WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-founder of the Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, released the following statement after the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted to roll back cybersecurity regulations put in place following Salt Typhoon, the worst telecommunications cyberattack in our nation’s history:

“In the aftermath of the worst telecommunications compromise in our nation’s history, today’s vote by the FCC walks back yet another effort to set meaningful, enforceable cybersecurity standards for America’s communications backbone, after congressional Republicans overturned cybersecurity rules set by the FCC in 2017.

“The Salt Typhoon intrusion made clear that existing voluntary measures alone have not been sufficient to prevent sophisticated, state-sponsored actors from gaining long-term, covert access to critical networks. While collaboration with industry is essential, it must be paired with clear, enforceable expectations that reflect the scale of the threat.

“I am concerned that abandoning an enforceable, standards-based approach in favor of undefined ‘flexible’ solutions leaves us without a credible plan to address the gaps exposed by Salt Typhoon, including basic failures like credential reuse and the absence of multi-factor authentication for highly privileged accounts.

“Congress, the administration, and the FCC should be moving toward greater transparency and stronger protections, not less. I will continue pressing for a comprehensive national strategy to ensure that our telecommunications infrastructure is resilient against the kinds of intrusions we know are not hypothetical, but ongoing.”

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* High-quality photographs of Sen. Mark R. Warner are available for download here *

Photos may be used online and in print, and can be attributed to ‘The Office of Sen. Mark R. Warner’

WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Sens. Mark Warner (D-VA), Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Alex Padilla (D-CA), Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, wrote Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard regarding concerns that she may have directed the Intelligence Community (IC) to cease disclosing attempted foreign interference in U.S. elections and requested she provide an urgent briefing on foreign election threats. The Senators also demanded Gabbard clarify her comments made about alleged “evidence” of vulnerabilities to electronic voting systems and manipulation of election results, which has not been substantiated.

As the country approaches the 2026 federal midterm elections, the Senators highlighted the importance of protecting the United States from foreign influence, including cyber threats. Warner and Padilla pushed Gabbard and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate an IC briefing on these threats by October 10th, and requested a plan for defensive cybersecurity measures ahead of the 2025 and 2026 election cycles.

This year, Gabbard has made harmful and unsubstantiated statements about voting system vulnerabilities as the Trump Administration has dismantled election security efforts at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and curtailed the Congressionally authorized Foreign Malign Influence Center at ODNI. At a cabinet meeting in April, Gabbard claimed that she has “evidence” about voting manipulation in electronic voting machines, and on a right-wing podcast in July, she said that her office has evidence of voting machine vulnerabilities that it had not disclosed to the American public or Congress.

“As your testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March made clear, foreign adversaries continue to conduct influence activities to undermine public confidence in our election system and potentially even shape election outcomes,” wrote the senators. “While you have chosen not to release a declassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment for the 2024 U.S. Elections, the final Election Security Update ahead of Election Day noted that ‘Foreign actors – particularly Russia, Iran, and China – remain intent on’ pursuing efforts to undermine public confidence in our democratic system, including inciting violence among Americans. We are concerned that you may have directed the Intelligence Community (IC) to cease its intelligence reporting on this vital topic.”

“Given sustained efforts by the current Administration to dismantle CISA’s election security mission, including discontinuing funding to the critically important Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, over the bipartisan objections of Secretaries of State, your cyber vulnerability claims are puzzling and elicit justified skepticism, as well as concerns of politicization,” continued the senators. “Since taking office, the Administration paused CISA’s election security work, fired election security staff, and staff are reportedly afraid to work with state and local election officials and vendors for fear of retribution.”

Full text of the letter is available here and below:

Director Gabbard:

For the better part of the last decade, the Senate Rules Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have led efforts to educate the United States Senate, and the American public, about foreign threats to our elections. As your testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March made clear, foreign adversaries continue to conduct influence activities to undermine public confidence in our election system and potentially even shape election outcomes. While you have chosen not to release a declassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment for the 2024 U.S. Elections, the final Election Security Update ahead of Election Day noted that “Foreign actors – particularly Russia, Iran, and China – remain intent on” pursuing efforts to undermine public confidence in our democratic system, including inciting violence among Americans. We are concerned that you may have directed the Intelligence Community (IC) to cease its intelligence reporting on this vital topic.

As the election cycle for the 2026 federal mid-term elections gets underway, and multiple state contests have already begun, we write to request that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) coordinate an IC briefing for Senators on foreign election threats, including efforts to influence election outcomes through influence or cyber-enabled means. As part of that briefing, ODNI and the IC should also update the Senate on the status of planned defensive steps to ensure the cybersecurity of several state-wide elections in November 2025 and the mid-term elections in 2026.

In addition to an intelligence briefing on these threats, we invite you to clarify public statements that you have made about voting system security, which have generated significant confusion against the backdrop of efforts to dismantle key election security initiatives and programs at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and at the Foreign Malign Influence Center at ODNI. Specifically, at a cabinet meeting with the President on April 10, 2025, you stated that ODNI was “investigating” the issue of “election integrity”:

“We have evidence of how these electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a very long time and vulnerable to exploitation to manipulate the results of the votes being cast […].”

On July 31, 2025, you appeared on a partisan political podcast and repeated these claims, citing alleged information from CISA:

“[A] whistleblower who came forward who was working under CISA at that time which is responsible for critical infrastructure and trying to protect against cyber vulnerability and critical infrastructure, including of course the integrity of our elections. And what was interesting was seeing how this whistleblower brought forward information that CISA at the time – the federal government – was aware of vulnerabilities in our election machines but they chose not to disclose that information to the American people or administration at that time. […] We’re continuing to investigate this […].”

Given sustained efforts by the current Administration to dismantle CISA’s election security mission, including discontinuing funding to the critically important Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, over the bipartisan objections of Secretaries of State, your cyber vulnerability claims are puzzling and elicit justified skepticism, as well as concerns of politicization. Since taking office, the Administration paused CISA’s election security work, fired election security staff, and staff are reportedly afraid to work with state and local election officials and vendors for fear of retribution. In June, the Administration proposed to cut CISA’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget by $495 million and reduce its workforce by 30%. To date, CISA has failed to disclose its assessment of its election security work or its plans to secure future elections to Congress or the American people. According to public reports, you have also initiated a review of work of the Congressionally-authorized Foreign Malign Influence Center.

With significant elections occurring less than 60 days away, we ask that ODNI coordinate an IC briefing before October 10.

Sincerely,

WASHINGTON – Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) released the following statement on the firing of General Jeffrey Kruse as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 

“The firing of yet another senior national security official underscores the Trump administration’s dangerous habit of treating intelligence as a loyalty test rather than a safeguard for our country. General Kruse is a career military officer with decades of distinguished, non-partisan service to our nation, making this ouster all the more troubling.

“It is perhaps unsurprising that General Kruse’s removal as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency comes on the heels of a DIA assessment that directly contradicted the president’s claim to have ‘obliterated’ Iran’s nuclear program. That kind of honest, fact-based analysis is exactly what we should want from our intelligence agencies, regardless of whether it flatters the White House narrative. When expertise is cast aside and intelligence is distorted or silenced, our adversaries gain the upper hand and America is left less safe.”

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WASHINGTON – Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) released the following statement after Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard released plans to cut the office’s workforce:

“Twenty years after it was established, there is broad, bipartisan agreement that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is in need of thoughtful reform. The Intelligence Authorization Act directs Director Gabbard to submit a plan to Congress outlining her proposed changes, and we will carefully review her proposals and conduct rigorous oversight to ensure any reforms strengthen, not weaken, our national security. But given Director Gabbard’s track record of politicizing intelligence – including her decision just yesterday to revoke security clearances from career national security officials – I have no confidence that she is the right person to carry out this weighty responsibility.”

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WASHINGTON – Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) released the following statement after Senate Republicans voted 52-44 to confirm Joe Kent to head the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC):

“In May, Congress received clear written evidence that Mr. Kent, while serving as chief of staff to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, sought to manipulate intelligence to match a political narrative promoted by President Trump. His efforts to alter intelligence assessments in support of demonstrably false political claims is not only a gross violation of the solemn responsibility with which the intelligence community is charged, which is to speak truth to power regardless of politics, but it is also a threat to our ability to keep the nation safe. When intelligence is shaped to fit political agendas instead of hard facts, it blinds decision-makers to real threats, sows confusion among our allies, and emboldens our adversaries.

“With today’s party-line vote to confirm Mr. Kent to one of the nation’s most sensitive counterterrorism roles, the Senate missed an opportunity to hold the Trump administration accountable for openly politicizing intelligence – a precedent that, if left unchecked, threatens to erode trust in our intelligence agencies, compromise the integrity of national security assessments, and ultimately make Americans less safe.”

On May 21, the Senate Intelligence Committee received copies of emails indicating that Mr. Kent pressured career intelligence officials to revise and suppress analytical conclusions that contradicted public claims made by President Trump. Specifically, Kent pressed the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to rewrite findings about the relationship between Venezuela’s government and the criminal gang Tren de Aragua (TDA) “so this document is not used against the DNI or POTUS,” and to emphasize supposed ties between the Venezuelan government and TDA. Despite the pressure, the April 7 assessment issued by the NIC reaffirmed the original conclusion that Venezuela’s government “probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.” Shortly thereafter, the senior career analysts leading the NIC were dismissed from their positions by DNI Gabbard.

Sen. Warner spoke in opposition to Mr. Kent’s nomination on the Senate floor prior to the vote. Video of those remarks is available here.  

WASHINGTON – Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AK), and Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today released the following statements after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (IAA) today on a bipartisan 15-2 vote. The bill authorizes funding, provides legal authorities, and enhances oversight of national security threats and our United States Intelligence Community.

“This bipartisan bill provides the Intelligence Community the resources it needs to do its mission while ensuring that we maintain rigorous oversight of the IC’s activities. This year’s IAA responds to important concerns, including by enhancing protections for whistleblowers, and also safeguards our Nation’s critical infrastructure in the wake of the Salt Typhoon compromises.  At the same time, it readies the IC for the future by promoting IC energy resiliency through the deployment of nuclear technologies and enhancing the IC’s ability to detect and counter threats relating to biotechnologies and bioweapons,” said Sen. Warner. 

“I’d like to thank my colleagues for their tireless work on this bill that will go a long way towards keeping America safer and making the intelligence agencies charged with doing so more transparent and efficient. I am pleased this bill includes needed reforms and restructuring to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, restricts the travel of adversarial diplomats inside the United States, and protects Intelligence Community installations by adding further reviews to nearby land purchases which safeguards them against drone threats. This bill passed out of committee on a bipartisan basis and I hope my colleagues will support its passage by the full Senate,” said Sen. Cotton.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 will:

• Significantly reform and improve efficiencies and effectiveness within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the broader Intelligence Community;
• Require that visas be denied to certain nationals applying to work at the United Nations if they are known or suspected of being foreign intelligence officers or committing intelligence or espionage activities;
• Prohibit the Intelligence Community from contracting with Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research, development, or manufacturing;
• Codify tour and travel restrictions for Chinese, Russian Iranian and North Korean diplomats in the United States;
• Improve the Intelligence Community’s artificial intelligence capabilities and capacity and establish guidelines for the IC’s procurement and use of artificial intelligence;
• Shores up counter-intelligence risks posed by Salt Typhoon compromises of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure by leveraging IC procurement power;
• Strengthen the security of telecommunications networks by establish baseline cybersecurity requirements for vendors of telecommunications services to the IC;
• Establish authorities for protecting Central Intelligence Agency facilities from unmanned aircraft systems;
• Require the Intelligence Community to develop a policy for sharing biotechnological threats with U.S. agencies, allies, and private-sector partners, including on PRC efforts to acquire genomic data;
• Require the Director of National Intelligence to identify sites for deployment of advanced nuclear technologies;
• Establish a fund to support IC efforts to acquire and integrate emerging technologies proven to meet mission needs;
• Prohibit Intelligence Community contractors from collecting or selling Intelligence Community personnel location data;
• Support the Intelligence Community workforce by requiring the Director of National Intelligence to issue standard guidelines for Intelligence Community personnel to document and report Anomalous Health Incidents; 
• Enhance protections for, and congressional oversight of, Intelligence Community whistleblowers;
• Require the Director of National Intelligence to enhance efforts to counter narcotics trafficking with the Government of Mexico;
• Promote transparency by requiring the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a declassification review and publish intelligence relating to the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic;
• Streamline the construction of Intelligence Community facilities;
• Amend the Spectrum Relocation Fund authorization to clarify eligibility for Title 50 agencies that utilize spectrum and whose usage could be impacted by future reallocation decisions;
• Protect Americans’ privacy by statutorily requiring procedures governing the dissemination of U.S. identities and corresponding reporting requirements, as well as prohibits the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting intelligence on Americans; and
• Provide additional reviews for foreign purchases of land near IC facilities.

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WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee Jack Reed (D-RI), and Ranking Member on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Chris Coons (D-DE), led their committee colleagues in a letter to President Trump regarding the firing of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), General Timothy Haugh, as well as the reassignment of the Deputy Director of the NSA, Wendy Noble.

Joining Vice Chairman Warner and Ranking Members Reed and Coons in this letter are Sens. Patty Murray (D-WA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Gary Peters (D-MI), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), and Chris Murphy (D-CT).

“These actions severely compromise our ability to keep Americans safe. As you are well aware, our nation currently faces serious cyber threats from foreign adversaries, such as from China’s Salt Typhoon, with near-daily attacks against our critical infrastructure,” the senators wrote. “In addition, our nation’s military is engaged in ongoing operations against multiple threats, from the Houthis in Yemen to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Given the dangers facing the United States, it is inexplicable that the Administration would remove the senior leaders of NSA/CYBERCOM without cause or warning, and risk disrupting critical ongoing intelligence operations.”

The senators also highlighted the impact this move would have on the dual-hat arrangement, in which a single officer leads both the NSA and CYBERCOM, and stressed that prematurely severing this agreement could put U.S. national security at risk.

They continued, “Premature termination of the dual-hat arrangement would severely degrade the speed and effectiveness of NSA’s and CYBERCOM’s abilities to execute their missions and could have dire consequence for our national security. As Congress on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis has repeatedly made clear in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2017, 2018, and 2020, clear criteria must be met before any termination can be considered and both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must together certify that separation will not “pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the national security interests of the United States.”

As members of the key committees tasked with conducting oversight over NSA, the senators requested written justification for why Director Timothy Haugh and Ms. Wendy Noble were removed from their posts, and asked for a Congressional briefing regarding any additional actions the administration plans to take with respect to NSA and CYBERCOM, including but not limited to the separation of the dual-hat.

A copy of letter is available here and text is below.

Dear President Trump,

We write with alarm at the sudden and inexplicable firing of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, General Timothy Haugh, as well as the reassignment of the Deputy Director of the NSA, Wendy Noble. Not only have both dutifully served this nation for decades under both Democratic and Republican administrations, but their removals were conducted in the middle of the night with no consultation with Congress and, according to reports, at the behest of a private citizen who has a record of promoting conspiracy theories.

These actions severely compromise our ability to keep Americans safe. As you are well aware, our nation currently faces serious cyber threats from foreign adversaries, such as from China’s Salt Typhoon, with near-daily attacks against our critical infrastructure. In addition, our nation’s military is engaged in ongoing operations against multiple threats, from the Houthis in Yemen to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Given the dangers facing the United States, it is inexplicable that the Administration would remove the senior leaders of NSA/CYBERCOM without cause or warning, and risk disrupting critical ongoing intelligence operations.

Furthermore, we urge you to exercise careful consideration and consultation with Congress on any further actions that may impact NSA’s or CYBERCOM’s abilities to provide the critical intelligence and operational support to policymakers and warfighters. This includes, but is not limited to, any considerations to terminate the dual-hat arrangement. Premature termination of the dual-hat arrangement would severely degrade the speed and effectiveness of NSA’s and CYBERCOM’s abilities to execute their missions and could have dire consequence for our national security. As Congress on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis has repeatedly made clear in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2017, 2018, and 2020, clear criteria must be met before any termination can be considered and both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must together certify that separation will not “pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the national security interests of the United States.”

As Members of the respective committees of oversight, we request that you formally provide in writing a justification for why Director Timothy Haugh and Ms. Wendy Noble were removed from their posts and provide a briefing to Congress on any additional actions you plan to take with respect to NSA and CYBERCOM, including but not limited to the separation of the dual-hat.

Sincerely,

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BROADCAST-QUALITY VIDEO OF SEN. WARNER’S OPENING REMARKS IS AVAILABLE HERE

WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) delivered opening remarks at the Intelligence Committee’s annual Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing.

Sen. Warner’s opening remarks as delivered are below:

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, everybody, and I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.

I got to say, I've been on the committee now for 14 years, and this year's assessment is clearly one of the most complicated and challenging in my tenure on the committee.

And I want to get into that in a moment, but I want to, first of all, address the recent story that broke in the news.

Yesterday, we stunningly learned that senior members of this administration and according to reports, two of our witnesses here today, were members of a group chat that discussed highly sensitive and likely classified information that supposedly even included ‘weapons packages, targets and timing,’ and included the name of an active CIA agent.

Putting aside for a moment that classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it's also just mind boggling to me that all these senior folks were on this line and nobody bothered to even check, security hygiene 101...

Who are all the names? Who are they?

Well, it apparently includes a journalist.

And no matter how much the Secretary of Defense or others want to disparage him, this journalist had at least the ethics to not report everything he heard.

The question I raise is: everybody on this committee gets briefed on security protocols. They're told you don't make calls outside of SCIFs of this kind of classified nature.

Director Gabbard is the executive in charge of all keeping our secrets safe. Were these government devices? Or were they personal devices? Have the devices been collected to make sure there's no malware?

There’s plenty of declassified information that shows that our adversaries, China and Russia, are trying to break in to encrypted systems like Signal.

I can just say this. If this was the case of a military officer, or an intelligence officer, and they had this kind of behavior, they would be fired. I think this is one more example of the kind of sloppy, careless, incompetent behavior, particularly towards classified information, that this is not a one off or a first time error.

Let me take a couple of minutes and review some of the other reckless choices that this administration has made regarding our national security. We all recall it seems like it wasn't that long ago, but less than two months ago, in the first two weeks, the administration canceled all U.S. foreign assistance.

Now, some may say, how can that how bad can that be, its foreign assistance?

Well, U.S. foreign assistance paid for the units in Ukraine to provide air defense to civilian cities being attacked by Russia.

Foreign assistance paid for guarding camps in Syria, where ISIS fighters are to be detained.

Foreign assistance paid for programs abroad that ensure that diseases like Ebola don't come home.

And until recently, it paid for the construction of a railway in Africa that would have help given the United States much needed access to critical minerals in Congo.

Now that project… China is going to try to finance it as well.

In the first two weeks, the administration fired several of our most experienced FBI agents, including the head of the criminal Investigative submission, the head of the intelligence division, the head of the Counterterrorism division, the heads of the New York, Washington and Miami field office, all individuals who were distinctly and directly responsible for helping to keep America safe.

The irony a little bit, was the recently dismissed head of the counterterrorism division was involved in disrupting the ISIS attacks planned for Oklahoma City and Philadelphia and helped lead the effort to bring to justice the key planner of the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan, who killed 13 U.S. servicemen and 150 civilians.

That very Abbey Gate effort was actually praised by the president in his state of the Union address.

The administration’s response to these agents’ good works and years of service was to force these folks out.

It's hard to imagine how that makes our country safer.

Nor can I understand how Americans are made more secure by firing more than 300 staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, including those responsible for overseeing the security and safety of the nuclear stockpile, or by ousting 130 employees at CSA.

The agency directly responsible for trying to take on China's salt typhoon attack again. After Salt Typhoon, I would have thought folks on that group chat might have thought twice.

Or how are we made safer by sacking a thousand employees at the CDC and NIH. We're actually directly working on trying to keep our country safe from disease by pushing out hundreds of intelligence officers.

The amazing thing is our intelligence officers, they're not interchangeable like a Twitter coder. Our country makes $20,000 to $40,000 of an investment just in getting a security clearance.

It literally goes into six figures when you take the training involved. Can anyone tell how firing probationary individuals without any consideration for merit or expertise is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars?

And just to make clear that yesterday's story in the Atlantic was not this rookie one-off, it's a pattern.

I want to acknowledge Director Ratcliffe was not here in his position with this took place.

But again, earlier in the administration, when a new unclassified network was used, thereby exposing literally hundreds of CIA officers’ identities.

Those folks can't go into the field now.

How does that make our government more efficient?

You know, again, this pattern of an amazing, cavalier attitude towards classified information is reckless and sloppy.

And perhaps what troubles me most is the way the administration has decided that we can take on all of our problems by ourselves without any need for friends or allies.

I agree that we've got to put America's priorities first, but American first cannot mean America alone.

The intelligence we gather to keep Americans safe depends on a lot of allies around the world who have access to sources that we don't have.

That's sharing of information saves lives. And it's not hypothetical.

We all remember (because it was declassified) last year when Austria worked with our community to make sure to expose a plot against Taylor Swift in Vienna that could have killed literally hundreds of individuals.

However, these relationships are not built in stone. They're not dictated by law. Things like the Five Eyes are based on trust built on decades, but so often that trust is now breaking literally overnight.

Yet suddenly, for no reason that I can understand, the United States is starting to act like our adversaries are our friends. Voting in the UN with Russia, Belarus and North Korea. It's a rogues gallery if ever heard one.

Treating our allies like adversaries, whether it's threats to take over Greenland or over the Panama Canal, a destructive trade war with Canada, or literally threatening to kick Canada out of the Five Eyes, I feel our credibility is being enormously undermined with our allies, who I believe, and I think most of us on this committee, regardless of party believes, makes our country safer and stronger.

But how can our allies ever trust us as the kind of partner we used to be when we, without consultation or notice, for example, stop sharing information to Ukraine in its war for survival against Russia. Or how can our allies not only not trust our government, but potentially not our businesses with such arbitrary political decision?

Let me give you a few examples. You know, as a result of a lot of work from this committee and others in Congress, we made sure America's commercial space industry is second to none from space to launch to commercial sensing and communications.

The United States has taken a lead. Yet overnight, this administration called into question the reliability of American commercial tech industry.

When maps are and other commercial space companies were directed to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

I'm going to tell you… I’m a business guy. Can't say longer than being an elected official, but pretty close. That shockwave across all of commercial space and frankly, not just commercial space. I've heard it from some of our hyperscalers, in the tech community, has sent an enormous chill.

Who's going to hire an American commercial space company, government or foreign business with the ability to have that taken down so arbitrarily?

It's not just in the case of commercial space.

We've seen that Canada, Germany, Portugal have all been saying they're rethinking buying F-35s.

I've heard from Microsoft and Google directly, and Amazon that they're having questions about whether they can still sell their services.

We've also seen foreign adversaries and friends take advantage of this RIF in our national security areas, and our scientists.

Germany has already put out ads trying to attract some of our best scientists who've been RIFed and the Chinese intelligence agencies are posting on social media sites in the hopes of luring individuals with that national security clearance who've been pushed out, perhaps arbitrarily, to come into their service.

So, no, the signal fiasco is not a one off. It is, unfortunately, a pattern we're seeing too often repeated.

I fear that we feel the erosion of trust from our workplace, from our companies, and from our allies and partners can't be put back in the bottle overnight. Make no mistake, these actions make America less safe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released a statement after the Senate approved the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), sending the legislation to the president’s desk for his signature. The IAA authorizes funding, provides legal authorities, and enhances congressional oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).

“The annual intelligence authorization bill helps ensure that intelligence agencies have the authorities and resources they need to protect against rapidly evolving conflicts and threats,” said Chairman Warner. “This year’s IAA enhances the IC’s ability to identify and counter emerging technological threats posed by adversarial nations, including foreign adversaries’ efforts to use and dominate areas like artificial intelligence and biotechnology. The IAA also improves engagement between the IC and the private sector, promotes designations of foreign ransomware organizations as hostile cyber actors and furthers the Committee’s efforts to ensure the IC can attract and expeditiously on-board a talented, diverse, and trusted workforce to meet the emerging challenges we face.”  

Background:

The IAA for Fiscal Year 2025 authorizes funding for the IC and ensures that it has the resources, personnel, and authorities it needs to protect our country and inform decision makers, while ensuring continued robust congressional oversight. The bill’s provisions focus on the following key areas:

• Increases oversight of the national security threats posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its attempts to evade sanctions, as well as its military capabilities, and investments in, and attempts to dominate, supply chains. 
• Enhances the IC’s ability to identify and counter adversary threats relating to biotechnologies, including by improving and modernizing the roles, missions, and objectives of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and by standardizing the IC’s processes for collecting and analyzing biological data.  
• Improves the IC’s response to foreign ransomware organizations, including by promoting the designation of leading ransomware groups as hostile foreign cyber actors.
• Enhances policies relating to AI, including by establishing an AI Security Center within the National Security Agency to advance AI security research.
• Expands the IC’s ability to procure, transition, and incorporate emerging technologies, including by enhancing public-private talent exchanges.
• Increases the IC’s focus on the growing threats to the United States by ISIS and affiliated terrorist organizations.
• Requires the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy to advise National Laboratories regarding visitors and assignees who pose counterintelligence risks.
• Builds upon the Committee’s efforts relating to energy security by requiring a strategy to improve information sharing between the IC and the private sector regarding foreign adversary-based threats to U.S. critical minerals and other energy-related projects abroad.
• Requires the IC to conduct an assessment of the likely course of Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, and the effects of Western support to Ukraine.
• Requires the IC to conduct an assessment of the lessons learned by the IC with respect to the Israel-Hamas war.
• Improves oversight related to the Western Hemisphere, specifically when it comes to national security implications of visa-free travel by certain foreign nationals.
• Enhances insight into the Venezuela Maduro regime’s relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations.
• Increases support for IC recruitment and integration.
• Extends the requirement for annual reports on strikes against terrorist targets.
• Requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and Federal agency coordination.
• Reforms management of controlled access programs to improve congressional oversight.
• Maintains strong congressional oversight of and enhances protections for IC whistleblowers.

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) issued the statement below, following an election security update from the Director of National Intelligence. 

“It’s clear that our elections are in the bullseye of bad actors across the globe, and that foreign adversaries are only getting more and more serious about disrupting our democratic systems. Today’s latest update further highlights how foreign actors rely on commercial firms – including PR firms and technology enablers – to launder and refine their covert influence operations. It also, disturbingly, emphasizes the extent to which foreign actors – and particularly Russia – rely on both unwitting and witting Americans to promote foreign-aligned narratives in the United States. With 100 days left to go until the election, I welcome these ongoing unclassified updates from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It’s through this kind of increased transparency that we can arm the American public, civic leaders, and media platforms with the awareness needed to fight disinformation and safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes.”

WASHINGTON –Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA), U.S. Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX), and Sens. James Lankford (R-OK) and Mark Kelly (D-AZ) introduced the Enabling New Agile Buying-power and Leveraging Enhancements in Intelligence Community (ENABLE IC) Acquisitions Act, which would enable the IC to streamline acquisition processes and give priority to small business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors: 

“Our adversaries are rapidly advancing their technological capabilities, and so must we,” said Sen. Warner. “This legislation helps ensure that the Intelligence Community has the support, funding, and flexibility it needs to acquire and integrate the most cutting-edge emerging technologies to protect our national security.”

“There are important advancements in intelligence products being made in the private sector, but our intelligence agencies must fight bureaucratic delays throughout the acquisition process,” said Sen. Cornyn. “This legislation would give our Intelligence Community the flexibility it needs to speed up the acquisition of cutting-edge technologies and leverage American innovation across the country to get the most capable tools into the hands of our intelligence collectors and analysts.”

 “Our Intelligence Community works hard every day to protect our nation without any recognition or glory, but they are also fighting our own government with the amount of time it takes to process newer technology,” said Sen. Lankford. “The bad actors and foreign adversaries who are coming after us every day are not going to wait around while our Intelligence Community waits on bureaucratic delays. Our nation must have the ability to stop whatever new technology is being used against us without unnecessary delays.”

“Ensuring our Intelligence Community can get timely access to state-of-the-art products and tools will strengthen our national security and help us maintain an edge over adversaries,” said Sen. Kelly. “By cutting unnecessary red tape, our bill provides new acquisition options, further drives national security innovation, and ensures the U.S. is always one step ahead.”

Background:

In light of global threats to national security, acquisition leaders in the Intelligence Community must be able to explore the use of private capital partnerships to secure technological advantages for the intelligence community through the identification, development, and transfer of promising technologies to full-scale programs capable of meeting IC requirements.

This legislation would create a fund to assist in transitioning useful IC products from the research and development phase to the contracting and production phase, with priority given to small business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors. It would also enable the IC to use streamlined acquisition processes and enhances existing authorities to facilitate exchanges between the private sector and the IC.

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WASHINGTON – Today, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Mark R. Warner (D-VA) and Vice Chairman Marco Rubio (R-FL) released the following statement:

“The Senate Intelligence Committee has the intelligence in question, and has been rigorously tracking this issue from the start. We continue to take this matter seriously and are discussing an appropriate response with the administration. In the meantime, we must be cautious about potentially disclosing sources and methods that may be key to preserving a range of options for U.S. action.”

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