radio, and satellite.

The Honest Ads Act enhances the integrity of our democracy by improving disclosure requirements for online political advertisements by:

  • Amending the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s definition of electioneering communication to include paid Internet and digital advertisements.
  • Requiring digital platforms with at least 50,000,000 monthly viewers to maintain a public file of all electioneering communications purchased by a person or group who spends more than $500.00 total on ads published on their platform. The file would contain a digital copy of the advertisement, a description of the audience the advertisement targets, the number of views generated, the dates and times of publication, the rates charged, and the contact information of the purchaser.
  • Requiring online platforms to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that foreign individuals and entities are not purchasing political advertisements in order to influence the American electorate. 

Companion legislation to the Honest Ads Act is being introduced today in the House of Representatives by Reps. Derek Kilmer (D-WA), Mike Coffman (R-CO).

“The 2016 elections exposed glaring holes in our ability to police foreign intervention in US elections, and this bill is an appropriate, bipartisan disclosure remedy,” said Trevor Potter, president of Campaign Legal Center (CLC), and a former Republican Chairman of the Federal Election Commission. “Voters have a right to be fully informed about who is trying to influence their vote, particularly foreign powers whose motives are contrary to American interests. The Honest Ads Act gives voters, journalists, and law enforcement officers important tools to help root out illegal foreign activity. The transparency this bill aims to provide in the 2018 elections and beyond will protect and enhance the integrity of our elections, which are the most fundamental component of American self-governance.”

“Ensuring transparency and accountability remain encoded into our democracy in the 21st century has taken on new importance and relevance in the wake of the 2016 election. We hope this bill, which merits serious consideration, catalyzes an overdue public debate and substantive action in Congress and the Federal Election Commission to create platform parity for political ad disclosure across TV, radio, print and Internet companies. Opacity by design is not an acceptable status quo for the technology giants that shape public knowledge and discourse with limited accountability,” said Alexander B. Howard, Deputy Director of the Sunlight Foundation.

“The bipartisan introduction of the Honest Ads Act is an important step toward bringing American campaign finance law into the internet age, by ensuring that online political advertisements are subject to the same kind of disclosure rules that already exist for ads on television and radio,” said Lawrence Norden, Deputy Director of the Brennan Center’s Democracy Program. “At a time when hostile foreign powers are trying to exploit loopholes in our campaign laws to manipulate American elections, it is especially important for Congress to come together across partisan lines to strengthen our democracy.  The Brennan Center applauds Senators Klobuchar, Warner and McCain for reaching across partisan lines to introduce this significant bill.”

“Americans have a right to know who is using political advertising to influence their votes and their views. As technology changes and political advertising shifts to online platforms, our transparency laws should keep pace. The recent revelations of Kremlin-connected influence operations on Facebook and Twitter underscore how important it is for Congress to take meaningful action. The HONEST Act is a critical step forward in enhancing the transparency of online political advertising. Common Cause commends Senators Klobuchar, Warner and McCain for their strong bipartisan leadership in introducing this important bill to bolster the integrity of our democracy,” said Karen Hobert Flynn, President of Common Cause.

As Ranking Member of the Senate Rules Committee with oversight jurisdiction over federal elections, Klobuchar has introduced legislation to improve the security of U.S. election systems and make commonsense improvements to election administration. She and Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) introduced the bipartisan Stop Foreign Donations Affecting Our Elections Act to strengthen disclosure by requiring federal campaigns to use existing credit card verification protocols to help verify that online credit card donations come from U.S. sources. Klobuchar and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) also introduced bipartisan legislation to help states block cyber-attacks, secure voter registration logs and voter data, upgrade election auditing procedures, and create secure and useful information sharing about threats. In June, Klobuchar introduced the Helping State and Local Governments Prevent Cyber Attacks Act to help combat foreign interference by providing state and local governments with the information and resources they need to keep our elections secure and improve voter confidence. 

As vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Warner has been at the forefront of the Committee’s ongoing bipartisan counterintelligence investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Warner also is the co-founder of the Senate’s bipartisan Cybersecurity Caucus. In addition, Sen. Warner is working to finalize bipartisan legislation to create a comprehensive, nationwide and uniform data breach standard, requiring timelier consumer notification for breaches of financial data and other sensitive information, and setting national data-protection standards for companies handling sensitive personal information.  

Senator McCain has been a champion of campaign finance reform for decades. As a lead author of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, he has long advocated of transparency in the American electoral process.  

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WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the Senate Banking Committee, released the following statement after the Senate voted to approve Russia sanctions legislation, sending it to the President for his signature:

“This bill passed with overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and the House, sending a strong message to Vladimir Putin that attacks on our democracy will not be tolerated.

“President Trump should sign this bill as soon as it hits his desk. Otherwise, he risks encouraging Russia’s interference in future elections.”

   

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